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Dialogues on the Ethics of Abortion [Kietas viršelis]

(Arizona State University, USA)
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What happens when two intelligent and highly informed fictional college students, one strongly pro-choice and the other vigorously pro-life, are asked to put together a presentation on abortion? Their conversations over five days friendly but lively, charitable but clear are captured in this book.

Through these dialogues, students and other interested readers are introduced to the difficult moral issues of abortion. In Chapter 1, readers learn about Roe v. Wade and other relevant legal cases. Chapter 2 covers basic, philosophical issues such as: What is a person? Are fetuses persons? Is fetal potential morally relevant? How shall we define the moral community? Chapter 3 introduces students to Don Marquiss "Why Abortion is Immoral" and also the metaphysical issues of personal identity and its relevance to abortion. Chapter 4 covers Judith Jarvis Thomsons "A Defense of Abortion", including objections and responses to the argument from bodily autonomy. Finally, Chapter 5 looks at abortion in hard cases, such as in cases of rape, fetal disability, non-viable pregnancies, and sex-selection; the chapter also includes a conversation on fathers and abortion.

With a Foreword by Laurie Shrage, topics headings in the margins, and an annotated bibliography, Dialogues on the Ethics of Abortion is an easy-to-use volume and valuable resource for anyone interested in a fair and clear-headed approach to one of the most contentious moral issues of our time.
Foreword ix
Laurie Shrage
Preface xi
Acknowledgements xviii
Day 1 Roe v. Wade and Other Legal Concerns
1(25)
(a) Docs the Bible prohibit abortions?
2(1)
(b) The thalidomide scare
3(1)
(c) Does Roe v. Wade legalize abortion on demand?
4(2)
(d) Roe v. Wade does not legalize abortion on demand
6(1)
(e) What's included in the right to privacy?
7(1)
(f) Planned Parenthood v. Casey asserts viability as the point where abortion can be restricted
8(1)
(g) Many states do restrict abortion access at some point in pregnancy
9(1)
(h) New York's Reproductive Health Act.
9(1)
(i) Doe v. Bolton, and how to define maternal health
10(1)
(j) Making abortions illegal won't stop them
11(1)
(k) The effectiveness of laws prohibiting abortion
12(1)
(l) Women sentenced to prison over a miscarriage and the case of Savita Halappanavar
12(1)
(m) The role of contraception in reducing abortion rates
13(1)
(n) The role of sex education in reducing abortion rates
13(1)
(o) Do our tax dollars fund abortion?
14(1)
(p) Personhood Amendments
15(1)
(q) Embryos and fertility treatments
16(1)
(r) Killing abortion doctors
17(1)
(s) Does abortion harm women?
18(8)
Day 2 Abortions as Murder, Fetal Personhood, and Arguments from Potential
26(25)
(a) Viability and quickening as times when abortion becomes murder
26(1)
(b) Abortion kills an innocent child
27(1)
(c) Can "innocence" apply to embryos?
28(1)
(d) Is killing all human life wrong?
29(1)
(e) What is a person?
30(1)
(f) Is genetic humanity sufficient for personhood?
30(1)
(g) The cognitive traits of personhood
30(1)
(h) Persons who are not genetically human
31(1)
(i) Genetic humans who are not persons
32(1)
(j) Embryos and fetuses lack all the mental traits of personhood
33(1)
(k) The relationship between rights and desires
34(1)
(l) Do infants have a right to life?
35(1)
(m) The argument from potential
36(1)
(n) What does "potential" mean?
36(4)
(o) Do potential persons have the same rights as actual persons?
40(2)
(p) The right to life protects persons from harm
42(1)
(q) Sentience as a prerequisite for being able to be harmed
42(1)
(r) Harm as the setting back of interests
43(1)
(s) Must you be sentient in order to have interests?
44(1)
(t) When do fetuses become sentient?
45(6)
Day 3 Fetal "Future-Like-Ours" Arguments, and Considerations of Personal Identity
51(27)
(a) Sanctity of life arguments
51(2)
(b) Sanctity of life arguments and euthanasia
53(2)
(c) Abortion and religious diversity
55(1)
(d) Future-like-ours arguments
56(2)
(e) Future-like-ours arguments, contraception, and arguments from potential
58(1)
(f) Alternative accounts of the wrongness of killing
59(3)
(g) Do fetuses have futures of value?
62(1)
(h) Is the fetus the same being that will later enjoy a future?
63(2)
(i) A fertilized egg is not an individual human being
65(1)
(j) Personal identity consists in the persistence of a human organism
65(1)
(k) Personal identity consists in the continuation of mental contents
66(1)
(l) Personal identity consists in the continuation of a conscious mind
67(3)
(m) Does death harm a fetus to the same degree as it harms a person?
70(8)
Day 4 The Bodily Autonomy Argument
78(30)
(a) Abortion and the security persons
78(1)
(b) Is the right to life a positive right?
79(3)
(c) The violinist example
82(1)
(d) Is the violinist example too weird?
83(2)
(e) The violinist example's relevance to abortion
85(3)
(f) Kant's principle of humanity and its relation to pregnancy and abortion
88(3)
(g) The violinist example as analogous to rape
91(1)
(h) The responsibility objection
91(3)
(i) The tacit consent objection
94(2)
(j) The special relationship objection
96(2)
(k) The killing vs. letting die distinction
98(2)
(l) Restricting abortion after viability
100(2)
(m) Can we compel using someone's body to save another?
102(1)
(n) The compensation objection
103(5)
Day 5 Abortion in Hard Cases
108(31)
(a) Pro-choice and feminism
109(1)
(b) Early feminism and pro-life advocacy
109(1)
(c) Does abortion allow for the sexual exploitation of women?
110(1)
(d) Abortion and pro-family support policies
110(1)
(e) Areas where pro-choice and pro-life feminists agree
111(2)
(f) Abortion due to Sex-selection
113(2)
(g) Virtue theory and abortion
115(3)
(h) Later abortions
118(1)
(i) Abortion for non-viable pregnancies
119(2)
(j) Abortion due to fetal disabilities
121(1)
(k) Is there a duty to have the "best" child?
122(1)
(l) Subjective stories of families with disabled children
122(1)
(m) The exprcssivist argument against selective abortion
123(1)
(n) The parental attitude argument against selective abortion
124(1)
(o) Fathers and abortion
125(1)
(p) The right of refusal
126(3)
(q) Men and grief over abortion
129(1)
(r) Can a man force a woman to gestate?
129(1)
(s) Abortion in cases of rape
130(3)
(t) Final thoughts
133(6)
Annotated Bibliography 139(22)
Index 161
Bertha Alvarez Manninen is Professor of Philosophy at Arizona State University, West Campus. She is the author of the book, Pro-Life, Pro-Choice: Shared Values in the Abortion Debate (2014) and the co-editor of the book Being Ethical: Classic and New Voices on Contemporary Issues (2017). She is also the co-author of A Civil Dialogue on Abortion (2018), published by Routledge.