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ix | |
Symbols Used in Figures |
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xi | |
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1 | (20) |
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The Uniqueness of the Gulf War, |
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2 | (3) |
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The Gulf War and U.S. Policy Changes, |
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5 | (3) |
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8 | (4) |
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The Future of U.S. Foreign Policy, |
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12 | (2) |
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Foreign Policy Alternatives, |
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14 | (7) |
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2 The Failure of Deterrence |
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21 | (24) |
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22 | (1) |
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The Absence of Prewar Deterrence, |
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23 | (4) |
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27 | (2) |
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29 | (1) |
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29 | (4) |
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33 | (1) |
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34 | (1) |
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35 | (2) |
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37 | (2) |
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39 | (1) |
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40 | (1) |
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The Final Chance for a Warning, |
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41 | (2) |
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The Challenge of Deterrence, |
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43 | (1) |
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44 | (1) |
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3 The Failure of Diplomacy |
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45 | (24) |
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47 | (1) |
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48 | (1) |
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The First Phase of the Coalition Military Buildup, |
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49 | (2) |
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The Role of U.S. Reserve Units, |
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51 | (2) |
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Assembling an International Consensus, |
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53 | (4) |
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57 | (2) |
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From Deterrence to Compellence, |
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59 | (2) |
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61 | (2) |
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63 | (2) |
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65 | (4) |
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4 The Failure of Compellence |
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69 | (24) |
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69 | (1) |
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Defense Reorganization Initiatives, |
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70 | (1) |
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71 | (2) |
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Planning the Final Diplomacy Effort, |
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73 | (2) |
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Human-Rights Violations in Kuwait, |
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75 | (2) |
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The National Intelligence Estimate, |
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77 | (1) |
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Reasons for the Failure of Compellence, |
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78 | (2) |
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Enlisting Congressional Support, |
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80 | (1) |
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A Voice in Support of War, |
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81 | (1) |
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81 | (1) |
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82 | (1) |
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83 | (1) |
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The Congressional Debate, |
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84 | (2) |
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Analyzing the Costs of War, |
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86 | (1) |
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87 | (1) |
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87 | (2) |
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89 | (4) |
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93 | (32) |
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The High-Technology Warfare Revolution, |
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97 | (4) |
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101 | (5) |
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106 | (1) |
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107 | (6) |
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The Importance of Highly Trained Military Personnel, |
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113 | (4) |
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The U.S. Navy's Contribution, |
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117 | (2) |
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Preparations for the Ground War, |
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119 | (4) |
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The Effectiveness of the Air Campaign, |
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123 | (2) |
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125 | (34) |
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125 | (3) |
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128 | (2) |
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130 | (2) |
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132 | (3) |
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135 | (1) |
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The Ground Campaign Begins, |
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136 | (6) |
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142 | (1) |
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143 | (7) |
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150 | (3) |
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Attacks on the Republican Guard, |
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153 | (1) |
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154 | (5) |
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7 The Gulf War and U.S. Military Strategy |
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159 | (22) |
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Post-Cold War Defense Planning, |
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160 | (1) |
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Emphasis on Regional Contingencies, |
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161 | (2) |
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Maintenance of Residual Forces, |
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163 | (1) |
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Crisis Response and Forward Presence, |
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164 | (2) |
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Maintaining Modern Systems, |
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166 | (2) |
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168 | (3) |
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Limited Versus Total War, |
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171 | (3) |
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174 | (2) |
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176 | (1) |
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Guiding Principles for Future U.S. Defense Policy, |
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177 | (4) |
Notes |
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181 | (12) |
About the Book and Authors |
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193 | (2) |
Index |
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195 | |