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El. knyga: Articulating the Moral Community: Toward a Constructive Ethical Pragmatism

(Professor of Philosophy, Georgetown University)
  • Formatas: 304 pages
  • Serija: Oxford Moral Theory
  • Išleidimo metai: 09-Aug-2018
  • Leidėjas: Oxford University Press Inc
  • Kalba: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9780190247751
  • Formatas: 304 pages
  • Serija: Oxford Moral Theory
  • Išleidimo metai: 09-Aug-2018
  • Leidėjas: Oxford University Press Inc
  • Kalba: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9780190247751

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Is morality fixed objectively, independently of all human judgment, or do we "invent" right and wrong? Articulating the Moral Community argues that neither of these simple answers is correct. Its central thesis is that, working within zones of objective indeterminacy, the moral community-the community of all persons-has the authority to introduce new moral norms.

Unlike political communities, which are centralized, non-inclusive, and backed by coercion, the moral community is decentralized, inclusive, and not coercively backed. This book explains in detail how its structure arises from efforts by individuals to work out intelligently with one another how to respond to morally important concerns. Developing a novel theory of dyadic rights and duties based on this phenomenon, the book argues that conscientious efforts of this kind provide moral input, authoritative only over the parties involved. After sufficient uptake and reflective acceptance by the moral community, however, these innovations become new moral norms.

This account of the moral community's moral authority is motivated by, and supports, a type of normative ethical theory, constructive ethical pragmatism, which-to use an unfashionable distinction defended in the book-rejects the consequentialist claim that rightness is to be defined as a function of goodness and the deontological claim that principles of right stand fixed, independently of the good. It holds, rather, that what we ought to do depends on our continuing efforts to specify the right and the good in light of each other.

Recenzijos

clearly written ... well-researched * W. Simkulet, CHOICE * In the impressive Articulating the Moral Community, Henry Richardson argues for a dynamic idea of morality as at once resting on an "objective core" and able to be responsive to challenges that come from new technologies and our expanding moral awareness. The argument is rich, fully engaged with current normative and meta-ethical discussion, and filled with instructive examples that demand new standards of response. Centering the argument in the idea that the community of persons has the authority to extend morality, while preserving the objectivity morality requires, Richardson offers us a powerful alternative to standard forms of moral theorizing that compels our attention. * Barbara Herman, University of California, Los Angeles * Morality is a social institution, created and developed over time in complex ways. At the same time, it is a rational institution, aiming at objectivity. Henry Richardson, one of the foremost moral philosophers of our time, shows how these two aspects go together from the perspective of constructive ethical pragmatism. There is moral progress and innovation, as he shows, and there is progress in philosophy, as this book proves. * Rainer Forst, Goethe University Frankfurt *

Preface xi
PART ONE Preliminaries
Introduction
3(1)
I.1 The Universality of the Moral Community
4(5)
I.2 Illustrative Examples of Decentered Moral Innovation
9(4)
I.3 The Possibility of Indeterminacy-Reducing Moral Progress
13(8)
I.4 Basic Conditions on How New Moral Norms Can Be Socially Introduced
21(6)
I.5 Preview of the Argument
27(4)
1 Constructive Ethical Pragmatism
31(32)
1.1 Characterizing Constructive Ethical Pragmatism
31(10)
1.2 Moral Theory as Having a Practical Role
41(7)
1.3 The Flexibility of Constructive Ethical Pragmatism
48(8)
1.4 Constructive Ethical Pragmatism Will Guide Deliberation Better
56(7)
PART TWO The Moral Authority of the Moral Community
2 The Idea of the Moral Community
63(22)
2.1 Ways of Modeling the Moral Community
64(5)
2.2 Kant on the Ethical Community
69(4)
2.3 Norms to Structure the Moral Community
73(2)
2.4 The Unity of the Universal Moral Community: Thompson's Challenge
75(10)
3 Authoritative Input: Dyadic Duties and Rights
85(33)
3.1 The Specificatory Theory of Dyadic Moral Rights and Duties
85(4)
3.2 Rival Theories of Dyadic Rights and Duties?
89(4)
3.3 Addressing Human Rights
93(5)
3.4 Generalizing the Account to Include Transactional Duties and Private Rights
98(7)
3.5 From Specific Address to the Specificatory Theory of Dyadic Rights and Duties
105(6)
3.6 Objections to the Specificatory Theory
111(3)
3.7 The Specificatory Theory Compared to the Will Theory
114(1)
3.8 The Input Stage
115(3)
4 The Unity of the Moral Community
118(17)
4.1 Bringing Intelligent Beings Together Under One System of Norms
120(1)
4.2 Effacing the Boundaries Between Distinct Practices
121(3)
4.3 Knitting Together Morally Disagreeing Communities
124(2)
4.4 Looking Beyond Individual Human Nature to the Social
126(3)
4.5 Beyond Interacting Intelligent Beings
129(4)
4.6 How All Persons Can Be United in a Single Moral Community
133(2)
5 Introducing New Moral Norms
135(19)
5.1 Selection and Convergence
137(5)
5.2 The Very Idea of Moral Authority
142(3)
5.3 The Moral Community's Authority Respects Autonomy
145(4)
5.4 New Moral Norms
149(3)
5.5 New Objective Norms
152(2)
6 Working It Out together: Joint Moral Reasoning
154(22)
6.1 Why a New Account of Jointly Embodied Moral Reasoning Is Needed
157(8)
6.2 Generality, Inclusiveness, and Deference to Authority
165(4)
6.3 A Model of Embodied, Joint Moral Reasoning
169(7)
7 Ratification of New Moral Norms
176(19)
7.1 Mutual Recognition of Acceptance
177(7)
7.2 The Problem of Future Persons
184(3)
7.3 Backward-Looking Awareness
187(2)
7.4 Reasoning in the Ratification Stage
189(2)
7.5 Ratification: Summing up
191(4)
PART THREE Defending and Extending the Account
8 Reasons, Indeterminacy, and Compromise
195(23)
8.1 The Appeal of the Set of First-Order Reasons
196(5)
8.2 The Moral-Psychological Objection
201(4)
8.3 Reasoning in Terms of Ends
205(6)
8.4 The Role of Commitments
211(1)
8.5 Compromise: Working Things Out Together
212(4)
8.6 Reasons and Reasoning
216(2)
9 Noneternal Moral Principles
218(20)
9.1 Cudworth's Essentialist Argument for Moral Rationalism
219(7)
9.2 Cohens Argument Against Fact-Sensitive Principles
226(9)
9.3 Working with Moral Principles in Medias Res
235(3)
10 Objectivity and Path-Dependence
238(22)
10.1 A Working Conception of Moral Objectivity
241(4)
10.2 Objectivity in the Introduction of New Moral Norms
245(2)
10.3 Path-Dependence
247(3)
10.4 Retrospective Moral Judgment
250(6)
10.5 Taint by Actual Injustice and Corruption
256(4)
Conclusion
260(15)
C.1 Results of the Argument
260(4)
C.2 Implications for Constructive Ethical Pragmatism
264(3)
C.3 Broadening the Argument's Reach
267(4)
C.4 The Significance of These Conclusions
271(4)
References 275(14)
Index 289
Henry S. Richardson is Professor of Philosophy at Georgetown University. From 2008-18, he was the editor of Ethics. His previous books include Practical Reasoning about Final Ends (1994), Democratic Autonomy (2002), and Moral Entanglements (2012). He has held fellowships sponsored by the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, the National Endowment for the Humanities, and the University Center for Human Values at Princeton University.