Atnaujinkite slapukų nuostatas

Comparative Analysis of Merger Control Policy: Lessons for China [Minkštas viršelis]

  • Formatas: Paperback / softback, 296 pages, aukštis x plotis x storis: 240x160x17 mm, weight: 500 g
  • Serija: European Studies in Law and Economics 13
  • Išleidimo metai: 10-Aug-2014
  • Leidėjas: Intersentia Ltd
  • ISBN-10: 178068245X
  • ISBN-13: 9781780682457
Kitos knygos pagal šią temą:
  • Formatas: Paperback / softback, 296 pages, aukštis x plotis x storis: 240x160x17 mm, weight: 500 g
  • Serija: European Studies in Law and Economics 13
  • Išleidimo metai: 10-Aug-2014
  • Leidėjas: Intersentia Ltd
  • ISBN-10: 178068245X
  • ISBN-13: 9781780682457
Kitos knygos pagal šią temą:
After thirteen years of discussion, the Anti-Monopoly Law of the People's Republic of China was promulgated on 30 August 2007 and entered into force in August 2008. This book investigates to what extent competition goals may influence merger policy by taking a comparative perspective.

After 13 years of discussion, the anti-monopoly law of the People's Republic of China was promulgated in August 2007 and entered into force a year later. During the legislative process, a particular challenge was to determine the goal of competition law in China. This challenge can be best illustrated by the merger control policy under the Chinese anti-monopoly law, which has been formulated by taking into account economic goals, as well as various social and political considerations. This book takes a comparative perspective in investigating to what extent competition goals may influence merger policy by focusing on four major issues. First, in order to understand why competition law and policy in China incorporates a multitude of policy goals, the legislative history of the anti-monopoly law and merger policy is explored. Second, the evolution of the debate on competition goals in the US and the EU puts the developments in China in a comparative perspective. Third, emphasis is placed on the evolution of incorporating the efficiency goal into merger policy. Finally, given the theoretical debate on competition goals, the book discusses whether competition goals may have an impact on the analysis of merger cases. Taking economic theories and modern economic techniques as the benchmark, the book concludes that the divergent competition goals in China, the US, and the EU lead to a different outcome of merger cases. It also sets out the policy implications for competition policy makers in China. (Series: European Studies in Law & Economics - Vol. 13)
Acknowledgements x
Table of Cases xv
Table of Legislation xvii
List of Abbreviations xxi
List of Tables and Figures xxiii
Chapter 1 Introduction 1(10)
1 Introduction
1(2)
2 Motivation
3(1)
3 Research Question
4(2)
4 Structure
6(1)
5 Methodology
7(1)
6 Limitations
8(3)
Chapter 2 The Development of Competition Law and Merger Control Policy in China 11(50)
1 Introduction
11(3)
2 The 1978 Market Reform
14(3)
3 Merger and Acquisition between SOEs
17(4)
3.1 Reform of SOEs
17(2)
3.2 Merger Policy for SOEs
19(2)
4 Merger and Acquisition by Foreign Investors
21(8)
4.1 Foreign Direct Investment
21(3)
4.2 Entry into the WTO
24(1)
4.3 Merger Policy for Foreign Investors
25(4)
5 An Overview of the Anti-Monopoly Law and the Merger Policy
29(13)
5.1 Competition Policy before the AML
29(4)
5.2 The Drafting Process of the AML
33(2)
5.3 An Overview of the AML
35(1)
5.4 Enforcement of the AML
36(3)
5.4.1 Three Enforcement Agencies
36(2)
5.4.2 MOFCOM: the Merger Enforcement Agency
38(1)
5.5 Merger Guidelines after the AML
39(3)
5.5.1 Notification Guidelines
39(1)
5.5.2 Assessment Guidelines
40(2)
6 Non-Economic Goals in the AML and Merger Policy
42(3)
6.1 The Development of a Socialist Market Economy
43(1)
6.2 Concerns of Protecting SOEs
43(1)
6.3 Promoting Public Interest
43(2)
6.4 National Security Review
45(1)
7 Interpreting the Multiple Goals of the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law
45(13)
7.1 Academic Scholars
46(8)
7.1.1 Non-Economic Goals versus Economic Goals
46(1)
7.1.2 The Development of a Socialist Market Economy
47(1)
7.1.3 Competition Policy versus Industrial Policy
48(1)
7.1.4 The Considerations of Public Interests
49(2)
7.1.5 Considerations of National Security
51(1)
7.1.6 Efficiency and Welfare Standards
51(3)
7.2 The Legislative Debate
54(1)
7.3 Policy Makers
54
7.4 Conclusion 57
8(50)
Conclusion
58(3)
Chapter 3 Goals of Competition Policy in the US and the EU: A Law and Economics Perspective 61(58)
1 Introduction
61(2)
2 Goals of Antitrust Law in the US
63(31)
2.1 Introduction
63(2)
2.2 Social and Political Goals of Antitrust
65(4)
2.2.1 Populism
65(1)
2.2.2 Influence of Populism in Court
66(2)
2.2.3 Criticism from Academic Scholars
68(1)
2.3 Harvard School
69(3)
2.3.1 The Structure-Conduct-Performance Paradigm
69(1)
2.3.2 Harvard School's View on the Goals of Antitrust Law
70(1)
2.3.3 Influence of the Harvard School in Court
71(1)
2.4 Chicago School
72(12)
2.4.1 Chicago School's View on the Goals of Antitrust Law
73(4)
2.4.1.1 Efficiency as the Sole Aim
73(1)
2.4.1.2 Rejecting the Goal of 'Maximizing Competition'
74(2)
2.4.1.3 Bork's Use of 'Consumer Welfare'
76(1)
2.4.2 Influence of the Chicago School in Court
77(2)
2.4.3 Criticism from Academic Scholars
79(5)
2.4.3.1 Interpreting Legislative Intent
79(1)
2.4.3.2 The Concerns of Distributive Effects
80(2)
2.4.3.3 Protecting Competition as the Goal
82(2)
2.5 The Debate on Welfare Standards in the Post-Chicago Era
84(9)
2.5.1 Consumer Welfare Standard
86(5)
2.5.1.1 Who is the Consumer?
86(1)
2.5.1.2 What is Consumer Welfare?
87(1)
2.5.1.3 Consumer Welfare or Consumer Surplus?
88(1)
2.5.1.4 Consumer Welfare Maximization
89(1)
2.5.1.5 Consumer Choice
90(1)
2.5.2 Consumer Welfare versus Total Welfare
91(5)
2.5.2.1 Distributive Issues
91(1)
2.5.2.2 Implementation Issues
92(1)
2.6 Conclusion
93(1)
3 Goals of Competition Law in the EU
94(22)
3.1 Introduction
94(1)
3.2 The Market Integration Goal
95(1)
3.3 The Consumer Protection Goal
96(3)
3.3.1 Consumer Welfare versus Total Welfare
96(1)
3.3.2 Defining 'Consumer Welfare'
97(2)
3.4 The Total Welfare Goal and Industrial Policy
99(2)
3.5 The Influence of Ordoliberalism
101(7)
3.5.1 Ordoliberalism
102(2)
3.5.2 The Influence of Ordoliberalism on EU Competition Law
104(4)
3.6 The Evolution of Legal Doctrine
108(4)
3.6.1 Historical Backgrounds
108(1)
3.6.2 The Market Integration Goal of the EEC
109(1)
3.6.3 The Extension of the Policy Goal of the TEU
110(1)
3.6.4 The Social Goals of the TFEU
110(2)
3.7 A Viewpoint from the Competition Commissioners
112(3)
3.7.1 Commissioner Karel Van Miert (1993-1999)
112(1)
3.7.2 Commissioner Mario Monti (1999-2004)
112(1)
3.7.3 Commissioner Neelie Kroes (2004-2010)
113(2)
3.8 Conclusion
115(1)
4 Conclusion
116(3)
Chapter 4 Integrating the Efficiency Goal in Merger Control Policy: A Comparative Perspective 119(38)
1 Introduction
119(3)
2 Economic Theories of Efficiency
122(9)
2.1 Productive Efficiency
123(1)
2.2 Allocative Efficiency
123(1)
2.3 Dynamic Efficiency
124(4)
2.4 Conflicts between Allocative, Dynamic and Productive Efficiencies
128(2)
2.5 Unsolved Issues
130(1)
3 Economic Analysis of Merger Effects
131(4)
3.1 Economic Effects of Mergers
131(1)
3.2 The Williamson Tradeoff
132(1)
3.3 Impact on the Choice of Welfare Standards
133(2)
4 Integrating Efficiency Goals in the US Merger Control Policy
135(14)
4.1 Introduction
135(2)
4.2 Academic Debate
137(2)
4.2.1 Concerns of Legal Uncertainties
137(1)
4.2.2 Economic Techniques to Measure Efficiencies
138(1)
4.2.3 Efficiency Defense
139(1)
4.3 Merger Guidelines
139(6)
4.3.1 1968 Horizontal Merger Guidelines
139(1)
4.3.2 1982 Horizontal Merger Guidelines
140(2)
4.3.3 1984 Horizontal Merger Guidelines
142(1)
4.3.4 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines
142(1)
4.3.5 1997 Horizontal Merger Guidelines
143(1)
4.3.6 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines
144(1)
4.4 Judicial Treatment
145(4)
4.4.1 Hostility toward Efficiency Claims
145(2)
4.4.2 Cautiously Accepted Efficiency Claims
147(2)
5 Integrating Efficiency Goal in the EU Competition Policy
149(6)
5.1 Introduction
149(2)
5.2 Merger Regulation
151(2)
5.2.1 Merger Regulation 4064/89
151(1)
5.2.2 2004 EC Merger Regulation (ECMR)
152(1)
5.3 Case Law
153(6)
5.3.1 Negative View on Efficiency Claims
153(1)
5.3.2 Cautiously Accepted Efficiency Claims
154(1)
6 Conclusion
155(2)
Chapter 5 The Impact of Competition Goals on Merger Cases: A Comparative Perspective 157(74)
1 Introduction
157(2)
2 An Overview of Merger Cases in China
159(16)
2.1 Merger Policy in China: Five Years' Implementation
159(2)
2.2 A Brief Overview of MOFCOM's Merger Decisions
161(14)
2.2.1 An Overview of the MOFCOM Published Cases
161(4)
2.2.2 Observation: How Does the MOFCOM Investigate?
165(1)
2.2.3 Observation: The High Use of Behavioral Remedies
165(3)
2.2.4 Observation: The Focus on Market Share
168(1)
2.2.5 Summary
168(7)
3 The Economic Theories and Techniques for Horizontal Merger Analysis: A Brief Summary
175(17)
3.1 Market Power
175(2)
3.2 Indirect Assessment of Market Power
177(10)
3.2.1 The Definition of the Relevant Market
178(2)
3.2.2 Market Concentration
180(1)
3.2.3 Market Share
181(1)
3.2.4 The Consideration of Efficiency Gains
182(2)
3.2.5 Entry
184(1)
3.2.6 Buyers' Power
185(1)
3.2.7 Remedies
186(1)
3.3 Direct Assessment of Market Power
187(5)
3.3.1 Introduction
187(3)
3.3.2 Merger Simulation Techniques
190(2)
4 Comparing Merger Policy in the US, the EU and China
192(29)
4.1 Introduction
192(1)
4.2 Comparing Merger Policy in the US and the EU: A Theoretical Debate
192(4)
4.2.1 The Concepts of 'Monopolization' versus 'Dominance'
193(1)
4.2.2 The Definition of Relevant Market
194(1)
4.2.3 The Treatment of Econometric Techniques
195(1)
4.3 Comparing Merger Policy in the US, the EU and China: Empirical Evidence
196(15)
4.3.1 Comparing Merger Decisions in the US and the EU
196(2)
4.3.2 Empirical Evidence on EU Merger Policy
198(4)
4.3.3 Empirical Evidence on Merger Policy in China
202(9)
4.3.4 Conclusion
211(1)
4.4 Comparing Merger Policy in the US, EU and China: Two Case Studies
211(9)
4.4.1 Panasonic/Sanyo Case
212(3)
4.4.1.1 Case Summary
212(1)
4.4.1.2 A Comparative Study on Economic Analysis of Merger Effects
213(1)
4.4.1.3 Conclusion
214(1)
4.4.2 Seagate/Samsung and Western Digital/Hitachi Case
215(5)
4.4.2.1 Case Summary
215(1)
4.4.2.2 A Comparative Study on Economic Analysis of Merger Effects
216(3)
4.4.2.3 Conclusion
219(1)
4.5 Summary: What Can the Evidence Tell?
220(1)
5 Does Goal Matter? A Discussion on Competition Goals and Merger Policy
221(7)
5.1 Different Goals, Different Results?
221(2)
5.2 Moving Towards Economic Goals?
223(2)
5.3 Implications for Chinese Policy Makers
225(3)
6 Conclusion
228(3)
Chapter 6 Conclusions 231(6)
1 Different Goals in the US, the EU and China
231(2)
2 Competition Goals and Merger Analysis
233(1)
3 Lessons for China
233(1)
4 Future Research
234(3)
References 237