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El. knyga: Cyber-espionage in international law: Silence speaks

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This book analyses the normative avoidance of cyber-espionage, arguing that it is neither prohibited nor authorised by international law. This situation did not emerge by chance but through the purposeful silence of States, leaving them free to pursue cyber-espionage themselves at the same time as they both try to prevent and fall victim to it.

While espionage among nations is a long-standing practice, the emergence of the Internet has challenged the traditional legal framework and has resulted in the intensification of intelligence activities. With the emergence of cyber-espionage, agents may collect intelligence from within their own jurisdictions, with a great deal of secrecy and less risk. This book argues that – save some exceptions – this activity has been subject to normative avoidance, meaning that it is neither prohibited, nor authorized or permitted. States are aware of such status of law, and are not interested in any further regulation, leaving them free to pursue cyber-espionage themselves at the same time as they adopt measures to prevent and falling victim to it. This book resorts to a first-class sample of state practice and analyses several rules and treaties, and demonstrates that no specific customary law has emerged in the field.
Acknowledgements x
List of abbreviations
xii
Part I Introduction
Introduction to Part I
3(5)
1 Main notions
8(23)
1.1 The concept of `cyber-espionage'
9(9)
1.2 The concept of `cyber-space'
18(13)
2 Methodological and conceptual frameworks
31(40)
2.1 The determination of law
32(14)
2.1.1 The approach to treaty interpretation
33(5)
2.1.2 The approach to sources
38(8)
2.2 The concept of normative avoidance
46(25)
2.2.1 Definition
46(12)
2.2.2 Novelty
58(13)
Part II The rules connected to territorial integrity Introduction to Part II
71(108)
3 Territorial sovereignty
73(37)
3.1 The dissimilarities between physical trespass and digital intrusion
75(19)
3.1.1 Espionage per se is not an international wrongful act
75(5)
3.1.2 The lack of an analogy between digital and physical intrusions
80(14)
3.2 The `do-not-harm' challenge and the minimal effects of cyber-espionage
94(16)
4 Collective security law
110(27)
4.1 A traditional interpretation of the UN Charter does not result in a regulation of cyber-espionage
111(10)
4.2 Alternative interpretations of cyber-espionage do not result in the regulation of cyber-espionage
121(16)
4.2.1 Interpretation based on meta-rules
122(10)
4.2.2 Teleological interpretation
132(5)
5 The law applicable between belligerent States
137(16)
5.1 The territorial rationale of the regulation of espionage between belligerents
138(8)
5.1.1 The categories of spies defined by the law of armed conflict
138(3)
5.1.2 The challenging application of rules about espionage in a digital space
141(5)
5.2 A lack of State support in favour of the application of espionage-related rules in cyber-space
146(7)
6 The law applicable between belligerent and non-belligerent States
153(26)
6.1 The absence of regulation by rules on material operations
154(11)
6.1.1 The obligations between belligerents
154(8)
6.1.2 The obligations on neutral States
162(3)
6.2 A limited restriction of cyber-espionage by rules on the use of telecommunications
165(7)
6.2.1 The obligations between belligerents
165(1)
6.2.2 The obligations on neutral States
166(6)
Conclusion to Part II
172(7)
Part III The rules disconnected from territorial integrity Introduction to Part III
179(106)
7 The law of diplomatic relations
182(20)
7.1 Indirect regulation of espionage by embassies
183(7)
7.1.1 The accreditation of the mission
183(1)
7.1.2 The performing of the mission
184(6)
7.2 Indirect regulation of espionage on embassies
190(12)
7.2.1 The lack of regulation by the inviolability of diplomatic premises
190(5)
7.2.2 The incompatibility of cyber-espionage with the rules protecting the inviolability of archives and documents
195(7)
8 International economic law
202(18)
8.1 The absence of a prohibition of economic cyber-espionage
203(11)
8.1.1 The absence of a prohibition by national treatment
203(4)
8.1.2 The absence of a prohibition by the obligation to protect undisclosed information
207(7)
8.2 The tolerance of cyber-espionage required for the preservation of essential security interests
214(6)
8.2.1 Cyber-espionage activities in peacetime
214(2)
8.2.2 Cyber-espionage in a time of war or other emergency in international relations
216(4)
9 International human rights law
220(23)
9.1 The absence of extraterritorial jurisdiction in the event of remote cyber-espionage activities
221(6)
9.2 The measured regulation of surveillance activities by the right to privacy
227(16)
9.2.1 Interference and legality
230(3)
9.2.2 Legitimacy and proportionality
233(10)
10 State practice
243(26)
10.1 The unanimous prohibition of espionage by domestic criminal law
244(12)
10.1.1 The traditional prohibition of espionage
244(7)
10.1.2 The progressive prohibition of digital intrusions and interceptions
251(5)
10.2 The predominant authorisation of one's own intelligence activities against other States
256(13)
10.2.1 Provisions authorising intelligence gathering
256(7)
10.2.2 Grounds allowing intelligence collection
263(6)
11 Opinio juris
269(16)
11.1 The absence of a right to spy
269(8)
11.2 The absence of a prohibition on espionage
277(5)
Conclusion to Part III
282(3)
Conclusion 285(6)
Index 291
Thibault Moulin is an Associate Professor at the Catholic University of Lyon and a Research Associate at the Federmann Cyber Security Center of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He also serves as a Captain in the Reserve (RC) of the French Air and Space Force. -- .