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El. knyga: Defending the Correspondence Theory of Truth

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  • Formatas: PDF+DRM
  • Išleidimo metai: 26-Jun-2014
  • Leidėjas: Cambridge University Press
  • Kalba: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9781139990783
Kitos knygos pagal šią temą:
Defending the Correspondence Theory of TruthDidesnis paveikslėlis
  • Formatas: PDF+DRM
  • Išleidimo metai: 26-Jun-2014
  • Leidėjas: Cambridge University Press
  • Kalba: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9781139990783
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The correspondence theory of truth is a precise and innovative account of how the truth of a proposition depends upon that proposition's connection to a piece of reality. Joshua Rasmussen refines and defends the correspondence theory of truth, proposing new accounts of facts, propositions, and the correspondence between them. With these theories in hand, he then offers original solutions to the toughest objections facing correspondence theorists. Addressing the Problem of Funny Facts, Liar Paradoxes, and traditional epistemological questions concerning how our minds can access reality, he challenges recent objections, and defends what has traditionally been the most popular theory of truth. Written with clarity, precision, and sensitivity to a range of philosophical backgrounds, his book will appeal to advanced students and scholars seeking a deeper understanding of the relationship between truth and reality.

This book offers a precise account of the correspondence theory of truth and new responses to recent objections. Accessible and original, it will appeal to readers coming from a variety of viewpoints, from advanced students to scholars, to those seeking a deeper understanding of the relationship between truth and reality.

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This book defends the correspondence theory of truth by developing a new account of the relationship between truth and reality.
Preface ix
Introduction 1(5)
1 The correspondence theory and its rivals
6(22)
1.1 Basic components
6(6)
1.2 Versions of the correspondence theory
12(4)
1.3 Correspondence and realism
16(2)
1.4 Rivals of correspondence
18(10)
2 Objections to correspondence
28(33)
2.1 Classifying objections
28(1)
2.2 Funny facts
29(15)
2.3 More funny facts
44(8)
2.4 The Problem of Matching
52(4)
2.5 The Slingshot Argument
56(4)
2.6 A diagnosis
60(1)
3 A theory of facts
61(24)
3.1 Corresponding to facts
61(1)
3.2 Facts as arrangements
62(10)
3.3 How to form a fact
72(2)
3.4 Everything composes something
74(3)
3.5 Abstract facts among other kinds
77(2)
3.6 Identity conditions
79(3)
3.7 Arrangements vis-a-vis states of affairs
82(1)
3.8 Recap
83(2)
4 Propositions
85(35)
4.1 Pre-philosophical propositions
86(1)
4.2 Abstract propositions
87(19)
4.3 Propositions as arrangements
106(3)
4.4 About aboutness
109(4)
4.5 Objections and replies
113(4)
4.6 Benefits of the theory
117(3)
5 Theories of correspondence
120(27)
5.1 Benefits of an analysis
120(1)
5.2 Previous theories of correspondence
121(8)
5.3 Review: propositions and facts
129(1)
5.4 The nature of correspondence
130(3)
5.5 Test cases
133(1)
5.6 Getting what we want
134(2)
5.7 Avoiding circularity
136(2)
5.8 A backup hypothesis
138(2)
5.9 Correspondence without abstracta
140(3)
5.10 The nature of falsehood
143(4)
6 Funny facts revisited
147(29)
6.1 Negative existentials
147(12)
6.2 Conjunctions and disjunctions
159(5)
6.3 Abstract reference
164(1)
6.4 Universal quantification
165(3)
6.5 Tensed propositions
168(3)
6.6 Modal
171(2)
6.7 Counterfactuals
173(1)
6.8 Correspondence without arrangements
173(2)
6.9 Closing remarks
175(1)
7 The Slingshot Argument disarmed
176(15)
7.1 The basic Slingshot Argument
176(2)
7.2 The argument sharpened
178(3)
7.3 Some solutions that fail
181(6)
7.4 A solution that succeeds
187(2)
7.5 Lessons learned
189(2)
8 The Liar Paradox and beyond
191(23)
8.1 Liars
191(8)
8.2 A puzzle about aboutness
199(4)
8.3 Belief and correspondence
203(1)
8.4 Awareness and correspondence
203(6)
8.5 Miscellaneous cases of correspondence
209(3)
8.6 Conclusion
212(2)
Bibliography 214(8)
Index 222
Joshua Rasmussen is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Azusa Pacific University. He has published many articles in journals, including in American Philosophical Quarterly and Analysis.
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