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Budapest Operation: An Operational-Strategic Study [Kietas viršelis]

  • Formatas: Hardback, 360 pages, aukštis x plotis: 248x171 mm, 2 b/w maps, 14 tables
  • Išleidimo metai: 12-Jun-2017
  • Leidėjas: Helion & Company
  • ISBN-10: 1911512420
  • ISBN-13: 9781911512424
Kitos knygos pagal šią temą:
  • Formatas: Hardback, 360 pages, aukštis x plotis: 248x171 mm, 2 b/w maps, 14 tables
  • Išleidimo metai: 12-Jun-2017
  • Leidėjas: Helion & Company
  • ISBN-10: 1911512420
  • ISBN-13: 9781911512424
Kitos knygos pagal šią temą:
The Budapest Operation (29 October 1944-13 February 1945): An Operational-Strategic Study examines in detail the Red Army's operations on the approaches to Budapest and the city's ultimate capture following a long siege. The first part of the study deals with the Red Army's arrival in central Hungary, following the successful conduct of the Iasi—Kishinev operation in late August 1944 and the subsequent development of the offensive through Romania, Bulgaria and eastern Yugoslavia. By mid-October the Soviets were poised to continue the offensive into Hungary and its capital of Budapest, the capture of which would clear the path for a subsequent advance into Austria and southern Germany. This study examines the rapid advance to the outskirts of Budapest, where stubborn German-Hungarian resistance forced them to halt, after which the Soviets sought to surround the city, finally closing the ring at the end of December. Also examined are the Germans' repeated attempts to break the siege by launching several counter-offensives to the west and south of the city. However, these were all beaten back in heavy fighting and the enemy garrison was forced to capitulate on 13 February. This study also devotes considerable attention to the combat arms (artillery, tanks and mechanized forces, aviation, and engineering troops) during the operation. The other study is an internal General Staff Academy document dealing with the activities of the Third Ukrainian Front during the Budapest operation. Throughout the greater part of the operation the Third Ukrainian Front played a decidedly secondary role, charged with protecting the flank of the Soviet advance through Yugoslavia and Hungary, with the Second Ukrainian Front slated to receive the accolades for taking Budapest. However, the bitter enemy resistance along the approaches to Budapest gradually forced the Soviet high command to increasingly shift its efforts to the right bank of the Danube River, first to help in isolating the Budapest garrison inside the city, and then to fend off repeated German counter-offensives to relieve the city. It was the Third Ukrainian Front's successful repulse of these efforts that enabled the Soviets to finally bring about the garrison's capitulation and the end of the operation.
List of Maps
xi
List of Tables
xii
Preface to the English-Language Edition xiii
Part 1 Introduction & Narrative of the Budapest operation
15(80)
1 Introduction
17(7)
A Short Military-Geographical Description of the Operational Area
18(4)
The Overall Situation
22(2)
2 The Rout of the German-Hungarian Forces in the Area Between the Tisza and Danube Rivers by the Forces of the Second Ukrainian Front. The Forcing of the Danube by the Forces of the Third Ukrainian Front along the Batina---Apatin Sector and the Seizure of an Operational Bridgehead Along the Western Bank of the Danube (The Operation's First Stage, 28 October-30 November 1944)
24(17)
The Second Ukrainian Front's Combat Operations (28 October-26 November 1944)
26(11)
Combat Activities by the Third Ukrainian Front's Forces (28 October-30 November 1944)
37(4)
3 The Defeat of the Enemy's Hatvan Group of Forces by the Second Ukrainian Front and the Defeat of the Enemy's Danube Group of Forces by the Third Ukrainian Front (The Operation's Second Stage, 1-9 December 1944)
41(9)
The Second Ukrainian Front's Combat Operations (5-9 December)
41(6)
The Third Ukrainian Front's Combat Operations (1-9 December)
47(3)
4 The Encirclement of the Enemy's Budapest Group of Forces in Budapest (The Operation's Third Stage, 10-31 December 1944)
50(22)
The Second Ukrainian Front's Combat Activities
50(5)
Combat Activities of the Third Ukrainian Front's Forces (20-31 December 1944)
55(17)
5 The Repulse of the Germans' Counteroffensive. The Defeat of the Enemy's Budapest Group of Forces and the Capture of the Hungarian Capital of Budapest (The Operation's Fourth Stage, 1 January-13 February 1945)
72(23)
Conclusions
89(6)
Part II The Employment of the Combat Arms in the Budapest Operation
95(74)
6 The Employment of Artillery in the Budapest Operation
97(15)
Artillery Support of the Enemy's Defeat along the Southern and Southeastern Approaches to Budapest
97(1)
The Activities of the 46th Army's Artillery in Defeating the Enemy in the Area Between the Tisza and Danube (28 October-4 November)
97(2)
The Actions of the 7th Guards Army's Artillery
99(4)
Artillery Support for the Forcing of the Csepeli Dunaag and Danube Rivers by the Forces of the 46th Army (22 November-10 December)
103(1)
The Activities of the 4th Guards Army's Artillery in Forcing the Danube and Supporting the Arrival of the Thitd Ukrainian Front's Forces at the Line of Lakes Velence and Balaton (24 November-10 December)
104(1)
Artillery Support for the Breakthrough of the "Margarita" Line by the Forces of the Third Ukrainian Front's 46th Army (20-26 December)
105(2)
Artillery Support of the Breakthrough of the "Margarita" Line by the Forces of the Third Ukrainian Front's 4th Guards Army (20-23 December)
107(2)
The Activities of the Third Ukrainian Front's 4th Guards Army's Artillery in the Defensive Fighting West and Southwest of Budapest (2 January-13 February)
109(1)
Brief Conclusions
110(2)
7 The Employment of Tank and Mechanized Forces in the Budapest Operation
112(29)
The Tank and Mechanized Forces' Activities During the First Stage of the Operation (28 October-30 November 1944)
112(6)
The Tank and Mechanized Forces' Activities During the Second Stage of the Operation (1-9 December 1944)
118(3)
The Tank and Mechanized Troops' Activities During the Third Stage of the Operation (10-31 December 1944)
121(7)
The Tank and Mechanized Troops' Activities During the Fourth Stage of the Operation (1 January-13 February 1945)
128(1)
The Disposition of Tank and Mechanized Forces by Fronts, as of 1 January 1945
128(1)
The Course of Combat Activities
129(8)
Brief Conclusions
137(4)
8 Features of Aviation Employment and Air Operations in the Budapest Operation
141(13)
Aviation's Activities in Repelling the Enemy's Counteroffensives
141(1)
The Overall and Air Situation Along the Third Ukrainian Front in January 1945
141(6)
Air Operations in the Fighting for Budapest
147(1)
The Overall and Air Situation in the Budapest Area in January-February, 1945
147(5)
Brief Conclusions
152(2)
9 Engineer Support of the Budapest Operation
154(15)
Engineer Support for the Forcing of the Danube
154(8)
Engineer Support for the Assault on Budapest
162(4)
The Employment of Engineer Troops in Repelling the Enemy's Counteroffensives
166(3)
Part III The Third Ukrainian Front's Activities in the Budapest Operation (An Operational--Tactical Sketch)
169(172)
10 The Strategic Situation Along the Soviet-German Front by the Start of the Budapest Operation (By 29 October 1944)
171(13)
The USSR's Military-Political Situation by the Start of the Budapest Operation
171(2)
The Fourth, Second and Third Ukrainian Fronts' Situation
173(3)
The Fascist Bloc's Military-Political Situation
176(1)
The Situation in the Countries of Southeastern Europe
177(7)
11 The Operational Situation in the Third Ukrainian Front's Sector Along the Budapest Direction by the end of October 1944
184(4)
12 The Enemy's Plan: An Operational--Tactical Description of the Enemy's Group of Forces Along the Third Ukrainian Front's Operational Sector
188(3)
13 An Operational-Tactical Description and Evaluation of the Terrain and the Enemy's Defense in the Sector of the Third Ukrainian Front's Forthcoming Offensive
191(6)
The Nagykanizsa Operational Direction
191(1)
The Szekesfehervar Operational Direction
192(2)
The Defensive Line Along the Sector Erd---Lake Velence---Lake Balaton---Nagybajom---Drava River
194(3)
14 The Third Ukrainian Front's Preparation for the Budapest Operation
197(4)
15 The Forcing of the Danube River and the Defeat of the Enemy's Danube Group of Forces
201(32)
The Development of the Offensive and the Arrival at the "Margarita Line"
223(9)
Conclusions on the defeat of the enemy's Danube group of forces
232(1)
16 The Third Ukrainian Front's Preparations for Breaking Through the Fortified Defensive Zone, the so-called "Margarita Line," and the Defeat of the Enemy's Budapest Group of Forces
233(18)
The Stavka of the Supreme High Command's Plan
233(1)
The Third Ukrainian Front Commander's Plan
234(1)
The Third Ukrainian Front Commander's Decision
235(1)
The Front's Mobile Forces
236(3)
The Army Commander's Decision
239(2)
The Planning and Preparation for the Operation
241(4)
The Organisation of Control and Communications
245(1)
Operational Support
246(2)
Anti-Aircraft Defense
248(3)
17 Activities of the Front's Left Wing. The 57th Army's Assumption of the Defensive, 20 December 1944
251(8)
The Instructions by the Stavka of the Supreme High Command to the Commander of the Third Ukrainian Front
251(1)
The 57th Army Commander's Decision to Defend
251(2)
The Organization of Anti-Tank Defense
253(2)
Engineer Outfitting
255(1)
Planning the Defensive Operation
256(2)
Conclusions
258(1)
18 The Breakthrough of the "Margarita Line" by the Forces of the 46th and 4th Guards Armies
259(18)
The Front's Mobile Formations
274(1)
Conclusions on Breaking Through the "Margarita Line"
275(2)
19 The Repulse of the Enemy's Counterblows
277(55)
The Repulse of the First Counterblow (1-7 January 1945)
277(12)
Conclusions on Repelling the Enemy's First Counterblow
289(2)
The Repulse of the Enemy's Second Counterblow
291(5)
Conclusions on Repelling the Enemy's Second Counterblow
296(1)
The Repulse of the Third Counterblow
297(27)
Overall Conclusions on Repulsing Counterblows
324(8)
20 Conclusions on Military Art from the Experience of the Third Ukrainian Front's Operation
332(9)
Strategy
332(1)
Operational Art
333(4)
Tactics
337(4)
Index 341