Atnaujinkite slapukų nuostatas

El. knyga: Economic Analysis of the Rise and Decline of Chinese Township and Village Enterprises

DRM apribojimai

  • Kopijuoti:

    neleidžiama

  • Spausdinti:

    neleidžiama

  • El. knygos naudojimas:

    Skaitmeninių teisių valdymas (DRM)
    Leidykla pateikė šią knygą šifruota forma, o tai reiškia, kad norint ją atrakinti ir perskaityti reikia įdiegti nemokamą programinę įrangą. Norint skaityti šią el. knygą, turite susikurti Adobe ID . Daugiau informacijos  čia. El. knygą galima atsisiųsti į 6 įrenginius (vienas vartotojas su tuo pačiu Adobe ID).

    Reikalinga programinė įranga
    Norint skaityti šią el. knygą mobiliajame įrenginyje (telefone ar planšetiniame kompiuteryje), turite įdiegti šią nemokamą programėlę: PocketBook Reader (iOS / Android)

    Norint skaityti šią el. knygą asmeniniame arba „Mac“ kompiuteryje, Jums reikalinga  Adobe Digital Editions “ (tai nemokama programa, specialiai sukurta el. knygoms. Tai nėra tas pats, kas „Adobe Reader“, kurią tikriausiai jau turite savo kompiuteryje.)

    Negalite skaityti šios el. knygos naudodami „Amazon Kindle“.

This book provides a historical economic analysis of two key issues relating to township and village enterprise (TVE) development in China. Firstly, the nature of the evolving relationship between TVEs and local government; in particular how TVE entrepreneurs have used institutionalized power to secure the political influence needed to defend their financial independence. Secondly, the relationship between TVEs and state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and the role of SOEs in China’s economic transition.

This study highlights the importance of the role of SOEs in the “dual-track pricing system” and its impact on other parts of the economy. Township and village enterprises were key to China's success in the late twentieth century, but have more or less disappeared as an entity over the past decade or so. By measuring the structural difference of the SOE sector before and after 1998–2003 SOE reform, Jin explains their fast catch-up in productivity since the mid-1990s, as well as

the relative decline of TVE productivity.



1 Introduction
1(18)
1.1 Township and Village Enterprise and Economic Duality
1(3)
1.2 Implications of TVE Studies: Macro and Micro Perspectives
4(2)
1.3 Empirical and Theoretical Considerations: The Definition of Economic Environment
6(2)
1.4 Research Method and Methodology
8(4)
1.4.1 Definition of Township and Village Enterprise
8(2)
1.4.2 Official Data Sources
10(1)
1.4.3 Empirical Studies and the Using of Data
10(2)
1.5 The Purpose of This Study and the Structure of the Book
12(7)
References
14(5)
2 TVEs: Theories and Methodology
19(28)
2.1 A Brief Introduction to TVEs
19(1)
2.2 A General Macro-Level Theory Review
20(8)
2.2.1 Economic Growth and Economic Transition
20(3)
2.2.2 M-Form Theory and Fiscal Feudalism
23(2)
2.2.3 State Corporatism and Joint Liability
25(1)
2.2.4 Economic Environment and Ambiguous Property Rights
26(2)
2.3 Comments on Macro Issues and Theories
28(4)
2.4 Micro-Theory: Ownership Structure and Entrepreneurship
32(4)
2.5 Implications
36(6)
2.5.1 Junction of Institutions: The Represented M-Form Theory
36(2)
2.5.2 Alternative Institutions
38(1)
2.5.3 Macro and Micro: Economic Reform and Organizational Change
39(3)
2.6 Conclusion
42(5)
References
43(4)
3 Township and Village Enterprises: History and Institutions (1958--1997)
47(40)
3.1 Introduction
47(3)
3.2 Commune-Brigade Enterprises (CBEs) in the Pre-reform Period: 1958--1978
50(8)
3.2.1 The Origin of CBEs
50(2)
3.2.2 CBE Operation Under Central Planning Economy
52(2)
3.2.3 CBE Institutions: Strengths and Weaknesses
54(2)
3.2.4 CBE and Central Government Decentralization
56(2)
3.3 From Commune---Brigade Enterprises (CBEs) to Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs): 1978--1984
58(11)
3.3.1 1978 Reform and Its Institutional Foundations
58(3)
3.3.2 Decentralization and Liberalization
61(3)
3.3.3 The Role of Local Government in the Creation of CBE Property Rights
64(2)
3.3.4 The Transformation of CBEs into TVEs
66(3)
3.4 The Golden Age of TVEs: 1984--1997
69(10)
3.4.1 The Development of TVEs and Their Increasingly Important Role in the Chinese Economy
69(1)
3.4.2 Changes in Fundamental Institutions and the Local Government
70(2)
3.4.3 The Financial Market: TVEs and the Banking Sector
72(2)
3.4.4 The Firm: State Relationship---The Different Roles of Central and Local Government
74(2)
3.4.5 Changes in Central-Local Government Relationship and Their Impacts on TVEs
76(2)
3.4.6 TVE Privatization in the Late 1990s
78(1)
3.5 Conclusion
79(8)
References
83(4)
4 Ownership Structure of TVEs: TVE and Local Politics
87(26)
4.1 Introduction
87(5)
4.1.1 TVE Property Rights: Two Issues
87(2)
4.1.2 Problems with the Ambiguous Property Rights Approach
89(1)
4.1.3 Problems with TVE Institutions
90(2)
4.2 From CBE to TVE: Changes in Incentives
92(4)
4.2.1 Pattern Classification of Pre-reform CBEs
92(2)
4.2.2 The Impact of Reform and CBE Transformation
94(2)
4.3 The Nature of TVE Property Rights
96(11)
4.3.1 TVE: An Interloper in the Central Planning System
96(2)
4.3.2 Why Local Politics Matter
98(3)
4.3.3 Why TVE Patterns Matter
101(3)
4.3.4 Political Costs
104(2)
4.3.5 Institutional Conditions of TVE Development
106(1)
4.4 Conclusion
107(6)
References
5 The Fall and Rise of State-Owned Enterprises (I): The Dual-Track Price System
113(28)
5.1 Introduction
113(2)
5.2 The Dual-Track System: The Pre-1998 Economy and SOEs
115(9)
5.2.1 The Origin of the Dual-Track System
115(3)
5.2.2 The Nature of the Dual-Track System
118(2)
5.2.3 Problems with the Dual-Track Price System: 1992 and the Factors Leading to the 1998 SOE Reform
120(4)
5.3 SOEs After 1998: Monopoly and Primogeniture of the State
124(10)
5.3.1 Restructuring SOEs: Zhua Da Fang Xiao
124(2)
5.3.2 The Rise of the Power of the Centre and Bank Reform
126(3)
5.3.3 Impacts of 1998-2003 SOE Reform
129(3)
5.3.4 Impacts of Banking Industry Reform to TVEs
132(2)
5.4 The Rise of SOEs: Accident or Inevitability?
134(7)
References
137(4)
6 The Fall and Rise of State-Owned Enterprises (II): The Institutional Root of the Chinese Dual Head Economy
141(28)
6.1 How to Measure and Identify Successful SOEs
141(2)
6.2 From Central Planning to Dual-Track
143(7)
6.2.1 The Legacy of the Central Planning System
143(2)
6.2.2 The Central Planning System and the State Sector
145(2)
6.2.3 Why Did the Dual-Track System Work?
147(3)
6.3 The Logic of SOE Reform: From Dual-Track System to State Monopoly
150(6)
6.3.1 The De-linking Between SOEs and the State's Fiscal Income
150(2)
6.3.2 Restructuring Central and Local SOEs
152(1)
6.3.3 SOEs After Reform
153(3)
6.4 The Nature of the Chinese State Sector: From Dual-Track System to State Monopoly
156(7)
6.4.1 SOEs and the Market: The Logic of Chinese SOE Reform
156(2)
6.4.2 The Role of Regulator
158(2)
6.4.3 Central Planning and State Monopoly: Conditions and Implications
160(3)
6.5 Conclusion
163(6)
References
166(3)
7 TVE and the Economic Environment
169(26)
7.1 Market Environment: Is There a Chinese Index?
169(3)
7.2 The `Old' Reform
172(11)
7.2.1 The Economic Environment: The State Sector as the Dominant Component
172(2)
7.2.2 The gongxiaoyuan (`Salesman') Phenomenon
174(3)
7.2.3 The Rule of the State Sector: Dual-Track Pricing
177(4)
7.2.4 The Economic Environment for TVEs: Characteristics of the Pre-1998 Reform
181(2)
7.3 The `New' Reform
183(5)
7.3.1 TVEs and the Impact of the 1998-2003 SOE Reforms
183(3)
7.3.2 Late 1990s: Privatization and the Economic Environment
186(2)
7.4 The Nature of the Chinese Economic Environment
188(7)
References
192(3)
8 Conclusions
195(14)
8.1 Structure of This Book
195(1)
8.2 Conclusion I: The Micro Structure of TVE Ownership
196(5)
8.2.1 Problems with Principal-Agent Model-Based Approach
196(2)
8.2.2 An Alternative Explanation: The Entrepreneur's Political Role
198(3)
8.3 Conclusion II: SOE Sector as the Economic Environment
201(4)
8.3.1 SOE and Dual-Track System as Economic Environment
201(3)
8.3.2 The Demise of the Dual-Track System and State Sector Reform
204(1)
8.4 Conclusion
205(4)
References
207(2)
Index 209
Cheng Jin is Associate Research Fellow in the Institute of Public Policy at the South China University of Technology, China. His research areas include imperial Chinas land market, and Chinas fiscal management from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century.