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Churchill, Chamberlain and Appeasement [Kietas viršelis]

4.22/5 (17 ratings by Goodreads)
(University of Stirling)
  • Formatas: Hardback, 418 pages, aukštis x plotis x storis: 236x159x28 mm, weight: 750 g, Worked examples or Exercises
  • Išleidimo metai: 01-Dec-2022
  • Leidėjas: Cambridge University Press
  • ISBN-10: 1009201980
  • ISBN-13: 9781009201988
Kitos knygos pagal šią temą:
Churchill, Chamberlain and AppeasementDidesnis paveikslėlis
  • Formatas: Hardback, 418 pages, aukštis x plotis x storis: 236x159x28 mm, weight: 750 g, Worked examples or Exercises
  • Išleidimo metai: 01-Dec-2022
  • Leidėjas: Cambridge University Press
  • ISBN-10: 1009201980
  • ISBN-13: 9781009201988
Kitos knygos pagal šią temą:
Pastovi nuoroda: https://www.kriso.lt/db/9781009201988.html
Raktažodžiai:
"There are few more contrasting historical reputations than those of Winston Churchill and Neville Chamberlain. On the one hand, there is the hero who led Britain in its finest hour when it stood alone against Nazi Germany in 1940. On the other, there isthe man of Munich who attempted to appease Hitler by agreeing to his territorial demands on Czechoslovakia in 1938. Appeasement subsequently became a byword for weakness and shameful failure to stand up to dictators. Even today diplomatic compromise withan authoritarian regime is frequently criticised as another Munich. Churchill is dominant in history partly because of what he achieved as prime minister but also because of what he wrote in his best-selling history of the Second World War. Volume one, which appeared in 1948, established an enduring narrative of government failure to heed his warnings and of missed opportunities to halt Hitler before Germany became too powerful. Churchill's account still influences popular perceptions of Chamberlain. In contrast, academic historians have debated the pros and cons of appeasement for six decades without reaching a consensus. Surprisingly, this book is the first to compare Churchill and Chamberlain systematically in relation to both foreign and defence policy. It places their ideas in the context of Britain's power to influence international affairs through armed force or diplomacy, and of advice from the Foreign Office, the Treasury, the armed forces and the intelligence services as to what should be done.By doing so it demonstrates not only the uncertainty facing statesmen in the 1930s but also why historians find it difficult to agree what would have happened if statesmen had taken different decisions"--

Recenzijos

'A masterly analysis that takes a fresh approach to appeasement, based on the author's expert knowledge and understanding of both policies and personalities.' Gill Bennett, Former FCO Chief Historian 'A rigorous and compelling new look at one of the most important episodes in twentieth-century British and European History.' Richard Toye, University of Exeter 'Chamberlain, the man with the umbrella, and Churchill, the man with the cigar, were both brand names by 1930 Chamberlain's dramatic flight to meet Hitler at Munich in September 1938 meant that the word 'appeasement' was associated with him as clearly as if it had been tattooed on his forehead. Churchill's opposition to the Munich Agreement was equally dramatic But G. C. Peden suggests that the contract between the two was less black-and-white than it first appears.' Richard Vinen, Literary Review 'This well-researched and scholarly book brings together Peden's earlier specialities and publications with fresh perspectives and work A book to enjoy as well as to consider.' Jeremy Black, Journal of European Studies 'Peden's book will be the definitive history of the Churchill-Chamberlain relationship for some time to come.' Peter Neville, Diplomacy & Statecraft 'Peden's contribution to the historiography is to juxtapose a close reading of the diplomatic sources with analysis of the structural strengths and weaknesses of the British economy as they related to rearmament. The result is not a revolutionary reinterpretation, but rather a more nuanced reading of what could realistically have been accomplished in the lead-up to September 1939 Recommended.' F. Krome, Choice 'Accessible and engaging.' David M. Valladares, History '[ The book gives] a thorough and often convincing picture of what is known and alerts the reader to multiple differing viewpoints. A willingness to address counterfactuals - and where they may lead - makes this compelling history.' David C. Isby, strategypage.com

Daugiau informacijos

The first study to compare Churchill and Chamberlain systematically in relation to appeasement and defence policy in the 1930s.
List of Figures
vii
List of Tables
viii
Acknowledgements ix
List of Abbreviations
x
Introduction 1(2)
1 Churchill, Chamberlain and Historians
3(12)
1.1 Chamberlain: Guilty Man?
3(6)
1.2 Why Historians Differ on Appeasement
9(6)
2 Personalities and Policymaking
15(33)
2.1 Two Contrasting Personalities
15(8)
2.2 Who Was Who in Whitehall
23(19)
2.3 The Intelligence Services
42(3)
2.4 Churchill and Whitehall in the 1930s
45(3)
3 Britain and the Balance of Power
48(40)
3.1 Measuring Power
48(5)
3.2 Sea Power
53(6)
3.3 Air Power
59(5)
3.4 Land Power
64(4)
3.5 Defence Industries
68(6)
3.6 The Wider Economy
74(3)
3.7 Public Opinion and National Morale
77(3)
3.8 Collective Security
80(5)
3.9 Intelligence and Perceptions of Power
85(3)
4 The Darkening Scene
88(30)
4.1 Dealing with the Great Depression
88(4)
4.2 The War Debts Controversy
92(6)
4.3 Manchuria and the End of the Ten Year Rule
98(2)
4.4 Disarmament and Defence Requirements, 1932--1934
100(7)
4.5 Reshaping Grand Strategy, 1934
107(6)
4.6 Anglo-Japanese Relations
113(5)
5 The Ethiopian and Rhineland Crises
118(30)
5.1 The German Threat Increases
118(4)
5.2 The Ethiopian Crisis
122(6)
5.3 Drawing Up the Rearmament Programme
128(4)
5.4 The Rhineland Crisis and After
132(7)
5.5 Rearmament and the Role of the Army
139(5)
5.6 Financing Rearmament
144(4)
6 Chamberlain Takes Charge
148(29)
6.1 Relations with the United States and Japan
148(9)
6.2 Seeking a General Settlement in Europe
157(9)
6.3 The Inskip Defence Review
166(7)
6.4 Eden's Resignation
173(4)
7 From the Anschluss to Munich
177(38)
7.1 First Reactions to the Threat to Czechoslovakia
177(10)
7.2 From May `Crisis' to September Crisis
187(7)
7.3 Berchtesgaden and Godesberg
194(11)
7.4 Munich
205(10)
8 From Munich to Prague
215(27)
8.1 The Aftermath of Munich
215(13)
8.2 Towards a Continental Commitment
228(7)
8.3 Still Hoping for the Best
235(3)
8.4 The End of Czechoslovakia
238(4)
9 Deterrence by Guarantee
242(38)
9.1 The Guarantee to Poland
242(13)
9.2 Negotiations with the Soviets
255(12)
9.3 Secret Contacts with Germans
267(5)
9.4 The Decision for War
272(8)
10 The Test of War
280(25)
10.1 The `Phoney War'
280(6)
10.2 Norway and the Fall of Chamberlain's Government
286(6)
10.3 Finest Hour
292(8)
10.4 The Limits of British Power
300(5)
11 Counterfactuals and Conclusions
305(15)
11.1 What Would Churchill Have Done?
305(3)
11.2 Would It Have Been Better to Fight in 1938?
308(7)
11.3 Concluding Reflections
315(5)
Notes 320(55)
Bibliography 375(24)
Index 399
G. C. Peden is Emeritus Professor of Stirling University. His previous publications include Arms, Economics and British Strategy: From Dreadnoughts to Hydrogen Bombs (2007), The Treasury and British Public Policy, 1906-1959 (2000) and British Rearmament and the Treasury, 1932-1939 (1979). He is a Fellow of Scotland's national academy, the Royal Society of Edinburgh.