Acknowledgements |
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x | |
Table of Cases |
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xv | |
Table of Legislation |
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xvii | |
List of Abbreviations |
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xxi | |
List of Tables and Figures |
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xxiii | |
Chapter 1 Introduction |
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1 | (10) |
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1 | (2) |
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3 | (1) |
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4 | (2) |
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6 | (1) |
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7 | (1) |
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8 | (3) |
Chapter 2 The Development of Competition Law and Merger Control Policy in China |
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11 | (50) |
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11 | (3) |
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14 | (3) |
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3 Merger and Acquisition between SOEs |
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17 | (4) |
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17 | (2) |
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3.2 Merger Policy for SOEs |
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19 | (2) |
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4 Merger and Acquisition by Foreign Investors |
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21 | (8) |
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4.1 Foreign Direct Investment |
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21 | (3) |
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24 | (1) |
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4.3 Merger Policy for Foreign Investors |
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25 | (4) |
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5 An Overview of the Anti-Monopoly Law and the Merger Policy |
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29 | (13) |
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5.1 Competition Policy before the AML |
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29 | (4) |
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5.2 The Drafting Process of the AML |
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33 | (2) |
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5.3 An Overview of the AML |
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35 | (1) |
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5.4 Enforcement of the AML |
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36 | (3) |
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5.4.1 Three Enforcement Agencies |
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36 | (2) |
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5.4.2 MOFCOM: the Merger Enforcement Agency |
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38 | (1) |
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5.5 Merger Guidelines after the AML |
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39 | (3) |
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5.5.1 Notification Guidelines |
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39 | (1) |
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5.5.2 Assessment Guidelines |
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40 | (2) |
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6 Non-Economic Goals in the AML and Merger Policy |
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42 | (3) |
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6.1 The Development of a Socialist Market Economy |
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43 | (1) |
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6.2 Concerns of Protecting SOEs |
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43 | (1) |
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6.3 Promoting Public Interest |
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43 | (2) |
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6.4 National Security Review |
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45 | (1) |
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7 Interpreting the Multiple Goals of the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law |
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45 | (13) |
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46 | (8) |
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7.1.1 Non-Economic Goals versus Economic Goals |
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46 | (1) |
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7.1.2 The Development of a Socialist Market Economy |
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47 | (1) |
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7.1.3 Competition Policy versus Industrial Policy |
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48 | (1) |
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7.1.4 The Considerations of Public Interests |
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49 | (2) |
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7.1.5 Considerations of National Security |
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51 | (1) |
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7.1.6 Efficiency and Welfare Standards |
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51 | (3) |
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7.2 The Legislative Debate |
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54 | (1) |
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54 | |
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8 | (50) |
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58 | (3) |
Chapter 3 Goals of Competition Policy in the US and the EU: A Law and Economics Perspective |
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61 | (58) |
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61 | (2) |
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2 Goals of Antitrust Law in the US |
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63 | (31) |
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63 | (2) |
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2.2 Social and Political Goals of Antitrust |
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65 | (4) |
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65 | (1) |
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2.2.2 Influence of Populism in Court |
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66 | (2) |
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2.2.3 Criticism from Academic Scholars |
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68 | (1) |
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69 | (3) |
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2.3.1 The Structure-Conduct-Performance Paradigm |
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69 | (1) |
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2.3.2 Harvard School's View on the Goals of Antitrust Law |
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70 | (1) |
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2.3.3 Influence of the Harvard School in Court |
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71 | (1) |
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72 | (12) |
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2.4.1 Chicago School's View on the Goals of Antitrust Law |
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73 | (4) |
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2.4.1.1 Efficiency as the Sole Aim |
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73 | (1) |
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2.4.1.2 Rejecting the Goal of 'Maximizing Competition' |
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74 | (2) |
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2.4.1.3 Bork's Use of 'Consumer Welfare' |
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76 | (1) |
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2.4.2 Influence of the Chicago School in Court |
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77 | (2) |
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2.4.3 Criticism from Academic Scholars |
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79 | (5) |
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2.4.3.1 Interpreting Legislative Intent |
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79 | (1) |
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2.4.3.2 The Concerns of Distributive Effects |
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80 | (2) |
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2.4.3.3 Protecting Competition as the Goal |
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82 | (2) |
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2.5 The Debate on Welfare Standards in the Post-Chicago Era |
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84 | (9) |
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2.5.1 Consumer Welfare Standard |
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86 | (5) |
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2.5.1.1 Who is the Consumer? |
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86 | (1) |
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2.5.1.2 What is Consumer Welfare? |
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87 | (1) |
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2.5.1.3 Consumer Welfare or Consumer Surplus? |
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88 | (1) |
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2.5.1.4 Consumer Welfare Maximization |
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89 | (1) |
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90 | (1) |
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2.5.2 Consumer Welfare versus Total Welfare |
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91 | (5) |
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2.5.2.1 Distributive Issues |
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91 | (1) |
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2.5.2.2 Implementation Issues |
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92 | (1) |
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93 | (1) |
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3 Goals of Competition Law in the EU |
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94 | (22) |
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94 | (1) |
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3.2 The Market Integration Goal |
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95 | (1) |
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3.3 The Consumer Protection Goal |
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96 | (3) |
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3.3.1 Consumer Welfare versus Total Welfare |
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96 | (1) |
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3.3.2 Defining 'Consumer Welfare' |
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97 | (2) |
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3.4 The Total Welfare Goal and Industrial Policy |
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99 | (2) |
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3.5 The Influence of Ordoliberalism |
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101 | (7) |
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102 | (2) |
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3.5.2 The Influence of Ordoliberalism on EU Competition Law |
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104 | (4) |
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3.6 The Evolution of Legal Doctrine |
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108 | (4) |
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3.6.1 Historical Backgrounds |
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108 | (1) |
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3.6.2 The Market Integration Goal of the EEC |
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109 | (1) |
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3.6.3 The Extension of the Policy Goal of the TEU |
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110 | (1) |
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3.6.4 The Social Goals of the TFEU |
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110 | (2) |
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3.7 A Viewpoint from the Competition Commissioners |
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112 | (3) |
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3.7.1 Commissioner Karel Van Miert (1993-1999) |
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112 | (1) |
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3.7.2 Commissioner Mario Monti (1999-2004) |
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112 | (1) |
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3.7.3 Commissioner Neelie Kroes (2004-2010) |
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113 | (2) |
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115 | (1) |
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116 | (3) |
Chapter 4 Integrating the Efficiency Goal in Merger Control Policy: A Comparative Perspective |
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119 | (38) |
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119 | (3) |
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2 Economic Theories of Efficiency |
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122 | (9) |
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2.1 Productive Efficiency |
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123 | (1) |
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2.2 Allocative Efficiency |
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123 | (1) |
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124 | (4) |
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2.4 Conflicts between Allocative, Dynamic and Productive Efficiencies |
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128 | (2) |
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130 | (1) |
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3 Economic Analysis of Merger Effects |
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131 | (4) |
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3.1 Economic Effects of Mergers |
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131 | (1) |
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3.2 The Williamson Tradeoff |
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132 | (1) |
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3.3 Impact on the Choice of Welfare Standards |
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133 | (2) |
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4 Integrating Efficiency Goals in the US Merger Control Policy |
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135 | (14) |
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135 | (2) |
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137 | (2) |
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4.2.1 Concerns of Legal Uncertainties |
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137 | (1) |
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4.2.2 Economic Techniques to Measure Efficiencies |
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138 | (1) |
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139 | (1) |
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139 | (6) |
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4.3.1 1968 Horizontal Merger Guidelines |
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139 | (1) |
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4.3.2 1982 Horizontal Merger Guidelines |
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140 | (2) |
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4.3.3 1984 Horizontal Merger Guidelines |
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142 | (1) |
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4.3.4 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines |
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142 | (1) |
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4.3.5 1997 Horizontal Merger Guidelines |
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143 | (1) |
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4.3.6 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines |
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144 | (1) |
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145 | (4) |
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4.4.1 Hostility toward Efficiency Claims |
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145 | (2) |
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4.4.2 Cautiously Accepted Efficiency Claims |
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147 | (2) |
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5 Integrating Efficiency Goal in the EU Competition Policy |
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149 | (6) |
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149 | (2) |
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151 | (2) |
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5.2.1 Merger Regulation 4064/89 |
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151 | (1) |
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5.2.2 2004 EC Merger Regulation (ECMR) |
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152 | (1) |
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153 | (6) |
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5.3.1 Negative View on Efficiency Claims |
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153 | (1) |
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5.3.2 Cautiously Accepted Efficiency Claims |
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154 | (1) |
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155 | (2) |
Chapter 5 The Impact of Competition Goals on Merger Cases: A Comparative Perspective |
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157 | (74) |
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157 | (2) |
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2 An Overview of Merger Cases in China |
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159 | (16) |
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2.1 Merger Policy in China: Five Years' Implementation |
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159 | (2) |
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2.2 A Brief Overview of MOFCOM's Merger Decisions |
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161 | (14) |
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2.2.1 An Overview of the MOFCOM Published Cases |
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161 | (4) |
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2.2.2 Observation: How Does the MOFCOM Investigate? |
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165 | (1) |
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2.2.3 Observation: The High Use of Behavioral Remedies |
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165 | (3) |
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2.2.4 Observation: The Focus on Market Share |
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168 | (1) |
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168 | (7) |
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3 The Economic Theories and Techniques for Horizontal Merger Analysis: A Brief Summary |
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175 | (17) |
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175 | (2) |
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3.2 Indirect Assessment of Market Power |
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177 | (10) |
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3.2.1 The Definition of the Relevant Market |
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178 | (2) |
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3.2.2 Market Concentration |
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180 | (1) |
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181 | (1) |
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3.2.4 The Consideration of Efficiency Gains |
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182 | (2) |
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184 | (1) |
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185 | (1) |
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186 | (1) |
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3.3 Direct Assessment of Market Power |
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187 | (5) |
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187 | (3) |
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3.3.2 Merger Simulation Techniques |
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190 | (2) |
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4 Comparing Merger Policy in the US, the EU and China |
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192 | (29) |
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192 | (1) |
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4.2 Comparing Merger Policy in the US and the EU: A Theoretical Debate |
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192 | (4) |
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4.2.1 The Concepts of 'Monopolization' versus 'Dominance' |
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193 | (1) |
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4.2.2 The Definition of Relevant Market |
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194 | (1) |
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4.2.3 The Treatment of Econometric Techniques |
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195 | (1) |
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4.3 Comparing Merger Policy in the US, the EU and China: Empirical Evidence |
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196 | (15) |
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4.3.1 Comparing Merger Decisions in the US and the EU |
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196 | (2) |
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4.3.2 Empirical Evidence on EU Merger Policy |
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198 | (4) |
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4.3.3 Empirical Evidence on Merger Policy in China |
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202 | (9) |
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211 | (1) |
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4.4 Comparing Merger Policy in the US, EU and China: Two Case Studies |
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211 | (9) |
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4.4.1 Panasonic/Sanyo Case |
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212 | (3) |
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212 | (1) |
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4.4.1.2 A Comparative Study on Economic Analysis of Merger Effects |
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213 | (1) |
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214 | (1) |
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4.4.2 Seagate/Samsung and Western Digital/Hitachi Case |
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215 | (5) |
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215 | (1) |
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4.4.2.2 A Comparative Study on Economic Analysis of Merger Effects |
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216 | (3) |
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219 | (1) |
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4.5 Summary: What Can the Evidence Tell? |
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220 | (1) |
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5 Does Goal Matter? A Discussion on Competition Goals and Merger Policy |
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221 | (7) |
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5.1 Different Goals, Different Results? |
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221 | (2) |
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5.2 Moving Towards Economic Goals? |
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223 | (2) |
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5.3 Implications for Chinese Policy Makers |
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225 | (3) |
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228 | (3) |
Chapter 6 Conclusions |
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231 | (6) |
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1 Different Goals in the US, the EU and China |
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231 | (2) |
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2 Competition Goals and Merger Analysis |
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233 | (1) |
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233 | (1) |
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234 | (3) |
References |
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237 | |