The nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in May 1998 shook the region and challenged the near-global consensus on non-proliferation. In their wake, the region's underlying problems have become still more intractable, and the need to resolve them has become more urgent than ever. The international community has been powerless in its response, and a new approach is now called for. Political stability should be encouraged within the countries concerned, in their relations with each other and in the wider region. Arms control and measures to increase confidence and security need to be re-examined and adapted to the changed circumstances. The nuclear-weapon states themselves should look again at their attitudes towards arms-control instruments, while India and Pakistan need to reappraise or clarify their nuclear doctrines, and take steps to improve relations.
Why did Indian and Pakistan carry out nuclear tests in 1998 and what are the consequences of their actions? This paper examines the complex domestic and international factors that persuaded each country to drop its long-standing "nuclear ambiguity" and unravels the reprecussions of the tests both for regional stability and for global non-proliferation regimes.
Why did India and Pakistan carry out nuclear tests in 1998 and what are the consequences of their actions? This paper examines the complex domestic and international factors that persuaded each country to drop its long-standing nuclear ambiguity. It also unravels the repercussions of the tests, both for regional stability and for global non-proliferation regimes, and argues that the West needs a new approach if it is to deal with the nuclear dangers on the subcontinent.
Glossary, Introduction,
Chapter l: Why Test in 1998?,
Chapter 2: After the Tests,
Chapter 3: What Next?,
Chapter 4: Nuclear Capabilities, Nuclear Doctrines, Conclusion: What Should Be Done?, Appendix: Confidence- and Security-Building Measures, Notes