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El. knyga: Controlling Credit: Central Banking and the Planned Economy in Postwar France, 1948-1973

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It is common wisdom that central banks in the postwar (1945–1970s) period were passive bureaucracies constrained by fixed-exchange rates and inflationist fiscal policies. This view is mostly retrospective and informed by US and UK experiences. This book tells a different story. Eric Monnet shows that the Banque de France was at the heart of the postwar financial system and economic planning, and that it contributed to economic growth by both stabilizing inflation and fostering direct lending to priority economic activities. Credit was institutionalized as a social and economic objective. Monetary policy and credit controls were conflated. He then broadens his analysis to other European countries and sheds light on the evolution of central banks and credit policy before the Monetary Union. This new understanding has important ramifications for today, since many emerging markets have central bank policies that are similar to Western Europe's in the decades of high growth.

This book provides a new perspective on the history of central banking, finance and growth before the financial liberalization of the 1980s. Monnet combines economic and historical methods in a novel way that will appeal to historians, economists, political scientists, and policymakers interested in current financial and monetary policies.

Recenzijos

'How central banks and governments used directed credit to positively influence post-World War II economic recovery and growth - and why similar policies do not work today - is one of the great unsolved mysteries of twentieth-century economic history. In this pathbreaking volume, Eric Monnet uses the French case to shed important new light on the question.' Barry Eichengreen, George C. Pardee and Helen N. Pardee Professor of Economics and Political Science, University of California, Berkeley 'Monnet's intensive study of the Banque de France during the Trente Glorieuses sheds new light on the development of credit policy in the decades before the central banking orthodoxy of the 2000s. It thus makes an important contribution to understanding the development of central banking in Europe and reminds us of the heterogeneity of central bank practice in the twentieth century.' Catherine Schenk, University of Oxford 'Controlling Credit is a valuable book and will remain an inescapable reference in the emerging literature about postwar central banking.' Stefano Ugolini, Journal of Interdisciplinary History

Daugiau informacijos

Monnet analyzes monetary and central bank policy during the mid-twentieth century through close examination of the Banque de France.
List of Figures
xii
List of Tables
xiv
Preface xv
Acknowledgments xix
List of Abbreviations
xxii
Introduction 1(29)
Monetary Policy and Credit Policy
2(2)
A Policy without Interest Rates
4(2)
For a Common History of Credit Policy and Central Banking
6(2)
An Institutionalist Approach to Credit Policy
8(4)
A New Perspective on the Postwar Economy
12(4)
Domestic Credit Policy and the International Monetary System
16(2)
Chronology, Sources and Archives
18(4)
Terminology
22(1)
Outline and Main Arguments
23(7)
PART I INSTITUTIONALIZING CREDIT
Introduction to Part h Chronology and Methodology
30(10)
I The Different Stages of Credit Policy
30(2)
II Institutional Analyses of Central Banking
32(1)
Institutions, Law and Power
33(1)
Strategies of Actors and Dissenting Views
34(1)
Three Key Aspects of the Institutionalizing Process
35(2)
Law, Social Norms and Institutional Change
37(3)
1 French Credit Policies before 1945
40(7)
I The "Socialization of Credit" before the War and the Popular Front
40(4)
II The Banking Laws of 1941 and the Vichy Turning-Point
44(3)
2 The Nationalization of Credit from 1945 to the Late 1950s
47(39)
I The Legal Institution of Credit
47(9)
The Credit Nationalization Law
47(2)
The National Credit Council: A Paritaire Vision of Credit
49(4)
The National Credit Council and Medium-Term Mobilizable Credit: A Monetary Vision of Credit
53(3)
II Credit As a Public Good, or the Institution's "Collective" Dimension
56(13)
The Emergence of Consensus?
56(2)
Continuity between Vichy and Postwar Credit Policy
58(5)
Adjustments and Complementarities: The Emergence of Credit Selectivity and the Fight against Inflation
63(6)
III Controlling Credit and Inflation
69(17)
Control and Selectivity
69(4)
The Banque de France Doctrine
73(3)
Was the Banque de France Keynesian? French Perspectives on the Radcliffe Report
76(4)
The Goals of Monetary Policy
80(2)
Quantitative Controls versus Interest Rates
82(4)
3 Development Then Gradual Deinstitutionahzation: The 1960s and 1970s
86(51)
I The Central Bank Changes But Not its Legal Framework
88(8)
The 1966-1967 Reforms: Liberalizing the Banking and Financial System without Abandoning Selectivity
89(3)
The Ambiguity of the New Statutes of 1973
92(3)
The End of a System
95(1)
II Rising Opposition and the Gradual Disappearance of Shared Beliefs
96(17)
Refusing to Change and Reaffirming Principles against Critics: 1958-1964
96(4)
The Marjolin-Sadrin-Wormser Report
100(7)
From Selectivity to Heterogeneity
107(6)
III From Attempts at Liberalization to Loss of Control Over Inflation
113(18)
The Successes of Quantitative Credit Controls
114(1)
Toward a More "Neutral" Policy: Minimum Reserves
115(2)
The Money Market Debate and the End of Rediscount Ceilings
117(4)
The Hybrid Return of Credit Ceilings (encadrement du credit)
121(2)
What Were the Primary Stakes of These Deep Institutional Changes?
123(2)
Money Supply Targets and the Monetary Theory of Inflation
125(6)
Conclusion to Part
131(6)
PART II MANAGING CREDIT
4 Monetary Policy without Interest Rates: Domestic Macroeconomic Effects and International Issues of Credit Controls
137(47)
I Instruments and Operating Procedures of the Banque de France
140(10)
Main Instruments Used by the Central Bank
142(6)
The Problem of Measuring the Monetary Policy Stance
148(2)
II Definition of Restrictive Episodes of Monetary Policy
150(12)
Six Restrictive Episodes
151(8)
Restrictive Monetary Policy and the Economy: A Graphical View
159(3)
III Econometric Estimations of Restrictive Policies
162(15)
Identification and Specification
163(2)
Estimations and Results
165(6)
Further Discussions about 1957
171(2)
Comparisons with Other Measures of Monetary Policy
173(4)
IV The International Dimension
177(5)
Balance of Payments and Inflation
177(1)
Credit Controls As a Way to Escape the Trilemma
178(4)
V Conclusion
182(2)
5 Blurred Lines: The Two Faces of Banque de France Loans to the Treasury, 1948-1973
184(26)
I The Basics of the System: Banque de France's Financing of the French Government before 1948
186(3)
Advances to the Treasury with Parliamentary Approval
186(1)
The Troubles of the Interwar
187(2)
II The Hidden Part of Treasury Financing, 1948-1973
189(10)
Description of the System
189(4)
Amounts Involved
193(4)
End of the System: The 1973 Law and the Path Toward Transparency
197(2)
III The Political Economy of Official and Unofficial Loans to the Treasury
199(7)
Political and Economic Limits on Monetary Financing of the Public Debt (1952-1958)
199(4)
Why Did Some Loans to the Treasury Remain Unofficial?
203(3)
The Turn Toward Marketable Public Debt
206(1)
IV Conclusion: Non-Marketable Public Debt and the Circuit
206(4)
6 Financing the Postwar Golden Age: The Banque de France, "Investment Credit" and Capital Allocation
210(37)
I The Birth of "Investment Credit" (credit d'investissement)
215(4)
II The State-Led Financial System and the Role of the Central Bank
219(8)
Loans from the Treasury
223(1)
Loans from Public and Semi-Public Institutions
223(1)
Rediscounting by the Central Bank
224(1)
Exemptions
225(1)
Compulsory Guidelines by the National Credit Council
226(1)
III Credit Statistics and the Undefined Borders of State Intervention
227(4)
Credit Statistics
227(1)
Corporate Tax Statistics
228(2)
Additional Remarks on the Statistics by Sector
230(1)
IV Investment Credit and Capital Accumulation
231(4)
V Reallocation of Capital Across Sectors
235(9)
Capital to Revenue Ratios and Convergence
237(3)
Discussion on Revenue and Value Added
240(4)
VI Conclusion
244(3)
7 The Rise and Fall of National Credit Policies: Implications for the History of European Varieties of Capitalism and Monetary Integration
247(36)
I The Internationalization of Credit Policies
249(7)
Credit Policies in the History of Central Banking
249(1)
US Perspectives on European Credit Policies
250(6)
II Similarities and Differences between Countries
256(10)
Legal and Political Responsibilities
256(3)
Banking Supervision and Relationships with the Banking System
259(2)
Instruments of Monetary Policy and Credit Controls
261(2)
Credit Policy and Economic Planning
263(3)
III Explaining the Differences
266(4)
Organization of the State, Structure of the Financial System and Ideology
266(2)
The Consciousness of Otherness: A Bundesbank Perspective on the Banque de France
268(2)
IV The Faltering End of Credit Policy
270(3)
V What is the Link with European Monetary Integration?
273(9)
From Werner to Delors: The Disappearance of Credit Policy
274(2)
The Silence of the Committee of Governors on Credit Policies
276(6)
VI Conclusion
282(1)
Conclusion
283(14)
The Historical and Political Consequences of the End of Credit Policy
284(4)
Directions for Future Research
288(3)
The Return of the Repressed: The Transformation of Central Banks since 2008
291(6)
Bibliography 297(26)
Index 323
Eric Monnet is a senior economist at the Bank of France, a Professor in Economic History at the Paris School of Economics, and a research affiliate at the Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR).