Since 2013, an organization called the Nonhuman Rights Project has brought before the New York State courts an unusual request - asking for habeas corpus hearings to determine whether Kiko and Tommy, two captive chimpanzees, should be considered legal persons with the fundamental right to bodily liberty.
While the courts have agreed that chimpanzees share emotional, behavioural and cognitive similarities with humans, they have denied that they are persons on superficial and sometimes conflicting grounds. Consequently, Kiko and Tommy remain confined as legal "things" with no rights. The major moral and legal question remains unanswered: are chimpanzees mere "things", as the law currently sees them, or can they be "persons" possessing fundamental rights?
In Chimpanzee Rights: The Philosophers Brief, a group of renowned philosophers consider these questions. Carefully and clearly, they examine the three lines of reasoning the courts have used to deny chimpanzees personhood: their species membership, whether they can bear rights and responsibilities, and whether they are members of a human community.
None of these, they argue, merits disqualifying chimpanzees from personhood. The authors conclude that when judges face the choice between seeing Kiko and Tommy as things and seeing them as personsthe only options under current lawKiko and Tommy are persons who should therefore be protected from unlawful confinement "in keeping with the best philosophical standards of rational judgment and ethical standards of justice."
Chimpanzee Rights: The Philosophers Briefan extended version of the amicus brief submitted to the New York Court of Appeals in Kiko and Tommys casesgoes to the heart of fundamental issues concerning animal rights, personhood, and the question of human and nonhuman nature. It is essential reading for anyone interested in these issues.
Acknowledgments |
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xi | |
Foreword |
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xiii | |
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One Introduction: Chimpanzees, rights, and conceptions of personhood |
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1 | (12) |
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Two The species membership conception |
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13 | (28) |
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Three The social contract conception |
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41 | (20) |
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Four The community membership conception |
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61 | (16) |
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Five The capacities conception |
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77 | (24) |
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101 | (10) |
Afterword Steven M. Wise |
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111 | (6) |
Author Index |
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117 | (2) |
Subject Index |
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119 | |
Authors: Kristin Andrews, York Research Chair in Animal Minds, Associate Professor of Philosophy, York University, Canada.
Gary Comstock, Professor of Philosophy, North Carolina State University, USA.
G.K.D. Crozier, Canada Research Chair in Environment, Culture and Values, Professor of Philosophy, Laurentian University, Canada.
Sue Donaldson, Research Associate, Department of Philosophy, Queens University, Canada.
Andrew Fenton, Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Dalhousie University, Canada.
Tyler M. John, Ph.D. Student in Philosophy, Rutgers University, USA.
L. Syd M Johnson, Associate Professor of Philosophy and Bioethics, Michigan Technological University, USA.
Robert C. Jones, Associate Professor of Philosophy, California State University, Chico, USA.
Will Kymlicka, Canada Research Chair in Political Philosophy, Queens University, Canada.
Letitia Meynell, Associate Professor of Philosophy, Dalhousie University, Canada.
Nathan Nobis, Associate Professor of Philosophy, Morehouse College, USA.
David Peńa-Guzmįn, Assistant Professor of Humanities and Liberal Studies, California State University, San Francisco, USA.
Jeffrey Sebo, Clinical Assistant Professor of Environmental Studies, Affiliated Professor of Bioethics, Medical Ethics, and Philosophy, and Director of the Animal Studies M.A. Program, New York University, USA.
Foreword: Lori Gruen is William Griffin Professor of Philosophy at Wesleyan University, USA, coordinator of the Wesleyan Animal Studies program, and Professor of Feminist, Gender and Sexuality Studies and Science in Society.
Afterword: Steven M. Wise is an American legal scholar, a former president of the Animal Legal Defense Fund, and founder and president of the Nonhuman Rights Project.