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Blinding as a Solution to Bias: Strengthening Biomedical Science, Forensic Science, and Law [Kietas viršelis]

Edited by (Brigham & Womens Hospital, Department of Medicine, Boston, MA, USA), Edited by (University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ, USA)
  • Formatas: Hardback, 388 pages, aukštis x plotis: 235x191 mm, weight: 1040 g
  • Išleidimo metai: 02-Feb-2016
  • Leidėjas: Academic Press Inc
  • ISBN-10: 0128024607
  • ISBN-13: 9780128024607
Kitos knygos pagal šią temą:
  • Formatas: Hardback, 388 pages, aukštis x plotis: 235x191 mm, weight: 1040 g
  • Išleidimo metai: 02-Feb-2016
  • Leidėjas: Academic Press Inc
  • ISBN-10: 0128024607
  • ISBN-13: 9780128024607
Kitos knygos pagal šią temą:

What information should jurors have during court proceedings to render a just decision? Should politicians know who is donating money to their campaigns? Will scientists draw biased conclusions about drug efficacy when they know more about the patient or study population? The potential for bias in decision-making by physicians, lawyers, politicians, and scientists has been recognized for hundreds of years and drawn attention from media and scholars seeking to understand the role that conflicts of interests and other psychological processes play. However, commonly proposed solutions to biased decision-making, such as transparency (disclosing conflicts) or exclusion (avoiding conflicts) do not directly solve the underlying problem of bias and may have unintended consequences.

Blinding As A Solution To Bias: Strengthening Biomedical Science, Forensic Science, and Law, Robertson and Kesselheim bring together a renowned group of interdisciplinary scholars to consider another way to reduce the risk of biased decision-making: blinding. What are the advantages and limitations of blinding   How can we quantify the biases in unblinded research? Can we develop new ways to blind decision-makers   What are the ethical problems with withholding information from decision-makers in the course of blinding   How can blinding be adapted to legal and scientific procedures and in institutions not previously open to this approach? Fundamentally, these sorts of questions—about who needs to know what—open new doors of inquiry for the design of scientific research studies, regulatory institutions, and courts. The volume consists of three main parts, drawing upon leading authors who bring an exceedingly diverse range of skills and methodologies, including: forensic sciences, medicine, law, philosophy, economics, psychology, sociology and statistics.

  • Introduces readers to the primary policy issue this book seeks to address: biased decision-making.
  • Provides a focus on blinding as a solution to bias, which has applicability in many domains. 
  • Traces the development of blinding as a solution to bias, and explores the different ways blinding has been employed.
  • Includes case studies to explore particular uses of blinding for statisticians, radiologists, and fingerprint examiners, and whether the jurors and judges who rely upon them will value and understand blinding. 

Recenzijos

"Since the time of Ben Franklin, scientists have recognized the power of blinding to help us see the world more objectively. This collection of essays explores the complicated psychology of blinding, while making a compelling case that we have yet to fully embrace the power of invisibility." --Peter A. Ubel, University Professor, Fuqua School of Business, Duke University

"Robertson and Kesselheims book provides an authoritative look at the practice of blinding and how it can be used to improve our health care and legal systems. It is a wonderful resource for medical students, policymakers, and anyone else interested in studying conflicts of interest and helping address bias in clinical practice and biomedical research." --Jerry Avorn, Professor of Medicine, Harvard Medical School

"This extraordinary collection of scholars takes on in exhaustive detail one of the foundational questions of public policy under what circumstances are decisions improved by limiting decisionmakers access to information.  From orchestra auditions and secret ballots to blinded trials and the parole evidence rule, the examples discussed in in this volumes broad-ranging contributions illuminate when veils of ignorance should be embraced." --Ian Ayres, Professor, Yale Law School

Daugiau informacijos

An invaluable resource for biomedical scientists, forensic scientists, lawyers and policy makers
List of Contributors
xiii
Foreword xv
Lawrence Lessig
I Introduction and Overview
Introduction
Aaron S. Kesselheim
Christopher T. Robertson
Overview
3(1)
Book Organization
4(5)
Acknowledgments
9(4)
II BLINDING AND BIAS
1 A Primer on the Psychology of Cognitive Bias
Carla L. Maclean
Itiel E. Dror
A Primer on the Psychology of Cognitive Bias
13(1)
Theoretical Framework of Human Cognition
14(1)
Context Effects
15(4)
Mitigating the Effect of Context
19(2)
Conclusion
21(1)
References
22(3)
2 Why Blinding? How Blinding? A Theory of Blinding and Its Application to Institutional Corruption
Christopher T. Robertson
Blinding as Disaggregation
25(2)
The Breadth of Blinding
27(1)
Institutional Corruption and the Failure of Common Solutions
28(4)
Blinding as a Solution to Institutional Corruption
32(3)
Blinding Applied to Litigation, Science, and Politics
35(1)
Conclusion
36(1)
References
36(9)
III BIOMEDICAL SCIENCE
Rigor in Biomedical Science
GREGORY CURFMAN
3 From Trials to Trials: Blinding, Medicine, and Honest Adjudication
Scott H. Podolsky
David S. Jones
Ted J. Kaptchuk
Introduction
45(1)
Blinding of Patients
46(3)
Blinding of Researchers
49(4)
Blinding in Medicine Moves to the Courtroom
53(3)
References
56(3)
4 Blinding in Biomedical Research: An Essential Method to Reduce Risk of Bias
Asbjørn Hrobjartsson
Introduction
59(1)
Terminology and Reporting
60(2)
Mechanisms for Introducing Bias in Nonblinded Studies
62(1)
Empirical Investigations of the Impact of Blinding
63(3)
Risk of Unblinding
66(1)
Blinding in Nonrandomized Study Designs
67(3)
Conclusion
70(1)
References
70(5)
5 Blind Peer Review by Academic Journals
Emily A. Largent
Richard T. Snodgrass
Introduction
75(2)
Overview of Peer Review
77(2)
Double-Blinding as a Means of Enhancing Fairness
79(5)
Blinding as a Means of Improving the Quality of Reviews
84(3)
Breaking the (Double) Blind
87(3)
Preferences for Open, Single-, or Double-Blind Review
90(2)
Conclusion
92(1)
References
93(4)
6 Clinical Trial Blinding in the Age of Social Media
Paul Wicks
Introduction
97(1)
Researcher-Led Unblinding
98(1)
Patient-Led Unblinding
99(4)
A New Social Contract
103(2)
References
105(2)
7 The Ethics of Single-Blind Trials in Biomedicine
Franklin G. Miller
Introduction
107(1)
Internal Mammary Artery Ligation: An Instructive Case Study
108(2)
Justifying Invasive Placebo Controls: Risk-Benefit Assessment
110(1)
Deception and Informed Consent
111(2)
Concluding Reflections
113(1)
References
114(1)
8 "Money Blinding" as a Solution to Biased Design and Conduct of Scientific Research
Christopher T. Robertson
Marc A. Rodwin
The Problem of Commercial Bias in Science
115(1)
Models for Independent Science
116(2)
Money Blinding as a Solution
118(1)
Limits and Disadvantages
119(2)
Avenues for Reform
121(2)
Assessing the Arguments against Money Blinding
123(1)
Conclusion
124(1)
Acknowledgment
124(1)
References
124(9)
IV FORENSIC SCIENCE: CRIMINAL AND CIVIL
Rigor in Forensic Science
TANIA SIMONCELLI
9 Determining the Proper Evidentiary Basis for an Expert Opinion: What Do Experts Need to Know and When Do They Know Too Much?
William C. Thompson
Introduction
133(2)
What Should Ancillary Experts Know? Dilemmas in Three Fields
135(4)
A Framework for Analysis
139(8)
Experts Who Are Also Decision Makers
147(1)
Conclusion
148(1)
Acknowledgments
149(1)
References
149(2)
10 Minimizing and Leveraging Bias in Forensic Science
Roger Koppl
Dan Krane
Introduction
151(2)
Hierarchical versus Distributed System
153(4)
Minimizing Bias versus Leveraging Bias
157(2)
Finding the Optimal Mix
159(2)
Why It May Be Hard to Get the Optimal Mix
161(3)
Conclusion
164(1)
References
164(3)
11 What Do Statisticians Really Need to Know, and When Do They Need to Know It?
D. James Greiner
Introduction
167(1)
Causal Inference from Observational Data
168(7)
Blinding: Lock the Outcome Variables in a Closet
175(2)
Can We Institutionalize This Kind of Analysis?
177(1)
References
178(1)
Further Reading
178(3)
12 Using Blind Reviews to Address Biases in Medical Malpractice
Jeffrey D. Robinson
Introduction
181(1)
Expert Witnesses
182(3)
Eliminating Expert Bias
185(7)
Conclusion
192(1)
References
192(4)
13 Mock Juror and Jury Assessment of Blinded Expert Witnesses
Megan S. Wright
Christopher T. Robertson
David V. Yokum
Introduction
196(1)
Literature Review
196(1)
Impact of Blinded Expert Witnesses on Civil Jury Verdicts
197(8)
Mock Jurors' Assessments of Blinded Experts in Criminal Trials
205(4)
Conclusion
209(1)
References
210(1)
14 Disclosure Discretion and Selection Bias in Blinding of Experts
Christopher T. Robertson
Introduction
211(1)
Selection Bias and the Attorney Work-Product Doctrine
212(2)
The Fallacies of Disclosure Discretion
214(2)
Systematic Effects
216(1)
Dual, Adversarial Use
217(2)
Implications
219(1)
References
219(12)
V BLINDING IN LEGAL INSTITUTIONS
Legal Applications of the Disclose-or-Blindfold Question
SAUL LEVMORE
15 Why Eyes? Cautionary Tales from Law's Blindfolded Justice
Judith Resnik
Dennis Curtis
Impartiality---or Ignorance, Caprice, and Obstinacy
231(2)
Revising the Valence of the Blindfold
233(4)
The Philosophy and Psychology of Sight: A Blind Man "Made to See"
237(1)
Separating Powers, Color-Blind Constitutions, and Veils of Ignorance
238(4)
The Multiple Vantage Points of Justice
242(3)
References
245(4)
16 A Theory of Anonymity
Jeffrey M. Skopek
Introduction
249(2)
A Taxonomy of Anonymity Rules
251(1)
A Theory of Production
252(5)
Implications for Law and Policy
257(6)
Conclusion
263(1)
References
263(2)
17 The Cases for and against Blindfolding the Jury
Shari Seidman Diamond
Introduction
265(2)
The Jury as Active Information Processor
267(1)
Attempts to Control Juries
267(1)
Assessing the Effects of Blindfolding and Instructions
268(3)
The Role of Expectations in Jury Decision Making
271(1)
The Case against Blindfolding
272(1)
When Blindfolding Is Required
273(1)
Minimizing Harmful Effects When Blindfolding Is Not a Plausible Strategy
274(1)
Conclusions
275(1)
References
275(3)
18 The Compliance Equation: Creating a More Ethical and Equitable Campaign Financing System by Blinding Contributions to Federal Candidates
Bertram J. Levine
Michael Johnston
Introduction
278(2)
Anonymity: An Alternative to Mandatory Disclosure
280(1)
Denning Corruption
280(2)
How Disclosure Contributes to Legalized Corruption
282(2)
Beneficiaries of FECA's Mandatory Public Reporting System
284(2)
What Contributions Do and Do Not Buy
286(2)
An Anonymity-Based Campaign Finance System
288(1)
The Compliance Equation: Leveraging Human Nature
289(3)
Additional Benefits of Anonymity-Based Campaign Financing
292(1)
The Question of Constitutionality
293(2)
Closing Observation
295(1)
References
296(1)
19 Blinding Eyewitness Identifications
Brandon L. Garrett
Introduction
297(1)
Lineups as Experiments
298(2)
The Law of Eyewitness Identifications
300(1)
The Blind Lineup
301(2)
Beyond Blinding
303(1)
Blinded Lineups
303(1)
Adopting Blind Lineups
304(1)
References
305(2)
20 Blind Appointments in Arbitration
Sergio Puig
Introduction
307(1)
Blind Appointments and the Debate Over Unilaterals
308(1)
The Case of International Investment Arbitration
309(4)
Debiasing Party Appointments and the Case for Blinding
313(4)
Conclusions
317(1)
Appendix
317(1)
References
317(2)
21 Psychological Obstacles to the Judicial Disqualification Inquiry, and Blinded Review as an Aid
David V. Yokum
Introduction
319(2)
The Law of Judicial Disqualification
321(3)
Psychological Obstacles to Diagnosing Bias
324(5)
Third-Party Disqualification Review
329(1)
Blinded Disqualification Review
330(2)
References
332(3)
22 Masking Information Source within the Internal Revenue Service
Karie Davis-Nozemack
The Tax System We Have
335(1)
A Potential Solution in the Whistleblower Program
336(1)
Bias against Whistleblowers
336(1)
Cognitive Bias
337(1)
Cognitive Bias and Prosecutorial Discretion
337(1)
Strategies for Combating Cognitive Bias from Prior Literature
338(1)
Removing Cognitive Bias Instead of Mitigating Its Effects
338(1)
Blinding in the IRS Whistleblower Program
339(3)
References
342(4)
23 Blinding the Law: The Potential Virtue of Legal Uncertainty
Yuval Feldman
Shahar Lifshitz
Introduction
346(2)
Legal Ignorance as Bliss
348(3)
Legal Uncertainty as a Veil of Ignorance
351(3)
The Inadvertent Consequences of Legal Uncertainty
354(1)
Policy Implications: The Role of Uncertainty within the Law
355(4)
Conclusion
359(1)
References
360(3)
Index 363
Christopher Robertson is an expert at the intersection of science, health, decision sciences, and law. He serves as associate dean for research and innovation and professor at the James E. Rogers College of Law, University of Arizona, and is affiliated faculty with the Petrie Flom Center for Health Care Policy, Bioethics and Biotechnology at Harvard. Robertson also leads the University of Arizona Regulatory Science program, which identifies and resolves legal issues that impede scientific progress. Robertson has received research support from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, the Safra Center for Ethics at Harvard, and the Greenwall Foundation. He graduated magna cum laude from Harvard Law School, and earned a doctorate in Philosophy at Washington University in St. Louis. He has taught at Harvard Law, NYU Law, and Washington University in St. Louis. Robertson has other forthcoming books with Johns Hopkins University Press and Harvard University Press. Aaron S. Kesselheim, M.D., J.D., M.P.H., is an Associate Professor of Medicine at Harvard Medical School and a faculty member in the Division of Pharmacoepidemiology and Pharmacoeconomics in the Department of Medicine at Brigham and Womens Hospital. His research focuses on the effects of intellectual property laws and regulatory policies on pharmaceutical development, the drug approval process, and the costs, availability, and use of prescription drugs both domestically and in resource-poor settings. Dr. Kesselheim leads the Program On Regulation, Therapeutics, And Law (PORTAL), an interdisciplinary research core focusing on intersections among prescription drugs and medical devices, patient health outcomes, and regulatory practices and the law. In 2013, Dr. Kesselheim was named a Greenwall Faculty Scholar in Bioethics by the Greenwall Foundation, which supports innovative empirical research in bioethics. Dr. Kesselheims work is also currently funded by the Harvard Program in Therapeutic Science, the FDA, and the Laura and John Arnold Foundation. Dr. Kesselheim serves as a faculty member at the Harvard Medical School Center for Bioethics, has been a Visiting Associate Professor of Law at Yale Law School, where he teaches Food and Drug Administration Law. He is Board Certified in Internal Medicine, working as a primary care physician at the Phyllis Jen Center for Primary Care at BWH.