Atnaujinkite slapukų nuostatas

Economics of Science: Methodology and Epistemology as if Economics Really Mattered [Kietas viršelis]

(University of New Hampshire, USA)
  • Formatas: Hardback, 284 pages, aukštis x plotis: 234x156 mm, weight: 690 g, 13 Tables, black and white
  • Serija: Routledge Frontiers of Political Economy
  • Išleidimo metai: 04-Dec-1997
  • Leidėjas: Routledge
  • ISBN-10: 0415172578
  • ISBN-13: 9780415172578
Kitos knygos pagal šią temą:
Economics of Science: Methodology and Epistemology as if Economics Really MatteredDidesnis paveikslėlis
  • Formatas: Hardback, 284 pages, aukštis x plotis: 234x156 mm, weight: 690 g, 13 Tables, black and white
  • Serija: Routledge Frontiers of Political Economy
  • Išleidimo metai: 04-Dec-1997
  • Leidėjas: Routledge
  • ISBN-10: 0415172578
  • ISBN-13: 9780415172578
Kitos knygos pagal šią temą:
Pastovi nuoroda: https://www.kriso.lt/db/9780415172578.html
Raktažodžiai:
Scientists as economically rational individuals is the philosophical springboard for Wible (economics, U, of New Hampshire-Durham), who more pragmatically provides economic models of institutional practices and structures of science (e.g. Pierce's economics of research project selection), failures in the marketplace of ideas (a la Popper), and fraud. The author finds science to be self-corrective in the long run like the scientific method itself, though in the short-run the allocation of resources within the profession harbors significant flaws. An exploration of broader methodological issues raised by an economics of science concludes the book. Annotation c. by Book News, Inc., Portland, Or.

Recenzijos

'The book represents a substantial contribution to the growing literature on the economics of science. The book is highly recommended, and given the growth of literature on the economics of science it is certain to become one of the seminal contributions to the field.' - Review of Social Economy Sep 2000

List of figures
xi(1)
List of tables
xii(1)
Preface xiii(4)
Acknowledgements xvii
1 WHY AN ECONOMICS OF SCIENCE?
1(22)
Science as an economically rational activity
1(1)
Misconduct, market failure, and the marketplace of ideas
2(3)
The substitutes argumentative structure of mainstream economics and an economics of science
5(3)
Mechanism versus evolution
8(2)
Positive economic science and the sociology of science
10(3)
The problem of self-reference
13(1)
Why an economics of science?
14(4)
The structure of this book
18(1)
Caveats and internal criticism
19(4)
2 AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF REPLICATION FAILURE
23(20)
Misconduct as a point of departure
23(1)
Replication failure as an economic phenomenon
24(3)
Concepts of replication in science
27(4)
An economic model of replication failure
31(6)
Some extensions and applications of the model
37(5)
Conclusions
42(1)
3 AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF FRAUD IN SCIENCE
43(18)
Fraud as an economic phenomenon
43(1)
Recent episodes of fraud in science
44(6)
An economic approach to fraud in science
50(6)
Conclusions
56(1)
Mathematical appendix: the Ehrlich model of choice under uncertainty
57(4)
4 PEIRCE'S ECONOMICS OF RESEARCH PROJECT SELECTION
61(22)
Research project selection as an economic problem
61(2)
The role of economics in Peirce's thought
63(4)
Peirce's economic model of research project selection
67(4)
The notion of probable error and the earliest correct usage of the logic of statistical inference
71(2)
Peirce's note as the first scientific piece in economics
73(3)
Nicholas Rescher on Peirce's economy of research
76(2)
Rescher's Peircean interpretation of Karl Popper
78(3)
Conclusions
81(2)
5 A COST-BENEFIT APPROACH TO RESEARCH PROJECT SELECTION, POPPER'S METHODOLOGY, AND SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS
83(13)
A cost-benefit logic of science
83(1)
Radnitzky's cost-benefit interpretation of Popper
84(2)
A cost-benefit model of research project selection
86(4)
A cost-benefit approach to the selection of facts, theories, and research programs
90(3)
An appraisal of Radnitzky's cost-benefit interpretation of Popper
93(2)
Conclusions
95(1)
6 MARKET FAILURE IN THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS: THE CASES OF KARL POPPER AND THE ECONOMICS PROFESSION
96(19)
Market failure in science and philosophy
96(2)
Bartley's economic critique of science and universities
98(4)
Market failure in the marketplace of ideas and philosophy of science: the case of Karl Popper
102(3)
A critique of Bartley's defense of Popper
105(5)
Market failure and the economics profession: the case of free market economics
110(3)
Conclusions
113(2)
7 MARKET FAILURE IN THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS: THE CASE OF FRIEDMAN'S ESSAY
115(18)
Market failure in economic methodology
115(1)
Friedman's essay
116(3)
Innovation in philosophy of science and Friedman's essay
119(4)
Boland's defense of Friedman's essay
123(2)
Friedman's essay: a case for market failure in the marketplace of ideas
125(3)
Friedman's somewhat unwarranted dominance of two similar methodological rivals: Dewey and Samuelson
128(4)
Conclusions
132(1)
8 SELF-CORRECTIVE SCIENCE IN THE CONTEXT OF MARKET FAILURE: THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS IS NOT REALLY A MARKET
133(25)
Markets, self-correctiveness, and science
133(2)
Noneconomic conceptions of the self-correctiveness of science
135(2)
The noneconomic origin of the marketplace of ideas
137(4)
Polanyi's nonmarket, self-corrective republic of science
141(3)
Hayek's theory of science as a noncommercial, rule-governed order
144(6)
Rescher's logarithmic retardation theory and scientific progress
150(3)
Partially endogenizing science as an economic process
153(3)
Conclusions
156(2)
9 ON THE ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION OF SCIENCE, THE FIRM, AND THE MARKETPLACE
158(32)
From cost-benefit theory and market failure to the economic organization of science
158(1)
Science as an anomaly to the substitutes theory of institutions in mainstream economics
159(5)
Why do firms exist? The substitutes view
164(6)
Why does science exist? The substitutes view
170(2)
Why do markets exist? The complements view
172(3)
Why does science exist? The complements view
175(5)
A dual economy in the philosophy of science literature
180(6)
Transactions costs and the economic organization of science
186(1)
Conclusions
187(3)
10 TOWARDS AN EVOLUTIONARY CONCEPTION OF RATIONALITY IN SCIENCE AND ECONOMICS
190(13)
Towards an evolutionary, processive conception of rationality
190(2)
Scientific rationality and the problem of induction
192(1)
An evolutionary conception of rationality in science
193(5)
An evolutionary conception of economic rationality
198(2)
Towards an economic conception of scientific rationality
200(2)
Conclusions
202(1)
11 INTERNAL CRITICISM AND THE PROBLEM OF SELF-REFERENCE
203(15)
An economics of science and self-reference
203(1)
William Bartley on self-reference and the tu quoque dilemma
204(1)
The problem of induction in science again
205(3)
Self-reference in mathematics and Godel's theorems
208(3)
Falsification and the problem of self-reference
211(2)
An economic response to the problems generated by self-reference
213(3)
Conclusions
216(2)
12 AN ECONOMIC CRITIQUE OF THE ARCHITECTURE OF ECONOMIC THEORY AND METHOD
218(13)
The economics of science and the problem of self-reference
218(1)
Regressive conceptions of economic competition
219(3)
Methodological competition in the scientific marketplace of ideas
222(3)
The architecture of economic theory and method
225(2)
An economics of science critique of the architecture of economic science
227(2)
Conclusions
229(2)
Notes 231(17)
Bibliography 248(13)
Index 261


James R Wible has been a member of the economics faculty at the Whittemore School of Business and Economics, University of New Hampshire in Durham for more than a decade. His main research interests are economic methodology and the economics of science, the economics and philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce, and macroeconomics and monetary theory.