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Animal Signals [Minkštas viršelis]

3.94/5 (62 ratings by Goodreads)
(, Professor Emeritus,), (, School of Biological Sciences, University of Sussex at Brighton, UK)
  • Formatas: Paperback / softback, 176 pages, aukštis x plotis x storis: 234x158x9 mm, weight: 309 g, numerous line drawings
  • Serija: Oxford Series in Ecology and Evolution
  • Išleidimo metai: 06-Nov-2003
  • Leidėjas: Oxford University Press
  • ISBN-10: 0198526857
  • ISBN-13: 9780198526858
Kitos knygos pagal šią temą:
  • Formatas: Paperback / softback, 176 pages, aukštis x plotis x storis: 234x158x9 mm, weight: 309 g, numerous line drawings
  • Serija: Oxford Series in Ecology and Evolution
  • Išleidimo metai: 06-Nov-2003
  • Leidėjas: Oxford University Press
  • ISBN-10: 0198526857
  • ISBN-13: 9780198526858
Kitos knygos pagal šią temą:
Co-authored by a theoretician and a fieldworker, this text discusses the reasons behind the reliability of animal signals. Challenging the assumption that there is only one correct explanation for signal reliability, Smith and Harper (both U. of Sussex, UK) argue that it is maintained in several ways, relevant in different circumstances. The authors provide examples of animal signaling systems to which one or another theory applies, and identify areas where further research is needed. Annotation ©2004 Book News, Inc., Portland, OR (booknews.com)

Why are animal signals reliable? This is the central problem for evolutionary biologists interested in signals. Of course, not all signals are reliable; but most are, otherwise receivers of signals would ignore them. A number of theoretical answers have been proposed and empirical studies made, but there still remains a considerable amount of confusion. The authors, one a theoretician the other a fieldworker, introduce a sense of order to this chaos. A significant cause of confusion has been the tendency for different researchers to use either the same term with different meanings, or different terms with the same meaning. The authors attempt to clarify these differences. A second cause of confusion has arisen because many biologists continue to assume that there is only one correct explanation for signal reliability. The authors argue that the reliability of signals is maintained in several ways, relevant in different circumstances, and that biologists must learn to distinguish between them. In this book they explain the different theories, give examples of signalling systems to which one or another theory applies, and point to the many areas where further work, both theoretical and empirical, is required.

Recenzijos

This book is essential reading for anyone studying animal signals ... the book is well laid out, and its emphasis on clear definition and logic is without parallel in books on animal communication ... We think this book marks a significant contribution by Maynard Smith and Harper, a keystone in the communication literature, and a fitting legacy for John as it will speak discussions long after his death. * ISBE Newsletter * Reading the book is a great pleasure, and anyone interested in animal communication will find it both useful and inspiring. * Science * It is an ideal text for the undergraduate new to the field. Part of the problem is the lack of a basic set of agreed concepts and definitions (signals?!) for workers in the field. This makes it an ideal starting place for ecological discussions where school students can try out different ideas as they try to understand ecology. There's even a case to be made for this as a way of doing fieldwork. Overall, worth reading for the insights it gives us. * TEG News *

1 Introduction: what are signals? 1(15)
1.1 Introduction
1(2)
1.2 Signals and cues
3(3)
1.3 The problem of reliability
6(3)
1.4 The forms of signals
9(2)
1.4.1 Efficacy
9(1)
1.4.2 Evolutionary origin
9(1)
1.4.3 Mimicry
10(1)
1.4.4 Sensory manipulation
10(1)
1.5 Action-response games, and some alternatives
11(1)
1.6 Sexual selection
12(3)
1.6.1 Paternal care
13(1)
1.6.2 Sexually attractive sons
13(1)
1.6.3 'Good genes'-indices and handicaps
14(1)
1.6.4 The female gets nothing (sensory exploitation)
14(1)
1.7 Definitions and terminology
15(1)
2 The theory of costly signalling 16(16)
2.1 Introduction
16(1)
2.2 A brief history of the handicap principle
17(3)
2.3 The Philip Sidney game
20(7)
2.3.1 The discrete model
21(1)
2.3.2 A model with continuously varying signallers
22(2)
2.3.3 A model with continuously varying signals and responses
24(1)
2.3.4 Perceptual error
25(1)
2.3.5 Conclusions
26(1)
2.4 'Pooling equilibria'-a more radical proposal
27(2)
2.5 Non-signalling equilibria
29(1)
2.6 Must honest signals always be costly?
29(1)
2.7 Conclusions
30(2)
3 Strategic signals and minimal-cost signals 32(13)
3.1 Introduction
32(1)
3.2 Strategic signals
33(4)
3.2.1 Stalk-eyed flies
33(1)
3.2.2 Musth in elephants
34(1)
3.2.3 Chick begging
35(2)
3.3 Minimal-cost signals
37(7)
3.3.1 When can minimal-cost signals be evolutionary stable?
37(2)
3.3.2 Signals between unrelated individuals with a common interest
39(2)
3.3.3 Relatedness
41(1)
3.3.4 Kin recognition
42(2)
3.4 Conclusions
44(1)
4 Indices of quality 45(23)
4.1 Introduction
45(1)
4.2 Are mammalian sounds reliable indices of size?
45(2)
4.3 The evolution of indices
47(1)
4.4 Indices in different contexts
48(12)
4.4.1 Indices of condition
48(2)
4.4.2 Indices of size and RHP
50(1)
4.4.3 Performance indices
51(2)
4.4.4 Parasites
53(1)
4.4.5 Indices of ownership
54(5)
4.4.6 Signals in contests, and in mate choice
59(1)
4.5 Indices and handicaps
60(1)
4.6 Some problem cases
61(7)
4.6.1 Stotting
61(2)
4.6.2 Fluctuating asymmetry
63(3)
4.6.3 Displays of weapons
66(2)
5 The evolution of signal form 68(22)
5.1 Ritualization
68(5)
5.2 Efficacy
73(1)
5.3 Arms races, manipulation and sensory bias
74(7)
5.3.1 Introduction
74(2)
5.3.2 A model, and an experiment
76(1)
5.3.3 The response to novel signals
77(3)
5.3.4 The comparative data
80(1)
5.3.5 Conclusions
81(1)
5.4 Sensory manipulation
81(5)
5.4.1 Frogs and swordtails
81(3)
5.4.2 Nuptial gifts in insects
84(1)
5.4.3 Further examples of sensory manipulation
85(1)
5.5 Mimicry and cheating
86(4)
6 Signals during contests 90(22)
6.1 Introduction
90(2)
6.2 Badges of status
92(4)
6.2.1 An avian example
92(2)
6.2.2 ESS models of badges
94(1)
6.2.3 Conclusions
95(1)
6.3 Can signals of need settle contests?
96(3)
6.3.1 The war of attrition
96(1)
6.3.2 The war of attrition with random rewards
97(1)
6.3.3 A model of conventional signals of need
97(1)
6.3.4 Conclusions
98(1)
6.4 Punishment
99(1)
6.5 Protracted contests and varied signals
100(9)
6.5.1 Varied signals-the evidence
101(1)
6.5.2 Cichlid fishes and the sequential assessment game
102(2)
6.5.3 Spider fights, and a motivational model
104(4)
6.5.4 Territorial behaviour and the negotiation game
108(1)
6.6 Conclusions
109(3)
7 Signals in primates and other social animals 112(25)
7.1 Introduction
112(1)
7.2 Vervet Monkeys: a case study
113(3)
7.3 How does the ability to signal develop?
116(2)
7.4 Questions about what is going on in an animal's head
118(3)
7.4.1 Do signals convey information about the external world?
118(1)
7.4.2 Do signallers intend to alter the behaviour of receivers?
119(2)
7.4.3 Conclusions
121(1)
7.5 Social reputation and the honesty of signals
121(3)
7.5.1 Introduction
121(1)
7.5.2 A model
122(1)
7.5.3 Evidence for direct reputation
123(1)
7.6 Emotional commitment
124(6)
7.6.1 Cultural and innate behaviour
124(1)
7.6.2 'Altruistic punishment' in humans
125(1)
7.6.3 Mutual displays
126(2)
7.6.4 The interpretation of group displays
128(2)
7.7 Human language
130(7)
7.7.1 Cultural inheritance in Chimpanzees
131(1)
7.7.2 The peculiarities of human language
132(1)
7.7.3 The evolution of language
133(4)
Glossary of scientific names 137(4)
References 141(20)
Index 161


John Maynard Smith (1920-2004) was an eminent evolutionary biologist and author of many books on evolution, both for scientists and the general public. He was professor emeritus at the University of Sussex, UK, Fellow of the Royal Society, winner of the Darwin Medal, and laureate of the Crafoord Prize of the Swedish Academy of Sciences.

David Harper is Senior Lecturer in Evolution, School of Biological Sciences, University of Sussex, UK.