This book provides a critical appraisal of cyber-doom rhetoric that begins to fill the gaps in our knowledge of why, how, and with what effects such rhetoric is used in U.S. cyber-security discourse.
In the U.S. cyber security debate, it is common for policymakers, military leaders, news media, and others to deploy frightening cyber-doom scenarios when making the case for action on cyber security. Such scenarios involve fictional tales of cyber attack resulting in mass destruction or disruption. Some even contemplate total economic, social, or civilizational collapse. Though there is no doubt that we face serious cyber security challenges, few if any cyber attacks to date have come close to causing the kinds of damage often contemplated in cyber-doom rhetoric. The Director of National Intelligence told Congress on two separate occasions in 2015 that such scenarios are unlikely and do not reflect the real cyber-security threat. Nonetheless, policymakers, military leaders, and others continue to warn of hypothetical "cyber Pearl Harbors" and "cyber 9/11s" or even claim that data breaches resulting in no loss of life or physical destruction are analogous to Pearl Harbor or 9/11. Why does this rhetoric persist in public policy discourse and why do so many individuals use such rhetoric in the first place? Does this confusion of fiction and fact even matter? If so, how can we move beyond the rhetoric of cyber-doom? This book answers these questions.
The work argues that cyber-doom rhetoric is not entirely unique but is, rather, the latest manifestation of longstanding fears of technology-out-of-control in Western societies, as well as a tradition of blurring distinctions between fact and fiction when thinking about and responding to new technologies. From this perspective, the book argues that the specific fears expressed in cyber-doom rhetoric are unrealistic and that relying on them to frame our thinking about and motivate a response to the threats we do face is counterproductive. It therefore concludes by offering a way forward for thinking and speaking about cyber security beyond the use of cyber-doom rhetoric specifically, but also for appreciating the role of language and rhetoric in framing and responding to security threats more generally.
This book will be of much interest to students of cyber-security, foreign policy, public administration, national security and IR in general.
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