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El. knyga: Al-Jazeera's "e;Double Standards"e; in the Arab Spring: A Peace Journalism Analysis (2011-2021)

  • Formatas: EPUB+DRM
  • Išleidimo metai: 14-Dec-2022
  • Leidėjas: Palgrave Macmillan
  • Kalba: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9783031142796
  • Formatas: EPUB+DRM
  • Išleidimo metai: 14-Dec-2022
  • Leidėjas: Palgrave Macmillan
  • Kalba: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9783031142796

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This book finds that Al-Jazeera’s coverage of Bahrain and Syria has conformed with Qatar’s foreign policy, throughout the last decade (2011-2021). Al-Jazeera Arabic adopted Qatar’s “double standards” policy in both countries in the beginning of the Arab Spring, framing Bahrain’s protests as a “sectarian movement,” while depicting the Syrian armed conflict as a legitimate “revolution” (2011-2013). The book observes that when ties between Qatar and Bahrain worsened during the 2017 Gulf crisis, Al-Jazeera Arabic has shifted its coverage from being “pro-Bahraini regime” to “pro-protesters,” focusing on violations and giving voice to activists (2014-2021). The book concludes that the lack of “Peace Journalism” framing in Al-Jazeera’s coverage of Bahrain’s uprising and Syria’s chemical weapons attacks has represented “claims” as “facts,” and justified military action against Syria. It also reveals distinctive differences between Al-Jazeera Arabic and English, with the former lacking “objective reporting standards,” and using more sectarian language than the latter.

1 Why "Peace Journalism" and Why Al-Jazeera's Coverage of Bahrain and Syria?
1(24)
1.1 Introduction
1(2)
1.2 Peace Journalism Model
3(1)
1.3 Research Design
4(6)
1.3.1 Case Studies
4(6)
1.4 Theoretical Framework and Methodology
10(4)
1.4.1 Peace Journalism Orientations
10(2)
1.4.2 Peace Journalism Frames
12(1)
1.4.3 Evaluative Criteria of Peace Journalism Frames
13(1)
1.5 Research Questions
14(1)
1.6 Book's Significance
15(1)
1.7 Outline of Book
Chapters
16(9)
References
19(6)
2 Al-Jazeera's Relationship with Qatar Before, During and After the Arab Spring (1996--2021)
25(28)
2.1 Introduction
25(2)
2.2 Al-Jazeera's Sponsor
27(1)
2.3 Al-Jazeera's Independence
28(2)
2.4 Why Was Al-Jazeera Founded?
30(2)
2.5 Al-Jazeera's Coverage of Conflicts
32(1)
2.6 Foundation of Al-Jazeera English
33(3)
2.7 Differences Between Al-Jazeera Arabic and English
36(1)
2.8 Al-Jazeera's Role Before the Arab Spring: Qatar's Public Diplomacy
37(4)
2.8.1 New Public Diplomacy
39(1)
2.8.2 Hybrid Diplomacy
40(1)
2.9 Al-Jazeera's Role After the Arab Spring: Qatar's Propaganda
41(3)
2.10 Conclusion
44(9)
References
46(7)
3 Peace Journalism Model: Characteristics, Misconceptions and Challenges
53(38)
3.1 Introduction
53(1)
3.2 Definition of Peace Journalism
54(1)
3.3 Evolving of Peace Journalism Characteristics
55(2)
3.3.1 Galtung's Table
55(1)
3.3.2 Two-Stage Strategy
56(1)
3.3.3 Shinar's Five Headings
56(1)
3.3.4 Good Journalism
56(1)
3.4 Critics of Galtung's Peace Journalism Model
57(4)
3.4.1 Gilboa's Three-Dimensional Framework
57(2)
3.4.2 Actor-Event Framework
59(1)
3.4.3 Reconciliatory Function Characteristics
60(1)
3.5 Expanding Peace Journalism Model
61(1)
3.5.1 Gender Awareness
61(1)
3.5.2 Human Rights Journalism
62(1)
3.6 Epistemology of Peace Journalism
62(4)
3.6.1 Critical Realism
62(2)
3.6.2 Critical Pragmatism
64(2)
3.7 "Which Facts Are Allowed Through the Gate?"
66(2)
3.8 Peace Journalism and Objectivity
68(4)
3.8.1 Feedback Loop
68(2)
3.8.2 Objectivity Regime
70(1)
3.8.3 Objectivity and Propaganda
71(1)
3.9 Peace Journalism and Advocacy Role
72(3)
3.9.1 Good Journalism or Advocacy Journalism?
72(2)
3.9.2 Advocacy Frameworks
74(1)
3.10 Challenges Facing Peace Journalism
75(5)
3.10.1 News Values
75(1)
3.10.2 Media Structure
76(3)
3.10.3 Journalists
79(1)
3.11 Possibility of Practising Peace Journalism
80(2)
3.12 Audience Responses
82(1)
3.13 Conclusion
83(8)
References
85(6)
4 Theoretical Framework and Research Questions
91(52)
4.1 Introduction
91(1)
4.2 Theoretical Framework
92(5)
4.2.1 Peace Journalism Frames
92(3)
4.2.2 Evaluative Criteria of Peace Journalism Frames
95(2)
4.3 Time Frame of Selected Online Articles
97(1)
4.3.1 Data Collection
98(1)
4.4 RQ1 and 6: Peace Journalism Framing in Bahrain's and Syria's Conflicts
98(31)
4.4.1 Peace Journalism Frames and Evaluative Criteria in Bahrain and Syria Coverage
98(2)
4.4.2 Significance of Context in Founding Evaluative Criteria of PJ Frames
100(1)
4.4.3 Context of Bahrain's Uprising
101(8)
4.4.4 Proposed Evaluative Criteria of PJ Frames in Bahrain's Coverage
109(8)
4.4.5 Context of the Al-Ghouta Attack
117(5)
4.4.6 Proposed Evaluative Criteria of PJ Frames in Syria's Coverage
122(7)
4.5 RQ2 and 7: Influence of "Here and Now" on Absence and Presence of PJ Frames
129(1)
4.6 RQ3 and 8: Dominant Sources in the Bahrain and Syria Coverage
130(1)
4.7 RQ4 and 9: Framing of Syrian and Bahraini Conflicts
131(1)
4.8 RQ5 and 10: Pro- and Anti-Qatar Framing in the Bahrain and Syria Coverage
132(3)
4.9 RQ11: Estimation of the Number of Syrian Victims
135(1)
4.10 RQ12: Extent of Depending on News Wires in the Coverage of Bahrain and Syria
135(1)
4.11 Conclusion
136(7)
References
137(6)
5 Bahrain's Uprising: Pro-democracy Protests or Sectarian Movement?
143(48)
5.1 Introduction
143(1)
5.2 Key Findings
144(1)
5.3 AJA Coverage of Bahrain's Protests (March--June 2011): A Quantitative Analysis
145(23)
5.3.1 AJA: Sectarian Framing of Bahrain's Protests and Protesters
145(1)
5.3.2 Implications of Excluding the Peace/Conflict-Orientated Frames in AJA
146(9)
5.3.3 AJA: Implications of Excluding the Truth- and Solution-Orientated Frames
155(4)
5.3.4 AJA: Implications of Including Official Sources and Excluding the Marginalised
159(5)
5.3.5 AJA: Pro-Qatar and GCC Framing
164(3)
5.3.6 Can PJ Still Be Implemented in AJA?
167(1)
5.4 AJE Coverage of Bahrain's Protests: Quantitative Analysis
168(11)
5.4.1 AJE: Implications of Applying the Peace-, Solution- and Truth-Orientated Frames
168(4)
5.4.2 AJE: Implications of Applying the People-Orientated Frame
172(3)
5.4.3 AJE: Anti-Qatar Framing
175(1)
5.4.4 AJE's Shouting in the Dark: An Ideal Example of Peace Journalism
175(4)
5.5 Differences Between AJA and AJE
179(2)
5.6 Conclusion
181(10)
References
182(9)
6 Syria's CWs Coverage (2013): Peace Deal or Military Action to "Punish" the Perpetrator?
191(58)
6.1 Introduction
191(1)
6.2 Key Findings
192(1)
6.3 Implications of Not Displaying Peace Journalism Framing in AJA and AJE
193(1)
6.4 Omission of Significant Facts
194(18)
6.4.1 Geopolitics of the Syrian Conflict
194(2)
6.4.2 Omission of the Context of Previous CW Attacks
196(5)
6.4.3 Omission of Al-Qaeda-Affiliated Groups as Potential Suspects
201(8)
6.4.4 Omission of Alternative Accounts
209(3)
6.5 Favouring Opposition Sources over the Regime
212(10)
6.5.1 Double Standard Coverage of the Syrian Regime and Opposition
214(2)
6.5.2 Double Standards Between Al-Nusra's Captive and Leader
216(6)
6.6 Pro-Qatar Framing in AJA and AJE
222(2)
6.7 Reporting Claims as Facts
224(7)
6.7.1 Launching Point and Range of Rockets Fired at Al-Ghouta Claims
224(3)
6.7.2 Intelligence Claims
227(2)
6.7.3 Number of Victims Claim
229(2)
6.8 AJA and AJE: Differences and Similarities
231(8)
6.8.1 Significant Application of Solution Frame in AJA and AJE
231(1)
6.8.2 AJE Is More People-Orientated than AJA
232(2)
6.8.3 AJA Uses More Emotive Language than AJE
234(5)
6.9 Conclusion
239(10)
References
240(9)
7 Al-Jazeera's (2011--2013) "Double Standards" Coverage of the Bahraini and Syrian Conflicts
249(22)
7.1 Introduction
249(1)
7.2 Comparison Between the Findings of Bahrain's Uprising in 2011 and Syria's Second CW Attack in 2013
250(1)
7.3 Politics of Media Ownership
251(2)
7.4 Double Standards of Qatar's Foreign Policy in Bahrain and Syria
253(3)
7.5 AJA and AJE: Journalism Culture, Journalists and Target Audience
256(3)
7.6 Developments of Events: Here and Now
259(6)
7.7 News Wires
265(1)
7.8 Conclusion
265(6)
References
267(4)
8 Gulf Crisis (2014-2021): Al-Jazeera's Dramatic Shift from Pro- to Anti-Bahraini Regime
271(1)
8.1 Introduction
271(2)
8.2 Key Findings
273(1)
8.3 Truth Frame in AJA and AJE
274(1)
8.3.1 AJA: Intensive Focus on "Human Rights Violations" After 2017 Gulf Crisis
274(2)
8.3.2 AJE: Consistent Focus on "Human Rights Violations" During All Research Periods
276(1)
8.3.3 AJA and AJE: Reporting "Protesters' Violence" as a "Fact"
277(1)
8.4 AJA and AJE: More Reporting on "Torture" and "Sexual Assaults" After 2017 Crisis
278(2)
8.5 AJA and AJE: More Dependence on Human Rights Sources After 2017 Gulf Crisis
280(2)
8.6 Possible Reasons Behind the Increase of "Human Rights" Coverage
282(3)
8.6.1 AJA: Delegitimising the Bahraini Regime to Serve Qatar's Interest
282(2)
8.6.2 AJE: Less Influenced by Qatar's Foreign Policy
284(1)
8.7 Framing of Saudi Military Intervention and Israeli-Bahraini "Normalisation Deal"
285(6)
8.7.1 AJ A: Critical Coverage of Saudi Troops After the 2017 Gulf Crisis
285(1)
8.7.2 AJE: Critical Coverage of Saudi Troops Before and After 2017 Gulf Crisis
286(1)
8.7.3 AJA: Critical Coverage of "Normalisation Deal"
287(3)
8.7.4 AJE: Critical Coverage of "Normalisation Deals"
290(1)
8.8 Domination of "Al-Jazeera" as the Main Source of News After 2017 Gulf Crisis
291(1)
8.9 AJA and AJE: Peace Frame and Representation of "Protests" and "Protesters"
292(9)
8.9.1 AJA: Sectarian Framing of Bahrain's Uprising During All Research Periods
292(6)
8.9.2 AJE: Less Sectarian Framing of Bahrain's Uprising During All Research Periods
298(3)
8.10 AJA and AJE: Limited Application of People Frame
301(2)
8.11 AJA and AJE: Increase in Solution Frame After the 2017 Gulf Crisis
303(2)
8.12 Overall Peace Journalism Framing in AJA and AJE
305(1)
8.13 Conclusion
306(9)
References
309(6)
9 Conclusion
315(14)
9.1 Introduction
315(1)
9.2 Quantitative Findings
316(1)
9.3 Analytical Findings
317(5)
9.3.1 Implications of Not Including PJ Frames in 2011 Bahrain's Uprising Coverage
317(1)
9.3.2 Implications of Not Including PJ Frames in the Al-Ghouta CW Attack Coverage
318(1)
9.3.3 Double Standard Coverage of Bahrain's (2011) and Syria's (2013) Conflicts
319(1)
9.3.4 Al-Jazeera After 2017 Gulf Crisis: Legitimisation of Bahrain's Uprising
319(1)
9.3.5 AJA and AJE: Similarities and Differences
320(1)
9.3.6 Factors Behind Inclusion and Exclusion of PJ Frames
321(1)
9.4 Suggestions and Limitations
322(7)
References
325(4)
Index 329
Zainab Abdul-Nabi received her PhD from the University of Sydney (USYD) in 2017 and has taught Media courses at the USYD and University of New South Wales (UNSW). Zainab published her latest research articles in: Global Media and Communication, Peace Review, New Media and Society, and Arab Media and Society.