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El. knyga: Economic Analysis of Conflicts: With an Application to the Greek Civil War 1946-1949

  • Formatas: PDF+DRM
  • Išleidimo metai: 27-Jul-2016
  • Leidėjas: Springer International Publishing AG
  • Kalba: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9783319322612
Kitos knygos pagal šią temą:
Economic Analysis of Conflicts: With an Application to the Greek Civil War 1946-1949Didesnis paveikslėlis
  • Formatas: PDF+DRM
  • Išleidimo metai: 27-Jul-2016
  • Leidėjas: Springer International Publishing AG
  • Kalba: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9783319322612
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This book provides a quantitative framework for the analysis of conflict dynamics and for estimating the economic costs associated with civil wars. The author develops modified Lotka-Volterra equations to model conflict dynamics, to yield realistic representations of battle processes, and to allow us to assess prolonged conflict traps. The economic costs of civil wars are evaluated with the help of two alternative methods: Firstly, the author employs a production function to determine how the destruction of human and physical capital stocks undermines economic growth in the medium term. Secondly, he develops a synthetic control approach, where the cost is obtained as the divergence of actual economic activity from a hypothetical path in the absence of civil war. The difference between the two approaches gives an indication of the adverse externalities impinging upon the economy in the form of institutional destruction. By using detailed time-series regarding battle casualties, local socio-economic indicators, and capital stock destruction during the Greek Civil War (1946-1949), a full-scale application of the above framework is presented and discussed.

Recenzijos

A highly original and informative book, making a substantive contribution both to the quantitative documentation and the theoretical analysis of civil wars . the book is of great interest to every economist and historian who wants to learn about the theoretical and empirical analysis of civil wars and have a fresh and objective birds-eye view on the Greek Civil War. (Michel S. Zouboulakis, Defence and Peace Economics, Vol. 29 (3), 2018)

1 Introduction: Economic Analysis and Civil Wars
1(12)
1.1 The Economic Effects of Conflict
1(2)
1.2 The Conflict of Economics: Rival Explanations of Causes
3(1)
1.3 Empirical Relevance
4(1)
1.4 Conflict as an Institutional Failure
5(1)
1.5 Conflict Modelling
6(2)
1.5.1 The Two-Numbers Problem
7(1)
1.5.2 Enter Dynamics
7(1)
1.6 Conflict Definitions
8(1)
1.7 Book Structure
9(4)
References
11(2)
2 The Greek Civil War 1946-1949: Main Events and Data
13(12)
2.1 The Greek Conflict
13(3)
2.1.1 Origins
13(1)
2.1.2 Occupation
14(1)
2.1.3 The Onset of the Civil War
15(1)
2.1.4 Prosperity and Democracy Curtailed
16(1)
2.2 Data Analysis
16(4)
2.2.1 The Statistics of Conflict
17(1)
2.2.2 Periodicity
18(1)
2.2.3 The Conflict Distribution
19(1)
2.3 The Escalation of Conflict
20(5)
2.3.1 The State Army (GNA)
20(1)
2.3.2 The Guerrilla Army (DAG)
21(1)
2.3.3 Population Displacement
22(1)
References
23(2)
3 Static Models of Conflict
25(16)
3.1 Conflict Motivation
25(1)
3.2 The Static Tullock Model
26(2)
3.2.1 Payoffs and Win Probabilities
26(2)
3.2.2 Optimal Effort
28(1)
3.3 The Collier-Hoeffler Framework
28(2)
3.3.1 Guerrillas
29(1)
3.3.2 Government
29(1)
3.4 Optimal Armies
30(1)
3.5 Stylized Facts
31(1)
3.5.1 Inequality and Class Struggle
31(1)
3.6 Criticism to the Collier-Hoeffler Model
32(1)
3.7 APPLICATION: Greek Grievances and Conflict
33(8)
3.7.1 Social Grievances
33(1)
3.7.2 Contemporaneous Deprivation
34(1)
3.7.3 Discontent and Class Structure
35(2)
3.7.4 Entrenched Grievances
37(1)
References
38(3)
4 Models of Repression and Inclusion
41(20)
4.1 Introduction
41(1)
4.2 Repression and Inclusion
42(2)
4.2.1 Repression
42(1)
4.2.2 Reprisals
42(1)
4.2.3 Fighting Capabilities
42(1)
4.2.4 Inclusion Offers
43(1)
4.3 Avoiding the Conflict
44(3)
4.3.1 Peace Chances
44(2)
4.3.2 Balance of Power
46(1)
4.4 Break-Out of Civil War
47(3)
4.4.1 The Guerrilla Army
47(2)
4.4.2 The State Army
49(1)
4.4.3 Optimal Armies
49(1)
4.5 Stylized Facts of Conflict
50(2)
4.5.1 Counter-Productive Deprivation
50(1)
4.5.2 Capabilities and Terrain
51(1)
4.5.3 Termination and Recurrence of Hostilities
51(1)
4.5.4 Agendas and Propaganda Wars
51(1)
4.6 APPLICATION: Repression and Inclusion in Interwar Europe
52(2)
4.6.1 Civil Wars in Europe
52(2)
4.6.2 Reconciliation and Reconstruction
54(1)
4.7 APPLICATION: Exclusion and Persecution in Greece
54(7)
4.7.1 Measuring Repression Politics
55(1)
4.7.2 Regional Formations
55(2)
4.7.3 Raising the Payoffs
57(1)
Appendix
58(1)
Proof of Proposition 1
58(1)
Proof of Proposition 2
58(1)
Proof of Proposition 3
58(1)
References
59(2)
5 Dynamic Models of Conflict
61(22)
5.1 Modelling Conflict Interactions
61(1)
5.2 The Lanchester Model
62(3)
5.2.1 Congestion Effects
63(1)
5.2.2 Criticism
64(1)
5.3 Lotka-Volterra Models
65(6)
5.3.1 The Arms-Race Model
65(1)
5.3.2 Non-linear Models
66(1)
5.3.3 Steady-States and Stability
66(1)
5.3.4 Lagged Discrete-Time Models
67(2)
5.3.5 Fractional Models
69(1)
5.3.6 Criticism
70(1)
5.4 The Lotka-Volterra Model as a Cournot Competition
71(3)
5.4.1 Payoffs in a Lotka-Volterra Framework
71(2)
5.4.2 Reaction Functions
73(1)
5.5 The Conflict Trap
74(9)
5.5.1 A Non-autonomous Model
74(1)
5.5.2 Conflict Equilibria
75(1)
5.5.3 Stable Equilibria
76(1)
Appendix
77(1)
A Proof of Propositions 1, 2, 3
77(1)
B Wrong Lotka-Volterra Models
78(2)
References
80(3)
6 Estimation of Conflict Dynamics
83(12)
6.1 Estimation Issues
83(3)
6.1.1 Model Specification
83(1)
6.1.2 Simultaneous Equation Bias
84(1)
6.1.3 Stationarity
84(1)
6.1.4 Estimation in First-Differences
85(1)
6.2 APPLICATION: Estimating Conflict Dynamics in the Greek Civil War
86(3)
6.2.1 Single OLS Estimation
87(2)
6.3 Evaluating the Conflict Trap
89(6)
Appendix
90(1)
Alternative Estimations
90(2)
Endogeneity Tests
92(1)
References
93(2)
7 A Model of Intertemporal Conflict
95(20)
7.1 Introduction
95(1)
7.2 An Intertemporal Conflict Model
95(6)
7.2.1 Army Building
96(1)
7.2.2 Battle Planning
97(1)
7.2.3 The Information Set
98(2)
7.2.4 Optimal Battle Plans
100(1)
7.2.5 Battle-Effort Functions
101(1)
7.3 Equilibrium and Dynamics
101(3)
7.3.1 The Army Locus
101(1)
7.3.2 The Battle Locus
102(1)
7.3.3 Stability and Response to Shocks
103(1)
7.3.4 The Dynamics of State Army
104(1)
7.4 The Battle Equation
104(2)
7.4.1 The Steady State
105(1)
7.4.2 A Log-Linear Relationship
105(1)
7.4.3 The Lanchester Analogy
106(1)
7.5 Stylized Facts
106(4)
7.5.1 Conflict Patterns
106(1)
7.5.2 The Log-Linear Pattern
107(3)
7.6 APPLICATION: The Dynamics of the Greek Civil War
110(5)
7.6.1 Building Up the Guerrilla Army
111(1)
7.6.2 Endurance and Defeat
111(2)
References
113(2)
8 The Economic Impact of Civil Wars: A Production Function Approach
115(20)
8.1 Economic Losses
115(1)
8.2 Endogenous Growth in a Civil War
116(5)
8.2.1 Infrastructure and Protection
117(1)
8.2.2 Growth-Enhancing Policies
118(1)
8.2.3 The Effect of a Civil War
119(2)
8.3 Empirical Evidence
121(1)
8.4 Measurable Direct Costs
122(1)
8.5 APPLICATION: Estimating the Direct Cost of the Greek Civil War
123(4)
8.5.1 Assumptions
123(1)
8.5.2 Growth Accounting
124(2)
8.5.3 Loss Evaluation
126(1)
8.6 Bullets Versus Books
127(1)
8.7 Counterfactual Analysis
128(7)
8.7.1 The Cost of Conflict Escalation
128(2)
Appendix
130(1)
The Endogenous Growth Rate in an Economy with Civil War
130(2)
Proof of Propositions 1, 2, 3
132(3)
References
132(3)
9 The Comparative Economic Cost of Civil Wars
135(8)
9.1 The Comparative Approach
135(1)
9.2 A Two-Stage Approach
136(7)
9.2.1 Estimation Stage I
136(3)
9.2.2 Estimation Stage II
139(2)
9.2.3 Loss Evaluation
141(1)
References
142(1)
10 A Critical Appraisal
143(10)
10.1 The Role of Economic Analysis: A Postscript
143(3)
10.1.1 Dynamic Conflict Modelling
144(1)
10.1.2 The Correlates of War
144(1)
10.1.3 Measuring the Cost of Conflict
145(1)
10.2 Conflict as a Country Failure
146(1)
10.3 Greek Failures
147(1)
10.3.1 Uncontrollable Violence
147(1)
10.3.2 The Broken Trust
147(1)
10.3.3 Signaling by Proxy
148(1)
10.4 Missing Strategies
148(5)
10.4.1 The Communist Party: A Cause Without a Strategy
149(1)
10.4.2 The Government: Power Without a Vision
149(1)
10.4.3 Lack of Leadership
150(1)
References
150(3)
11 Appendix: Data Sources and Definitions
153(1)
11.1 Nomenclature
153(1)
11.2 Data Sources
153(4)
11.3 Battle Data
157(1)
11.4 Discontent Data
157(2)
11.5 Variables
159
Nicos Christodoulakis, is Professor of Economic Analysis at the Athens University of Economics and Business (AUEB) and Research Associate with the Hellenic Observatory at the London School of Economics. In 2002-2003, he was Minister of Finance in Greece and acting Chairman of the Eurogroup. He has written extensively on growth and economic policy - and on the Greek and the Eurozone crisis in particular. His last book "How Crises shaped Economic Ideas and Policies: Wiser after the events? has been published with Springer.
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