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Bomber Command's War Against Germany: Planning the RAF's Bombing Offensive in WWII and its Contribution to the Allied Victory [Kietas viršelis]

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  • Formatas: Hardback, 256 pages, aukštis x plotis: 234x156 mm, 16 black and white illustrations
  • Išleidimo metai: 29-Oct-2020
  • Leidėjas: Air World
  • ISBN-10: 1526790874
  • ISBN-13: 9781526790873
Kitos knygos pagal šią temą:
Bomber Command's War Against Germany: Planning the RAF's Bombing Offensive in WWII and its Contribution to the Allied VictoryDidesnis paveikslėlis
  • Formatas: Hardback, 256 pages, aukštis x plotis: 234x156 mm, 16 black and white illustrations
  • Išleidimo metai: 29-Oct-2020
  • Leidėjas: Air World
  • ISBN-10: 1526790874
  • ISBN-13: 9781526790873
Kitos knygos pagal šią temą:
Pastovi nuoroda: https://www.kriso.lt/db/9781526790873.html
Raktažodžiai:
The all-too frequently cited mantra that ‘the bomber will always get through’ had dominated Britain’s strategic air policy in the decades preceding the Second World War. However, the experiences of the Battle of Britain and the Blitz indicated that aerial bombardments were not as effective at disabling a country’s ability to fight as had been believed.This assessment was reinforced when the RAF’s Bomber Command analyzed the results of their precision bombing efforts during the early years of the war. A growing body of evidence indicated that the great ‘knockout’ blow expected to be delivered from the air was a fantasy and that it would only be through a prolonged campaign of attrition that the enemy could be worn down to such a degree that morale, the means of production and the infrastructure of the enemy would be degraded to the point where its fighting ability was crippled.The result of this assessment was a change of policy from precision bombing of carefully identified key installations, to area bombing with the declared intent of striking at the homes of the German workers, the factories where they worked regardless of the nature of such establishments or of the civilian casualties that would be the inevitable consequence.In compiling this official analysis of the effectiveness of the RAF’s strategic bombing campaign, the author was granted unrestricted access to Air Ministry, Cabinet and other relevant departmental documents that were maintained for internal government use, enabling him to gain a complete and unbiased assessment of the contribution made by Bomber Command to the defeat of Germany. The conclusion he draws fully justifies the decisions taken, by both Britain and the USA, to bomb the German people into surrender.

In compiling this official analysis of the effectiveness of the RAF’s strategic bombing campaign, the author was granted unrestricted access to official documents that were maintained for internal government use, enabling him to gain a complete and unbiased assessment of the contribution made by Bomber Command to the defeat of Germany.

Details the planning of the RAF's bombing offensive in the Second World War and its contribution to the Allied victory.
List of Abbreviations
vii
List of Code Names
xi
Introduction: The Background to the Bombing Offensive xii
Part I The First Bombing Offensive, 1939--1941
Chapter 1 The Collapse of the `Knock Out Blow' Theory and the Origins of Attritional Bombing
3(12)
Chapter 2 The Failure of the First Bombing Offensive: An Analysis of the Principal Assumptions on Which Hopes of Success Rested
15(16)
Part II The First Lessons of Experience: A New Design for the Bombing Offensive, 1941
Chapter 3 The Transition from Precision Attack to Area Bombing
31(17)
Chapter 4 The Weapon More Accurately Measured and the Origins of Strategic Misconception
48(17)
Part III The Crisis for Bomber Command, 1942
Chapter 5 The Attack on German Morale
65(27)
Chapter 6 The First Effects of Strategic Bombing
92(17)
Part IV The Climax of Area Bombing and the Return to Selective Bombing, 1943--1944
Chapter 7 The Year of Conflict, 1943
109(22)
Chapter 8 The Effects of R.A.F. Destruction and the Promise of American Strategy
131(18)
Part V Air Superiority and the Final Offensive, 1944--1945
Chapter 9 The Problem of How to Use Air Power in Triphibious War
149(22)
Chapter 10 The Vindication of Strategic Bombing and the Collapse of Germany
171(20)
Appendix I Note on Statistical Methods of Measuring Bombing Effect 191(8)
Appendix II Letter by Air Commodore Slessor, Director of Plans, 13 April 1940 199(3)
Appendix III Letter by Air Vice-Marshal Bottomley, Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, 14 February 1942 202(4)
Appendix IV Letter by Air Vice-Marshal Bottomley, Assistant Chief of the Air Staff, 10 June 1943 206(4)
Appendix V Letter by General H.H. Arnold, Commanding General, US Army Air Forces 210(2)
Appendix VI Report by Air Chief Marshal A. T. Harris, Commanding-In-Chief, Bomber Command, 3 November 1943 212(4)
Appendix VII Letter by Air Marshal Bottomley, Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, 1 November 1944 216(2)
Appendix VIII Directive No.2 for the Strategic Air Forces in Europe 218(2)
Notes 220
This official account of the planning of the RAF's bombing offensive in the Second World War and its contribution to the Allied victory was written for the Air Ministry soon after the end of the conflict and was based on information, reports and documents provided by those involved in the campaign.