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El. knyga: Addiction and Weakness of Will [Oxford Medicine Online E-books]

(Lecturer in Philosophy, University of Kent, Canterbury, and Affiliated Lecturer, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Cambridge, UK)
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The way in which society views addiction underlies how it treats, understands, blames, or even punishes those with addictive behaviours.

This thought-provoking new book presents an original philosophical analysis bringing together addiction and weakness of will. Within the book, the author develops an integrated account of these two phenomena, rooted in a classical conception of akrasia as valuing without intending and at the same time intending without valuing. This fascinating and suggestive account addresses a number of paradoxes faced by current thinking about addiction and weakness of will, in particular the significance of control and intention for responsible action.

Addiction and Weakness of Will makes an original contribution to central issues in moral psychology and philosophy of action, including the relationship between responsibility and intentional agency, and the nature and scope of moral appraisal. The book is valuable for philosophers, ethicists and psychiatrists with an interest in philosophy.
Introduction: The moral psychology of addiction and weakness of will ix
1 Addiction and voluntary control
1(32)
1.1 Wallace on responsibility and control
3(2)
1.2 The disparity of actions and attitudes
5(5)
1.3 Responsibility for addiction: Excuses and exemptions
10(8)
1.4 Responsible actions and omissions revisited
18(9)
1.5 Positive moral appraisal
27(6)
2 Addiction and rational judgment
33(34)
2.1 Smith on responsibility for attitudes
34(4)
2.2 Responsible irrationality
38(10)
2.2.1 Conflicting attitudes
41(4)
2.2.2 Implications for paradigm cases: Patterns of awareness and wholehearted attitudes
45(3)
2.3 Is responsibility best understood as a cluster concept?
48(6)
2.4 Addiction and agential evaluative stance
54(13)
2.4.1 De Quincey: Confessions of an English Opium-Eater
55(5)
2.4.2 Dostoevsky: The Gambler
60(7)
3 Weakness of will and moral appraisal
67(28)
3.1 Arpaly on responsibility in the absence of control
68(3)
3.2 Standard akrasia
71(9)
3.3 Inverse akrasia
80(11)
3.3.1 Inept Burglar
80(2)
3.3.2 Neoptolemus
82(3)
3.3.3 Huckleberry Finn
85(6)
3.4 Strength versus goodness of will
91(4)
3.4.1 Mizogushi
91(4)
4 Before weakness of will
95(24)
4.1 Holton on weakness of will
96(1)
4.2 Aristotle on akrasia
97(13)
4.2.1 The logical form of akrasia
98(4)
4.2.2 The blameworthiness of akrasia
102(3)
4.2.3 The pre-intentionality of akrasia
105(5)
4.3 Revisiting weakness of will
110(5)
4.4 Weakness of will as a failure to resist akrasia
115(4)
5 Addiction and weakness of will: An integrated account
119(21)
5.1 Action as actualization
120(4)
5.2 Success in action and the guise of the good
124(6)
5.3 Less than successful actions
130(3)
5.4 Concluding remarks: The offspring of akrasia
133(7)
References 140(6)
Index 146
Lubomira Radoilska's research has focused on developing a new theory of autonomous agency and exploring its implications in core areas of philosophy. She holds a doctorate in philosophy from Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS), Paris. Since 2003, she has held the following positions at the University of Cambridge: Research Fellow at Clare Hall, Director of Studies at New Hall and Downing College, and Wellcome Trust Fellow at the Faculty of Philosophy, where she is currently an Affiliated Lecturer. Since September 2003, she also holds a Lectureship in Philosophy at the University of Kent, Canterbury. Lubomira Radoilska is the author of 'Aristotle and the Moral Philosophy of Today' (PUF, 2007) and editor of 'Autonomy and Mental Disorder' (OUP, 2012).