Preface |
|
XV | |
|
|
3 | (4) |
|
Chapter 2: Economic Development: Overview |
|
|
7 | (40) |
|
|
7 | (3) |
|
|
10 | (11) |
|
|
10 | (6) |
|
2.2.2 Historical experience |
|
|
16 | (5) |
|
2.3 Income distribution in developing countries |
|
|
21 | (4) |
|
2.4 The many faces of underdevelopment |
|
|
25 | (8) |
|
|
25 | (2) |
|
2.4.2 An index of human development |
|
|
27 | (2) |
|
2.4.3 Per capita income and human development |
|
|
29 | (4) |
|
2.5. Some structural features |
|
|
33 | (9) |
|
2.5.1. Demographic characteristics |
|
|
34 | (1) |
|
2.5.2. Occupational and production structure |
|
|
34 | (2) |
|
2.5.3. Rapid rural-urban migration |
|
|
36 | (2) |
|
2.5.4. International trade |
|
|
38 | (4) |
|
|
42 | (2) |
|
|
44 | (3) |
|
Chapter 3: Economic Growth |
|
|
47 | (52) |
|
|
47 | (1) |
|
3.2. Modern economic growth: Basic features |
|
|
48 | (3) |
|
3.3. Theories of economic growth |
|
|
51 | (20) |
|
3.3.1. The Harrod-Domar model |
|
|
51 | (7) |
|
3.3.2. Beyond Harrod-Domar: Other considerations |
|
|
58 | (6) |
|
|
64 | (7) |
|
|
71 | (3) |
|
|
74 | (14) |
|
|
74 | (1) |
|
3.5.2. Unconditional convergence |
|
|
74 | (1) |
|
3.5.3. Unconditional convergence: Evidence or lack thereof |
|
|
75 | (5) |
|
3.5.4. Unconditional convergence: A summary |
|
|
80 | (2) |
|
3.5.5. Conditional convergence |
|
|
82 | (2) |
|
3.5.6. Reexamining the data |
|
|
84 | (4) |
|
|
88 | (2) |
|
|
90 | (4) |
|
3.A.1. The Harrod-Domar equations |
|
|
90 | (1) |
|
3.A.2. Production functions and per capita magnitudes |
|
|
91 | (3) |
|
|
94 | (5) |
|
Chapter 4: The New Growth Theories |
|
|
99 | (32) |
|
|
99 | (1) |
|
4.2. Human capital and growth |
|
|
100 | (5) |
|
4.3. Another look at conditional convergence |
|
|
105 | (2) |
|
4.4. Technical progress again |
|
|
107 | (12) |
|
|
107 | (1) |
|
4.4.2. Technological progress and human decisions |
|
|
108 | (1) |
|
4.4.3. A model of deliberate technical progress |
|
|
109 | (3) |
|
4.4.4. Externalities, technical progress, and growth |
|
|
112 | (5) |
|
4.4.5. Total factor productivity |
|
|
117 | (2) |
|
4.5. Total factor productivity and the East Asian miracle |
|
|
119 | (4) |
|
|
123 | (2) |
|
Appendix: Human capital and growth |
|
|
125 | (1) |
|
|
126 | (5) |
|
Chapter 5: History, Expectations, and Development |
|
|
131 | (38) |
|
|
131 | (1) |
|
|
132 | (15) |
|
5.2.1. Introduction: QWERTY |
|
|
132 | (4) |
|
5.2.2. Coordination failure |
|
|
136 | (2) |
|
5.2.3. Linkages and policy |
|
|
138 | (5) |
|
5.2.4. History versus expectations |
|
|
143 | (4) |
|
|
147 | (5) |
|
|
147 | (1) |
|
5.3.2. Increasing returns and entry into markets |
|
|
148 | (2) |
|
5.3.3. Increasing returns and market size: Interaction |
|
|
150 | (2) |
|
5.4. Competition, multiplicity, and international trade |
|
|
152 | (3) |
|
5.5. Other roles for history |
|
|
155 | (4) |
|
|
155 | (1) |
|
|
156 | (3) |
|
|
159 | (2) |
|
|
161 | (8) |
|
Chapter 6: Economic Inequality |
|
|
169 | (28) |
|
|
169 | (1) |
|
6.2. What is economic inequality? |
|
|
170 | (3) |
|
|
170 | (1) |
|
6.2.2. Economic inequality: Preliminary observations |
|
|
171 | (2) |
|
6.3. Measuring economic inequality |
|
|
173 | (19) |
|
|
173 | (1) |
|
6.3.2. Four criteria for inequality measurement |
|
|
174 | (4) |
|
|
178 | (6) |
|
6.3.4. Complete measures of inequality |
|
|
184 | (8) |
|
|
192 | (1) |
|
|
193 | (4) |
|
Chapter 7: Inequality and Development: Interconnections |
|
|
197 | (52) |
|
|
197 | (2) |
|
7.2. Inequality, income, and growth |
|
|
199 | (39) |
|
7.2.1. The inverted-U hypothesis |
|
|
199 | (2) |
|
7.2.2. Testing the inverted-U hypothesis |
|
|
201 | (8) |
|
7.2.3. Income and inequality: Uneven and compensatory changes |
|
|
209 | (2) |
|
7.2.4. Inequality, savings, income, and growth |
|
|
211 | (7) |
|
7.2.5. Inequality, political redistribution, and growth |
|
|
218 | (2) |
|
7.2.6. Inequality and growth: Evidence |
|
|
220 | (3) |
|
7.2.7. Inequality and demand composition |
|
|
223 | (3) |
|
7.2.8. Inequality, capital markets, and development |
|
|
226 | (11) |
|
7.2.9. Inequality and development: Human capital |
|
|
237 | (1) |
|
|
238 | (3) |
|
Appendix: Multiple steady states with imperfect capital markets |
|
|
241 | (3) |
|
|
244 | (5) |
|
Chapter 8: Poverty and Undernutrition |
|
|
249 | (46) |
|
|
249 | (1) |
|
8.2. Poverty: First principles |
|
|
250 | (6) |
|
|
250 | (3) |
|
|
253 | (3) |
|
8.3. Poverty: Empirical observations |
|
|
256 | (11) |
|
8.3.1. Demographic features |
|
|
257 | (2) |
|
8.3.2. Rural and urban poverty |
|
|
259 | (1) |
|
|
259 | (2) |
|
|
261 | (6) |
|
8.4. The functional impact of poverty |
|
|
267 | (21) |
|
8.4.1. Poverty, credit, and insurance |
|
|
268 | (4) |
|
8.4.2. Poverty, nutrition, and labor markets |
|
|
272 | (7) |
|
8.4.3. Poverty and the household |
|
|
279 | (9) |
|
|
288 | (2) |
|
Appendix: More on poverty measures |
|
|
290 | (2) |
|
|
292 | (3) |
|
Chapter 9: Population Growth and Economic Development |
|
|
295 | (50) |
|
|
295 | (2) |
|
9.2. Population: Some basic concepts |
|
|
297 | (5) |
|
9.2.1. Birth and death rates |
|
|
297 | (3) |
|
|
300 | (2) |
|
9.3. From economic development to population growth |
|
|
302 | (24) |
|
9.3.1. The demographic transition |
|
|
302 | (1) |
|
9.3.2. Historical trends in developed and developing countries |
|
|
303 | (4) |
|
9.3.3. The adjustment of birth rates |
|
|
307 | (11) |
|
9.3.4. Is fertility too high? |
|
|
318 | (8) |
|
9.4. From population growth to economic development |
|
|
326 | (12) |
|
9.4.1. Some negative effects |
|
|
326 | (6) |
|
9.4.2. Some positive effects |
|
|
332 | (6) |
|
|
338 | (2) |
|
|
340 | (5) |
|
Chapter 10: Rural and Urban |
|
|
345 | (58) |
|
|
345 | (8) |
|
10.1.1. The structural viewpoint |
|
|
345 | (1) |
|
10.1.2. Formal and informal urban sectors |
|
|
346 | (2) |
|
|
348 | (1) |
|
10.1.4. The ICRISAT villages |
|
|
349 | (4) |
|
10.2. Rural-urban interaction |
|
|
353 | (19) |
|
10.2.1. Two fundamental resource flows |
|
|
353 | (1) |
|
|
353 | (19) |
|
10.3. Rural-urban migration |
|
|
372 | (23) |
|
|
372 | (1) |
|
|
373 | (1) |
|
10.3.3. Floors on formal wages and the Harris-Todaro equilibrium |
|
|
374 | (5) |
|
10.3.4. Government policy |
|
|
379 | (7) |
|
10.3.5. Comments and extensions |
|
|
386 | (9) |
|
|
395 | (3) |
|
|
398 | (5) |
|
Chapter 11: Markets in Agriculture: An Introduction |
|
|
403 | (12) |
|
|
403 | (1) |
|
|
404 | (5) |
|
11.3. Land, labor, capital, and credit |
|
|
409 | (6) |
|
|
409 | (3) |
|
11.3.2. Capital and credit |
|
|
412 | (3) |
|
|
415 | (68) |
|
|
415 | (1) |
|
12.2. Ownership and tenancy |
|
|
416 | (4) |
|
12.3. Land rental contracts |
|
|
420 | (25) |
|
12.3.1. Contractual forms |
|
|
420 | (3) |
|
12.3.2. Contracts and incentives |
|
|
423 | (8) |
|
12.3.3. Risk, tenancy, and sharecropping |
|
|
431 | (5) |
|
12.3.4. Forms of tenancy: Other considerations |
|
|
436 | (5) |
|
12.3.5. Land contracts, eviction, and use rights |
|
|
441 | (4) |
|
|
445 | (17) |
|
12.4.1. A brief history of land inequality |
|
|
445 | (1) |
|
12.4.2. Land size and productivity: Concepts |
|
|
446 | (7) |
|
12.4.3. Land size and productivity: Empirical evidence |
|
|
453 | (3) |
|
|
456 | (1) |
|
|
457 | (5) |
|
|
462 | (1) |
|
Appendix 1: Principal-agent theory and applications |
|
|
463 | (11) |
|
12.A.1. Risk, moral hazard, and the agency problem |
|
|
463 | (3) |
|
12.A.2. Tenancy contracts revisited |
|
|
466 | (8) |
|
Appendix 2: Screening and sharecropping |
|
|
474 | (4) |
|
|
478 | (5) |
|
|
483 | (46) |
|
|
483 | (1) |
|
|
484 | (2) |
|
|
486 | (3) |
|
13.4. Poverty, nutrition, and labor markets |
|
|
489 | (15) |
|
|
489 | (10) |
|
13.4.2. Nutrition, time, and casual labor markets |
|
|
499 | (1) |
|
13.4.3. A model of nutritional status |
|
|
500 | (4) |
|
13.5. Permanent labor markets |
|
|
504 | (18) |
|
13.5.1. Types of permanent labor |
|
|
504 | (1) |
|
13.5.2. Why study permanent labor? |
|
|
505 | (2) |
|
13.5.3. Permanent labor: Nonmonitored tasks |
|
|
507 | (8) |
|
13.5.4. Permanent labor: Casual tasks |
|
|
515 | (7) |
|
|
522 | (2) |
|
|
524 | (5) |
|
|
529 | (62) |
|
|
529 | (3) |
|
14.1.1. The limits to credit and insurance |
|
|
529 | (2) |
|
14.1.2. Sources of demand for credit |
|
|
531 | (1) |
|
14.2. Rural credit markets |
|
|
532 | (11) |
|
14.2.1. Who provides rural credit? |
|
|
532 | (8) |
|
14.2.2. Some characteristics of rural credit markets |
|
|
540 | (3) |
|
14.3. Theories of informal credit markets |
|
|
543 | (18) |
|
14.3.1. Lender's monopoly |
|
|
543 | (1) |
|
14.3.2. The lender's risk hypothesis |
|
|
544 | (1) |
|
14.3.3. Default and fixed-capital loans |
|
|
545 | (1) |
|
14.3.4. Default and collateral |
|
|
546 | (2) |
|
14.3.5. Default and credit rationing |
|
|
548 | (5) |
|
14.3.6. Informational asymmetries and credit rationing |
|
|
553 | (2) |
|
14.3.7. Default and enforcement |
|
|
555 | (6) |
|
14.4. Interlinked transactions |
|
|
561 | (11) |
|
|
563 | (1) |
|
14.4.2. Interlinkages and information |
|
|
564 | (1) |
|
14.4.3. Interlinkages and enforcement |
|
|
564 | (1) |
|
14.4.4. Interlinkages and creation of efficient surplus |
|
|
565 | (7) |
|
14.5. Alternative credit policies |
|
|
572 | (12) |
|
14.5.1. Vertical formal-informal links |
|
|
573 | (5) |
|
|
578 | (6) |
|
|
584 | (2) |
|
|
586 | (5) |
|
|
591 | (30) |
|
|
591 | (5) |
|
15.2. The perfect insurance model |
|
|
596 | (4) |
|
|
596 | (1) |
|
15.2.2. Testing the theory |
|
|
597 | (3) |
|
15.3. Limits to insurance: Information |
|
|
600 | (5) |
|
15.3.1. Limited information about the final outcome |
|
|
601 | (1) |
|
15.3.2. Limited information about what led to the outcome |
|
|
602 | (3) |
|
15.4. Limits to insurance: Enforcement |
|
|
605 | (10) |
|
15.4.1. Enforcement-based limits to perfect insurance |
|
|
606 | (2) |
|
15.4.2. Enforcement and imperfect insurance |
|
|
608 | (7) |
|
|
615 | (2) |
|
|
617 | (4) |
|
Chapter 16: International Trade |
|
|
621 | (26) |
|
16.1. World trading patterns |
|
|
621 | (6) |
|
16.2. Comparative advantage |
|
|
627 | (3) |
|
16.3. Sources of comparative advantage |
|
|
630 | (13) |
|
|
630 | (1) |
|
16.3.2. Factor endowments |
|
|
631 | (5) |
|
|
636 | (2) |
|
16.3.4. Economies of scale |
|
|
638 | (5) |
|
|
643 | (1) |
|
|
644 | (3) |
|
|
647 | (64) |
|
|
647 | (9) |
|
17.1.1. Overall gains and distributive effects |
|
|
647 | (3) |
|
17.1.2. Overall losses from trade? |
|
|
650 | (6) |
|
17.2. Trade policy: Import substitution |
|
|
656 | (20) |
|
|
657 | (3) |
|
|
660 | (16) |
|
|
676 | (8) |
|
|
677 | (1) |
|
17.3.2. Effect on the exchange rate |
|
|
678 | (1) |
|
17.3.3. The instruments of export promotion: More detail |
|
|
679 | (5) |
|
17.4. The move away from import substitution |
|
|
684 | (15) |
|
|
684 | (1) |
|
17.4.2. The eighties crisis |
|
|
685 | (5) |
|
17.4.3. Structural adjustment |
|
|
690 | (9) |
|
|
699 | (2) |
|
Appendix: The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank |
|
|
701 | (4) |
|
|
705 | (6) |
|
Chapter 18: Multilateral Approaches to Trade Policy |
|
|
711 | (46) |
|
|
711 | (3) |
|
|
714 | (11) |
|
18.2.1. Second-best arguments for protection |
|
|
714 | (1) |
|
18.2.2. Protectionist tendencies |
|
|
715 | (2) |
|
18.2.3. Explaining protectionist tendencies |
|
|
717 | (8) |
|
18.3. Issues in trade liberalization |
|
|
725 | (28) |
|
|
725 | (2) |
|
18.3.2. Regional agreements: Basic theory |
|
|
727 | (3) |
|
18.3.3. Regional agreements among dissimilar countries |
|
|
730 | (5) |
|
18.3.4. Regional agreements among similar countries |
|
|
735 | (11) |
|
18.3.5. Multilateralism and regionalism |
|
|
746 | (7) |
|
|
753 | (2) |
|
|
755 | (2) |
|
Appendix 1: Elementary Game Theory |
|
|
757 | (20) |
|
|
757 | (1) |
|
|
757 | (2) |
|
|
759 | (8) |
|
|
767 | (10) |
|
Appendix 2: Elementary Statistical Methods |
|
|
777 | (28) |
|
|
777 | (1) |
|
|
778 | (5) |
|
|
783 | (22) |
References |
|
805 | (24) |
Author Index |
|
829 | (6) |
Subject Index |
|
835 | |