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xi | |
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xiii | |
Preface |
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xv | |
Abbreviations |
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xix | |
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1 | (17) |
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3 | (4) |
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7 | (4) |
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3 Plan of the Book and Findings |
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11 | (7) |
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2 The ILLR in Theory and Practice |
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18 | (23) |
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1 An International LLR: A Brief History of a Concept |
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19 | (5) |
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1.1 The ILLR and the Hegemon |
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20 | (2) |
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22 | (2) |
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2 The IMF's Limitations as ILLR |
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24 | (6) |
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2.1 The Problem of Unresponsiveness |
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25 | (2) |
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2.2 The Problem of Resource Insufficiency |
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27 | (3) |
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3 The United States' ILLR Mechanisms |
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30 | (10) |
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3.1 The Mechanics of Currency Swaps |
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31 | (1) |
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3.2 Speed and Independence |
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31 | (2) |
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33 | (4) |
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37 | (3) |
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40 | (1) |
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3 The United States Invents Its Own ILLR, 1961--1962 |
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41 | (23) |
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1 More Dollars, More Problems |
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42 | (4) |
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1.1 From Dollar Gap to Dollar Glut |
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43 | (1) |
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1.2 Two Threats: The "Gold Drain" and Speculation |
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44 | (2) |
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46 | (7) |
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2.1 The General Arrangements to Borrow |
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47 | (6) |
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3 An Alternative ILLR: Central Bank Currency Swaps |
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53 | (10) |
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54 | (2) |
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56 | (4) |
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3.3 How the Swap Lines Protected US Interests |
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60 | (1) |
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3.4 Why Did Europe Cooperate? |
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61 | (2) |
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63 | (1) |
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4 The Exchange Stabilization Fund and the IMF in the 1980s and 1990s |
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64 | (22) |
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1 The Exchange Stabilization Fund |
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66 | (4) |
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2 Global Banking and the Debt Crisis: 1980s |
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70 | (8) |
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2.1 The IMF's "Concerted Lending" Strategy and the Problem of Unresponsiveness |
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71 | (5) |
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2.2 The ESF and "Bridge Loans": Correcting for the Problem of IMF Unresponsiveness |
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76 | (2) |
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3 Portfolio Flows and Capital Account Crises: 1990s |
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78 | (6) |
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3.1 Capital Account Crises and IMF Resource Insufficiency |
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81 | (2) |
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3.2 The ESF and Supplemental Loans: Correcting for the Problem of IMF Resource Insufficiency |
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83 | (1) |
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84 | (2) |
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5 Who's In, Who's Out, and Why? Selecting Whom to Bail Out, 1983-1999 |
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86 | (19) |
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1 US Financial Interests and ESF Bailout Selection |
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88 | (5) |
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2 An Empirical Model of ESF Bailout Selection |
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93 | (6) |
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99 | (4) |
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103 | (2) |
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6 US International Bailouts in the 1980s and 1990s |
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105 | (34) |
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106 | (2) |
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108 | (29) |
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2.1 Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina, 1982-1983 |
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108 | (8) |
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116 | (3) |
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119 | (2) |
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121 | (6) |
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127 | (2) |
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2.6 Indonesia and South Korea, 1997 |
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129 | (6) |
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2.7 Declining Use: The ESF Is Put Out to Pasture |
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135 | (2) |
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137 | (2) |
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7 The United States as an ILLR during the Great Panic of 2008--2009 |
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139 | (36) |
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1 Background: "A Novel Aspect" of the Great Panic of 2008 |
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141 | (7) |
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2 US Financial Interests and the Fed's ILLR Actions |
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148 | (7) |
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3 An Empirical Model of Fed Swap Line Selection |
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155 | (4) |
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4 The Interest-Rate Threat and the Fed's ILLR Actions |
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159 | (3) |
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5 Transcript Analysis of FOMC Meetings |
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162 | (10) |
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5.1 The Initiation of the Swap Lines and the TAF, August 2007--December 2007 |
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163 | (4) |
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5.2 Incremental Expansion of Liquidity Facilities, March 2008--August 2008 |
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167 | (1) |
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5.3 Rapid Growth of the Swap Program: September 15, 2008--October 28, 2008 |
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168 | (2) |
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5.4 Swap Lines for Four Emerging Markets: October 29, 2008 |
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170 | (2) |
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172 | (3) |
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175 | (16) |
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176 | (3) |
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2 The Future of the United States as an ILLR |
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179 | (6) |
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185 | (4) |
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189 | (2) |
Appendix |
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191 | (6) |
Bibliography |
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197 | (16) |
Index |
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213 | |