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Brother, Can You Spare a Billion?: The United States, the IMF, and the International Lender of Last Resort [Kietas viršelis]

(Assistant Professor of Political Science, Syracuse University)
  • Formatas: Hardback, 246 pages, aukštis x plotis x storis: 236x160x25 mm, weight: 499 g
  • Išleidimo metai: 05-Jan-2017
  • Leidėjas: Oxford University Press Inc
  • ISBN-10: 0190605766
  • ISBN-13: 9780190605766
Kitos knygos pagal šią temą:
  • Formatas: Hardback, 246 pages, aukštis x plotis x storis: 236x160x25 mm, weight: 499 g
  • Išleidimo metai: 05-Jan-2017
  • Leidėjas: Oxford University Press Inc
  • ISBN-10: 0190605766
  • ISBN-13: 9780190605766
Kitos knygos pagal šią temą:
When financial crises occur, it has long been accepted that national economies need a lender of last resort to stabilize markets. In today's global financial system, crises are rarely confined to one country. Indeed, they often go global. Yet, there is no formal international lender of last resort (ILLR) to perform this function for the world economy. Conventional wisdom says that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has emerged as the de facto ILLR. Yet, that premise is incomplete. Brother, Can You Spare a Billion? explores how the United States has for decades regularly complemented the Fund's ILLR role by selectively providing billions of dollars in emergency loans to foreign economies in crisis. Why would U.S. policymakers ever put national financial resources at risk to "bailout" foreign governments and citizens to whom they are not beholden when the IMF was created for this purpose? Daniel McDowell argues the United States has been compelled to provide such rescues unilaterally when it believes a multilateral response via the IMF is either too slow or too small to protect vital U.S. economic and financial interests. Through a combination of historical case studies and statistical analysis, McDowell uncovers the defensive motives behind U.S. decisions to provide global liquidity beginning in the 1960s, moving through international debt crises of the 1980s and emerging market currency crises of the 1990s, and extending up to the 2008 global financial crisis. Together, these analyses paint a more complete picture of how international financial crises have been managed and highlight the unique role that the U.S. has played in stabilizing the world economy in troubled times.

Recenzijos

The book offers novel insights into the unique role that the United States has played in stabilizing international financial crises, while also shedding light on the limitations of the IMF to act as an ILLR. McDowell's writing style is clear and easy to comprehend for both experts and nonexperts alike, and the book's rich case studies help provide useful context to key findings discovered in the statistical analyses. * Perspectives on Politics *

Figures
xi
Tables
xiii
Preface xv
Abbreviations xix
1 Introduction
1(17)
1 The Puzzle
3(4)
2 The Argument
7(4)
3 Plan of the Book and Findings
11(7)
2 The ILLR in Theory and Practice
18(23)
1 An International LLR: A Brief History of a Concept
19(5)
1.1 The ILLR and the Hegemon
20(2)
1.2 The ILLR and the IMF
22(2)
2 The IMF's Limitations as ILLR
24(6)
2.1 The Problem of Unresponsiveness
25(2)
2.2 The Problem of Resource Insufficiency
27(3)
3 The United States' ILLR Mechanisms
30(10)
3.1 The Mechanics of Currency Swaps
31(1)
3.2 Speed and Independence
31(2)
3.3 Lending Capacity
33(4)
3.4 Division of Labor
37(3)
4 Conclusions
40(1)
3 The United States Invents Its Own ILLR, 1961--1962
41(23)
1 More Dollars, More Problems
42(4)
1.1 From Dollar Gap to Dollar Glut
43(1)
1.2 Two Threats: The "Gold Drain" and Speculation
44(2)
2 In Search of an ILLR
46(7)
2.1 The General Arrangements to Borrow
47(6)
3 An Alternative ILLR: Central Bank Currency Swaps
53(10)
3.1 The Fed's Novel Idea
54(2)
3.2 Who Needs the IMF?
56(4)
3.3 How the Swap Lines Protected US Interests
60(1)
3.4 Why Did Europe Cooperate?
61(2)
4 Conclusions
63(1)
4 The Exchange Stabilization Fund and the IMF in the 1980s and 1990s
64(22)
1 The Exchange Stabilization Fund
66(4)
2 Global Banking and the Debt Crisis: 1980s
70(8)
2.1 The IMF's "Concerted Lending" Strategy and the Problem of Unresponsiveness
71(5)
2.2 The ESF and "Bridge Loans": Correcting for the Problem of IMF Unresponsiveness
76(2)
3 Portfolio Flows and Capital Account Crises: 1990s
78(6)
3.1 Capital Account Crises and IMF Resource Insufficiency
81(2)
3.2 The ESF and Supplemental Loans: Correcting for the Problem of IMF Resource Insufficiency
83(1)
4 Conclusions
84(2)
5 Who's In, Who's Out, and Why? Selecting Whom to Bail Out, 1983-1999
86(19)
1 US Financial Interests and ESF Bailout Selection
88(5)
2 An Empirical Model of ESF Bailout Selection
93(6)
3 Results
99(4)
4 Conclusions
103(2)
6 US International Bailouts in the 1980s and 1990s
105(34)
1 Case Selection
106(2)
2 The Cases
108(29)
2.1 Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina, 1982-1983
108(8)
2.2 Argentina, 1984
116(3)
2.3 Poland, 1989
119(2)
2.4 Mexico, 1995
121(6)
2.5 Thailand, 1997
127(2)
2.6 Indonesia and South Korea, 1997
129(6)
2.7 Declining Use: The ESF Is Put Out to Pasture
135(2)
3 Conclusions
137(2)
7 The United States as an ILLR during the Great Panic of 2008--2009
139(36)
1 Background: "A Novel Aspect" of the Great Panic of 2008
141(7)
2 US Financial Interests and the Fed's ILLR Actions
148(7)
3 An Empirical Model of Fed Swap Line Selection
155(4)
4 The Interest-Rate Threat and the Fed's ILLR Actions
159(3)
5 Transcript Analysis of FOMC Meetings
162(10)
5.1 The Initiation of the Swap Lines and the TAF, August 2007--December 2007
163(4)
5.2 Incremental Expansion of Liquidity Facilities, March 2008--August 2008
167(1)
5.3 Rapid Growth of the Swap Program: September 15, 2008--October 28, 2008
168(2)
5.4 Swap Lines for Four Emerging Markets: October 29, 2008
170(2)
6 Conclusions
172(3)
8 Conclusions
175(16)
1 Contributions
176(3)
2 The Future of the United States as an ILLR
179(6)
3 Policy Implications
185(4)
4 Final Thoughts
189(2)
Appendix 191(6)
Bibliography 197(16)
Index 213
Daniel McDowell is Assistant Professor of Political Science, Syracuse University.