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El. knyga: Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs [Oxford Medicine Online E-books]

(Senior Lecturer in Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, University of Birmingham, UK)
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Delusions and Other Irrational BeliefsDidesnis paveikslėlis
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Delusions are a common symptom of schizophrenia and dementia. Though most English dictionaries define a delusion as a false opinion or belief, there is currently a lively debate about whether delusions are really beliefs and indeed, whether they are even irrational.
The book is an interdisciplinary exploration of the nature of delusions. It brings together the psychological literature on the aetiology and the behavioural manifestations of delusions, and the philosophical literature on belief ascription and rationality. The thesis of the book is that delusions are continuous with ordinary beliefs, a thesis that could have important theoretical and practical implications for psychiatric classification and the clinical treatment of subjects with delusions. By bringing together recent work in philosophy of mind, cognitive psychology and psychiatry, the book offers a comprehensive review of the philosophical issues raised by the psychology of normal and abnormal cognition, defends the doxastic conception of delusions, and develops a theory about the role of judgements of rationality and of attributions of self-knowledge in belief ascription.
Presenting a highly original analysis of the debate on the nature of delusions, this book will interest philosophers of mind, epistemologists, philosophers of science, cognitive scientists, psychiatrists, and mental health professionals.

Daugiau informacijos

Winner of Winner of the American Philosophical Association Book Prize 2011.
Synopsis xv
1 The background 1
1.1 Introduction to the project
1
1.2 Reflections on methodology
4
1.3 Introducing the rationality constraint
9
1.3.1 Interpretation and rationality
10
1.3.2 Features of beliefs
11
1.3.3 Rationality for beliefs
14
1.3.4 The rationality constraint on belief ascription
18
1.4 Introducing delusions
21
1.4.1 Definitions of delusions
23
1.4.2 Delusion formation
27
1.4.3 The two-factor theory
31
1.4.4 Delusions and self deception
37
1.4.5 Delusions and obsessive thoughts
41
1.4.6 Delusions and confabulations
43
1.4.7 Delusions and hypnotically induced beliefs
50
1.4.8 Delusions and irrational beliefs
55
Summary of chapter 1
59
2 Procedural rationality and belief ascription 61
2.1 Bad integration in delusions
62
2.1.1 Bad integration and meaning
64
2.1.2 Dissonance and double-bookkeeping
68
2.1.3 Delusions as imaginings or alternative realities
73
2.2 Bad integration in beliefs
77
2.2.1 Preference reversals
79
2.2.2 Beliefs about the probability of events
82
2.2.3 Dissonant beliefs
84
2.3 Recovery after 'Socratic tutoring'
86
2.3.1 Restoring rationality
86
2.3.2 Excuses for bad integration
88
2.3.3 Subscription to norms of rationality
90
2.3.4 Charity and explicability
92
2.4 The indeterminacy argument
96
2.4.1 Delusions and interpretation
97
2.4.2 Two notions of rationality
99
2.4.3 Interpreting in the real world
102
2.4.4 Heuristics versus constraints
107
Summary of chapter 2
109
3 Epistemic rationality and belief ascription 113
3.1 Delusions and epistemic rationality
115
3.1.1 Cognitive probing
116
3.1.2 Anti-doxastic arguments: delusions aren't probable explanations
118
3.1.3 Anti-doxastic arguments: delusions aren't responsive to evidence
121
3.2 Delusions and faulty reasoning
125
3.2.1 Empiricism and evidential support
126
3.2.2 Competence versus performance
128
3.2.3 Jumping to conclusions
133
3.2.4 Attributional biases: me and others
135
3.2.5 Resisting counterevidence
138
3.3 Badly supported beliefs
140
3.3.1 Beliefs about causes
140
3.3.2 Beliefs about intentions
143
3.3.3 Self-serving beliefs
146
3.4 Unrevisable beliefs
148
3.4.1 Racial prejudice
149
3.4.2 Religious beliefs and religious delusions
152
3.4.3 Conservatism
153
Summary of chapter 3
154
4 Agential rationality and belief ascription 159
4.1 Delusions and failure of action guidance
161
4.1.1 Are delusions action guiding?
162
4.1.2 Are delusions acceptances?
167
4.2 Beliefs and failure of action guidance
171
4.2.1 Hypocrisy
172
4.2.2 Poor self prediction
173
4.3 Delusions and failure of reason-giving
175
4.3.1 Authorship and agential rationality
176
4.3.2 Are delusions authored?
178
4.3.3 Giving reasons: deliberation and justification
183
4.4 Delusions and framework beliefs
187
4.4.1 Can we author framework beliefs?
188
4.4.2 Are delusions framework beliefs?
190
4.4.3 Do delusions conflict with framework beliefs?
193
4.4.4 Can framework beliefs be justified and revised?
195
4.5 Beliefs and failure of reason-giving
197
4.5.1 Bad reasons for attitudes
198
4.5.2 Dating couples
201
Summary of chapter 4
203
5 Beliefs and self knowledge 207
5.1 Authorship and first-person authority
209
5.1.1 Routes to knowledge of the self
210
5.1.2 The deliberative stance
212
5.1.3 Authorship challenged
214
5.1.4 Rationality and stability of attitudes
217
5.1.5 Causal efficacy
219
5.1.6 Knowing why
222
5.1.7 Authorship rescued
225
5.2 'Inserted' thoughts
227
5.2.1 What is thought insertion?
228
5.2.2 Thought insertion as a failure of ownership
231
5.2.3 Thought insertion as a failure of endorsement
235
5.3 Self narratives
242
5.3.1 Self narratives: truth or fiction?
242
5.3.2 Delusions: bad scientific theories or unreliable autobiographies?
247
5.3.3 Mental time travel and agency
250
5.3.4 Coherence versus correspondence
253
Summary of chapter 5
256
6 Conclusions 259
6.1 On delusions
259
6.2 On beliefs
261
6.2.1 Beliefs are integrated in a system and have some inferential relations with other intentional states
262
6.2.2 Beliefs are sensitive to evidence or argument
262
6.2.3 Beliefs can be manifested in behaviour
264
6.2.4 Beliefs can be self ascribed and some beliefs can be defended with reasons
264
Bibliography and reference list 267
Index 295
Lisa Bortolotti is Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Birmingham (UK). Her main research interests are in the philosophy of the cognitive sciences and in the intersection between philosophy of mind and ethics. She has published a number of articles on belief ascription, rationality and delusions in journals such as Mind & Language and Philosophical Psychology. She is the author of An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science for Polity Press, the editor of Philosophy and Happiness for Palgrave and the co-editor (with M.R. Broome) of Psychiatry as Cognitive Neuroscience: Philosophical Perspectives for Oxford University Press.
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