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Consciousness and Fundamental Reality [Kietas viršelis]

4.22/5 (120 ratings by Goodreads)
(Professor of Philosophy, Durham University)
  • Formatas: Hardback, 304 pages, aukštis x plotis x storis: 155x236x25 mm, weight: 544 g
  • Serija: Philosophy of Mind Series
  • Išleidimo metai: 14-Sep-2017
  • Leidėjas: Oxford University Press Inc
  • ISBN-10: 0190677015
  • ISBN-13: 9780190677015
Kitos knygos pagal šią temą:
  • Formatas: Hardback, 304 pages, aukštis x plotis x storis: 155x236x25 mm, weight: 544 g
  • Serija: Philosophy of Mind Series
  • Išleidimo metai: 14-Sep-2017
  • Leidėjas: Oxford University Press Inc
  • ISBN-10: 0190677015
  • ISBN-13: 9780190677015
Kitos knygos pagal šią temą:
A core philosophical project is the attempt to uncover the fundamental nature of reality, the limited set of facts upon which all other facts depend. Perhaps the most popular theory of fundamental reality in contemporary analytic philosophy is physicalism, the view that the world is fundamentally physical in nature. The first half of this book argues that physicalist views cannot account for the evident reality of conscious experience, and hence that physicalism cannot be true. Unusually for an opponent of physicalism, Goff argues that there are big problems with the most well-known arguments against physicalism--Chalmers' zombie conceivability argument and Jackson's knowledge argument -- and proposes significant modifications.

The second half of the book explores and defends a recently rediscovered theory of fundamental reality--or perhaps rather a grouping of such theories--known as 'Russellian monism.' Russellian monists draw inspiration from a couple of theses defended by Bertrand Russell in The Analysis of Matter in 1927. Russell argued that physics, for all its virtues, gives us a radically incomplete picture of the world. It tells us only about the extrinsic, mathematical features of material entities, and leaves us in the dark about their intrinsic nature, about how they are in and of themselves. Following Russell, Russellian monists suppose that it is this 'hidden' intrinsic nature of matter that explains human and animal consciousness.

Some Russellian monists adopt panpsychism, the view that the intrinsic natures of basic material entities involve consciousness; others hold that basic material entities are proto-conscious rather than conscious. Throughout the second half of the book various forms of Russellian monism are surveyed, and the key challenges facing it are discussed. The penultimate chapter defends a cosmopsychist form of Russellian monism, according to which all facts are grounded in facts about the conscious universe.

Recenzijos

This book is an interesting and energetic exploration of Russellian monism, a position in philosophy of mind that has gained considerable attention in recent years because it promises to move us beyond the physicalist-dualist stand-off ... the book is honest, unflinching, imaginative and argumentative; in other words, a very good philosophy book. * Daniel Stoljar, Notre Dame Philosophical Review * This book contains some of the most important contributions to the metaphysics of consciousness in recent years. Philip Goff develops a sophisticated argument against materialism, and then explores the prospects for radical alternatives in considerable depth. He makes a strong case for panpsychism, the thesis that consciousness exists at a fundamental level of physical reality, and extends this to a case for cosmopsychism, the thesis that the universe as a whole is conscious. Anyone interested in the philosophical problem of consciousness should pay close attention to his ideas. * David Chalmers, New York University, and series editor, Philosophy of Mind series (OUP) * Goff has produced a grand piece of speculative metaphysics, in the tradition of Leibniz, Spinoza and Unger. It is also probably the best single piece of work emerging from the recent bloom of interest in Russellian monist views of consciousness. Starting with plausible and well-defended premises, he argues for a daring conclusion that many will find difficult to accept; yet, he makes a compelling case that there is no easy way to resist it. Figuring out how to respond to his rigorous and thorough arguments will be highly instructive (and fun!) for anyone with an interest in metaphysically-oriented philosophy of mind. * Geoffrey Lee, University of California, Berkeley * This book will quickly become a reference point for philosophical discussions of consciousness. Philip Goff lays out the issues with precision and cuts through to the heart of the latest philosophical technicalities. He also writes beautifully and advances a number of strikingly novel theses. No philosopher interested in consciousness can afford to ignore Consciousness and Fundamental Reality. * David Papineau, King's College London and City University of New York Graduate Center * In an era of increasing specialization and "small ball" philosophy, Philip Goff's Consciousness and Fundamental Reality comes as a welcome antidote. He defends a grand metaphysical vision of the world, constitutive cosmopsychism, according to which the universe as a whole is conscious, and everything else is grounded in its evolving conscious state. Yes, this view is revisionary. But all views on the mind-body problem are revisionary including orthodox physicalism. Goff develops a number of powerful arguments against the alternatives as well as a positive case for his cosmopsychism. His discussion demands and will repay our close attention. * Adam Pautz, Brown University *

Acknowledgments xi
1 The Reality of Consciousness
1(22)
1.1 The Big Picture
2(12)
1.1.1 The Datum of Consciousness
2(3)
1.1.2 Science and Metaphysics
5(6)
1.1.3 The Philosophical Foundations of Physics
11(3)
1.2 Physicalism and Russellian Monism
14(9)
1.2.1 Physicalism
14(3)
1.2.2 Russellian Monism
17(6)
PART I AGAINST PHYSICALISM
2 What Is Physicalism?
23(41)
2.1 The Nature of Physicality
24(17)
2.1.1 A Priori and A Posteriori Definitions of the Physical
24(1)
2.1.2 Hempel's Dilemma and Physics-Based Responses to It
25(4)
2.1.3 Pure Physicalism
29(2)
2.1.4 Naturalism and Value-Laden Causal Explanations
31(5)
2.1.5 Against A Posteriori Definitions of the Physical
36(3)
2.1.6 Definitions of Physicality and Materiality
39(2)
2.2 The Nature of Fun Dame Ntality
41(23)
2.2.1 Constitutive Grounding and the Free Lunch Constraint
42(2)
2.2.2 Grounding by Analysis
44(4)
2.2.3 A Grounding Account of Physicalism
48(7)
2.2.4 Alternatives to Grounding Accounts of Fundamentally
55(1)
2.2.4.1 Accounts of Fundamentality in Philosophy of Mind
55(5)
2.2.4.2 Accounts of Fundamentality in Metaphysics
60(4)
3 The Knowledge Argument
64(12)
3.1 Black and White Mary
65(1)
3.2 Responses to the Knowledge Argument
66(8)
3.2.1 The No-Compromise Response
66(3)
3.2.2 Non-Propositional Knowledge Responses
69(2)
3.2.3 The New Truth/Old Property Response
71(3)
3.3 Transparency and Opacity: The Moral of the Story
74(2)
4 The Conceivability Argument
76(30)
4.1 Conceivability Arguments
77(5)
4.1.1 Ghosts and Zombies
77(4)
4.1.2 Clarifying Conceivability
81(1)
4.2 Type-A and Type-B Physicalism
82(4)
4.3 Moving From Conceivability to Possibility
86(20)
4.3.1 The Two-Dimensional Conceivability Principle
86(4)
4.3.2 Against the Two-Dimensional Conceivability Principle
90(6)
4.3.3 The Transparency Conceivability Principle
96(10)
5 Revelation and the Transparency Argument
106(29)
5.1 Revelation and Transparency
107(2)
5.2 The Case For Revelation
109(6)
5.3 Can the Physicalist Account For Super-Justification?
115(5)
5.4 Full and Partial Revelation
120(2)
5.5 The Conceivability Argument and the Transparency Argument
122(3)
5.6 The Dual Carving Objection
125(10)
PART II RUSSELLIAN MONISM: AN ALTERNATIVE
6 The Elegant Solution
135(30)
6.1 Impure Physicalism and Russellian Monism
135(14)
6.1.1 The Austerity Problem
135(2)
6.1.2 Against Causal Structuralism
137(4)
6.1.3 Introducing Impure Physicalism
141(1)
6.1.4 Introducing Russellian Monism
142(3)
6.1.5 The Distinction between Russellian Monism and Physicalism
145(2)
6.1.6 The Transparency Argument against Physicalism
147(2)
6.2 Varieties of Russellian Monism
149(16)
6.2.1 Constitutive and Emergentist Forms of Russellian monism
149(4)
6.2.2 The Causal Exclusion Problem
153(5)
6.2.3 Panqualityism
158(4)
6.2.4 A Promising View
162(3)
7 Panpsychism versus Panprotopsychism and the Subject-Summing Problem
165(28)
7.1 The Threat of Noumenalism
166(3)
7.2 The Simplicity Argument For Panpsychism
169(2)
7.3 The Subject-Summing Problem
171(22)
7.3.1 James's Anti-Subject-Summing Argument
172(1)
7.3.2 The Anti-Subject-Summing Conceivability Argument
173(1)
7.3.2.1 The Argument
173(3)
7.3.2.2 Fusionism and the Anti-Subject-Summing Conceivability Argument
176(2)
7.3.2.3 The Ignorance Response
178(1)
7.3.2.4 The Consciousness+ Response
179(2)
7.3.2.5 The Spatial Relations Response
181(5)
7.3.2.6 The Gap Is Here to Stay
186(1)
7.3.3 Coleman's Anti-Subject-Summing Argument
187(6)
8 Top-Down Combination Problems
193(27)
8.1 The Palette Problem
193(10)
8.1.1 The Strong Palette Problem
194(5)
8.1.2 The Mild Palette Problem
199(4)
8.2 The Structural Mismatch Problem
203(6)
8.3 The Subject Irreducibility Problem
209(11)
9 A Conscious Universe
220(36)
9.1 Grounding By Subsumption
220(7)
9.1.1 Grounding by Subsumption of Experiences
221(1)
9.1.2 Grounding by Subsumption of Hue, Saturation, and Lightness in Color
221(1)
9.1.3 Grounding by Subsumption of Properties in States of Affairs
222(1)
9.1.4 Grounding by Subsumption of Regions of Space in the Whole of Space
223(2)
9.1.5 What Is an Aspect?
225(1)
9.1.6 Free Lunch without Analysis
226(1)
9.2 Subject-Subsumption and the Decombination Problem
227(6)
9.3 Constitutive Cosmopsychism
233(10)
9.3.1 Does Cosmopsychism Require Brute Laws?
235(3)
9.3.2 The Revelation Argument
238(3)
9.3.3 Sharing Thoughts with the Cosmos
241(2)
9.4 Emergence or Constitution?
243(10)
9.5 The Incredulous Stare
253(3)
10 Analytic Phenomenology: A Metaphysical Manifesto
256(19)
10.1 The State of Contemporary Metaphysics
256(7)
10.2 A Way Forward For Metaphysics
263(3)
10.3 A Phenomenological Argument For Presentism
266(4)
10.4 Analytic Phenomenology
270(5)
Bibliography 275(10)
Index 285
Philip Goff is Professor of Philosophy at Durham University. His research focuses on consciousness and the ultimate nature of reality. Goff is also the author of Galileo's Error: Foundations for a New Science of Consciousness (Pantheon 2019), Why? The Purpose of the Universe (OUP 2024), and co-editor of Is Consciousness Everywhere? Essays on Panpsychism (Imprint Academic, 2022). Goff has published many academic articles, as well as writing extensively for newspapers and magazines, including Scientific American, The Guardian, Aeon, and the Times Literary Supplement.