| Series Foreword |
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ix | |
| Preface |
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xi | |
| Acknowledgments |
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xv | |
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1 Radical Human Enhancement as a Transformative Change |
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1 | (16) |
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Transformative Change and Invasion of the Body Snatchers |
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5 | (5) |
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The Rational Irreversibility of Some Transformative Changes |
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10 | (4) |
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Positive and Negative Transformative Changes |
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14 | (1) |
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Radical Enhancement as a Negative Transformative Change |
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15 | (2) |
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2 Two Ideals of Human Enhancement |
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17 | (16) |
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Defining Human Enhancement |
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18 | (2) |
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The Objective Ideal of Human Enhancement |
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20 | (6) |
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The Instrumental and Intrinsic Value of Human Capacities |
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26 | (1) |
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Anthropocentric Ways of Evaluating Enhancements |
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27 | (6) |
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3 What Interest Do We Have in Superhuman Feats? |
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33 | (22) |
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The Value of Enhanced Marathons |
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34 | (2) |
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36 | (8) |
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Is Human Enhancement the Right Way to Pursue External Goods? |
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44 | (6) |
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Is the Distinction between Internalizing and Externalizing Enhancement Philosophically Principled? |
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50 | (5) |
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4 The Threat to Human Identities from Too Much Enhancement |
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55 | (26) |
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Two Psychological Accounts of Personal Identity |
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56 | (1) |
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A Threat to Identity from Life Extension |
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57 | (3) |
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Radical Enhancement and Autobiographical Memory |
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60 | (2) |
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How Does Autobiographical Memory Work? |
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62 | (4) |
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An Asymmetry in Our Attitudes toward Past and Future |
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66 | (3) |
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The Tension between Enhancement and Survival |
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69 | (1) |
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The Analogy with Childhood |
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70 | (5) |
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Why Radical Enhancement Is More Psychologically Disruptive Than Growing Up |
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75 | (1) |
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The Regress Problem: The Tragedy of Unending Enhancement |
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76 | (5) |
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5 Should We Enhance Our Cognitive Powers to Better Understand the Universe and Our Place in It? |
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81 | (32) |
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Understanding the Consequences of Cognitive Enhancement for Science |
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84 | (4) |
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Two Ways in Which Human Science and Radically Enhanced Science Might Be Fundamentally Different |
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88 | (1) |
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Differences in Idealization as Fundamental Differences between Human and Radically Enhanced Science |
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89 | (4) |
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Idealizations That Enhance the Power of Scientific Explanations |
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93 | (2) |
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Mathematics as a Bridge between Human and Radically Enhanced Science |
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95 | (2) |
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Human Science, Radically Enhanced Science, and the Theory of Everything |
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97 | (1) |
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Dawkins and Haldane versus Deutsch on the Limits of Human Science |
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98 | (4) |
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How Different Idealizations Generate Different Theories of Everything |
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102 | (3) |
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Valuing Human Science and Radically Enhanced Science |
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105 | (1) |
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Radical Enhancement Reduces the Intrinsic Value of Our Cognitive Faculties |
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106 | (3) |
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What of Scientific Enhancement's Instrumental Benefits? |
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109 | (4) |
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6 The Moral Case against Radical Life Extension |
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113 | (24) |
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Two Kinds of Anti-Aging Research |
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114 | (3) |
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The SENS Response to the Seven Deadly Things |
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117 | (3) |
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Is Aging Really a Disease? |
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120 | (2) |
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122 | (4) |
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Why WILT (and Other SENS Therapies) Will Require Dangerous Human Trials |
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126 | (3) |
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Where to Find Human Guinea Pigs for SENS |
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129 | (2) |
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Will Volunteer Risk Pioneers Help Out? |
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131 | (4) |
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Ethical Anti-Aging Experiments Not Now, but Some Day? |
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135 | (2) |
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7 A Defense of Truly Human Enhancement |
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137 | (20) |
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The Ubiquity of Human Enhancement |
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139 | (3) |
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142 | (1) |
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Defining Genetic Enhancement |
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143 | (1) |
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The Interactionist View of Development |
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144 | (2) |
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Six Ways in Which Genetic Enhancements Could Turn Out to Be More Morally Problematic Than Environmental Enhancements (but, in Fact, Do Not) |
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146 | (8) |
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The Ideal of Truly Human Enhancement |
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154 | (3) |
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8 Why Radical Cognitive Enhancement Will (Probably) Enhance Moral Status |
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157 | (24) |
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Enhancing Moral Status versus Enhancing Moral Dispositions |
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158 | (1) |
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Why It's So Difficult to Enhance the Moral Status of Persons |
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159 | (1) |
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A justification for (Talking about) Moral Statuses |
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160 | (1) |
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Three Obstacles to Moral Enhancement |
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161 | (4) |
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(1) The Problem of the Logic of Thresholds |
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161 | (2) |
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(2) The Problem of How to Improve upon Inviolability |
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163 | (1) |
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(3) The Problem of Expressing Moral Statuses Higher Than Personhood |
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164 | (1) |
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Three Attempts to Describe Higher Moral Statuses |
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165 | (2) |
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DeGrazia's Dispositionally Superior Post-Persons |
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167 | (2) |
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McMahan's Freer, More Conscious Post-Persons |
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169 | (4) |
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Douglas's Enhanced Cooperators |
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173 | (1) |
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Criteria for Higher Moral Statuses and the Expressibility Problem |
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174 | (2) |
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Why Cognitively Enhanced Beings Are Probably Better Than Us at Judging Relative Moral Status |
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176 | (1) |
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Why Sufficiently Cognitively Enhanced Beings Will (Probably) Find That Cognitive Differences between Them and Us Mark a Difference in Moral Status |
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177 | (1) |
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Two Hypotheses about Higher Moral Statuses |
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178 | (3) |
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9 Why Moral Status Enhancement Is a Morally Bad Thing |
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181 | (14) |
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182 | (2) |
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Why a Change in Relative Moral Status Is Likely to Lead to Significant Harms for Human Mere Persons |
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184 | (5) |
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Why Post-Persons Will Probably Identify Many Supreme Opportunities Requiring the Sacrifice of Mere Persons |
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189 | (1) |
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What Complaint Can Mere Persons Make about the Harms They Suffer in Mixed Societies? |
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190 | (3) |
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Why a Loss of Relative Status Is Unlikely to Be Adequately Compensated |
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193 | (2) |
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10 A Technological Yet Truly Human Future---as Depicted in Star Trek |
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195 | (6) |
| Notes |
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201 | (12) |
| Index |
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213 | |
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