Atnaujinkite slapukų nuostatas

El. knyga: Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing

4.07/5 (15 ratings by Goodreads)
Kitos knygos pagal šią temą:
Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our BelievingDidesnis paveikslėlis
Kitos knygos pagal šią temą:

DRM apribojimai

  • Kopijuoti:

    neleidžiama

  • Spausdinti:

    neleidžiama

  • El. knygos naudojimas:

    Skaitmeninių teisių valdymas (DRM)
    Leidykla pateikė šią knygą šifruota forma, o tai reiškia, kad norint ją atrakinti ir perskaityti reikia įdiegti nemokamą programinę įrangą. Norint skaityti šią el. knygą, turite susikurti Adobe ID . Daugiau informacijos  čia. El. knygą galima atsisiųsti į 6 įrenginius (vienas vartotojas su tuo pačiu Adobe ID).

    Reikalinga programinė įranga
    Norint skaityti šią el. knygą mobiliajame įrenginyje (telefone ar planšetiniame kompiuteryje), turite įdiegti šią nemokamą programėlę: PocketBook Reader (iOS / Android)

    Norint skaityti šią el. knygą asmeniniame arba „Mac“ kompiuteryje, Jums reikalinga  Adobe Digital Editions “ (tai nemokama programa, specialiai sukurta el. knygoms. Tai nėra tas pats, kas „Adobe Reader“, kurią tikriausiai jau turite savo kompiuteryje.)

    Negalite skaityti šios el. knygos naudodami „Amazon Kindle“.

Epistemic Angst offers a completely new solution to the ancient philosophical problem of radical skepticism—the challenge of explaining how it is possible to have knowledge of a world external to us.

Duncan Pritchard argues that the key to resolving this puzzle is to realize that it is composed of two logically distinct problems, each requiring its own solution. He then puts forward solutions to both problems. To that end, he offers a new reading of Wittgenstein's account of the structure of rational evaluation and demonstrates how this provides an elegant solution to one aspect of the skeptical problem. Pritchard also revisits the epistemological disjunctivist proposal that he developed in previous work and shows how it can effectively handle the other aspect of the problem. Finally, he argues that these two antiskeptical positions, while superficially in tension with each other, are not only compatible but also mutually supporting.

The result is a comprehensive and distinctive resolution to the problem of radical skepticism, one that challenges many assumptions in contemporary epistemology.

Recenzijos

"[ An] innovative, clearly written, and wide-ranging book."---Daniel Immerman, Grazer Philosophische Studien "Pritchard is an excellent analytic philosopher and manifests to a high degree the analytic philosophical skills of conceptual sophistication and rigour of reasoning."---Peter Davson-Galle, Science and Education

Acknowledgments xiii
Introduction 1(8)
Part 1 Epistemic Angst
9(52)
Chapter 1 Radical Skepticism and Closure
11(18)
1 The Contemporary Radical Skeptical Paradox
11(5)
2 Undercutting versus Overriding Anti-skeptical Strategies
16(1)
3 An Overriding Anti-skeptical Strategy (I): Nonclosure
17(2)
4 An Overriding Anti-skeptical Strategy (II): Epistemic Externalism
19(3)
5 Radical Skepticism about Rationally Grounded Knowledge
22(3)
6 An Overriding Anti-skeptical Strategy (III): Abductivism
25(3)
7 Concluding Remarks
28(1)
Chapter 2 Radical Skepticism and Underdetermination
29(32)
0 Introductory Remarks
29(1)
1 Radical Skepticism and the Underdetermination Principle
29(3)
2 An Overriding Anti-skeptical Strategy: Epistemic Externalism
32(4)
3 Attributer Contextualism as an Overriding Anti-skeptical Strategy
36(4)
4 Attributer Contextualism as an Undercutting Anti-skeptical Strategy
40(6)
5 Comparing the Two Forms of Radical Skepticism
46(3)
6 The Source of Underdetermination-Based Radical Skepticism
49(5)
7 Two Sources of Radical Skepticism
54(4)
8 Anti-skeptical Desiderata
58(3)
Part 2 Wittgenstein and the Groundlessness of Our Believing
61(60)
Chapter 3 Wittgenstein on the Structure of Rational Evaluation
63(26)
0 Introductory Remarks
63(1)
1 Wittgenstein on the Structure of Rational Evaluation
63(3)
2 Wittgenstein contra the Skeptical "Paradox"
66(4)
3 A Core Problem for the Wittgensteinian Account of the Structure of Rational Evaluation
70(3)
4 Epistemic Ways of Developing the Wittgensteinian Account of the Structure of Rational Evaluation (I): The Externalist Reading
73(4)
5 Epistemic Ways of Developing the Wittgensteinian Account of the Structure of Rational Evaluation (II): The Entitlement Reading
77(7)
6 A Nonepistemic Way of Developing the Wittgensteinian Account of the Structure of Rational Evaluation: The Nonpropositional Reading
84(3)
7 Concluding Remarks
87(2)
Chapter 4 Hinge Commitments
89(32)
0 Introductory Remarks
89(1)
1 The Nonbelief Reading
90(4)
2 Hinge Commitments
94(9)
3 Anti-skeptical Contrasts (I): Inferential Contextualism
103(7)
4 Anti-skeptical Contrasts (II): Strawsonian Naturalism
110(2)
5 Anti-skeptical Contrasts (III): Davidsonian Content Externalism
112(1)
6 Wittgensteinian Anti-skepticism and Underdetermination-Based Radical Skepticism
113(3)
7 Epistemic Priority and Underdetermination-Based Radical Skepticism
116(2)
8 Concluding Remarks
118(3)
Part 3 Epistemological Disjunctivism
121(46)
Chapter 5 Epistemological Disjunctivism and the Factivity of Reasons
123(21)
0 Introductory Remarks
123(1)
1 Epistemological Disjunctivism in Outline
123(4)
2 Three Core Problems for Epistemological Disjunctivism
127(5)
3 Epistemological Disjunctivism qua Anti-skeptical Strategy
132(4)
4 Radical Skepticism and Favoring/Discriminating Epistemic Support
136(6)
5 Concluding Remarks
142(2)
Chapter 6 Epistemological Disjunctivism and Closure-Based Radical Skepticism
144(23)
0 Introductory Remarks
144(1)
1 Anti-skeptical Contrasts (I): Rational Support Contextualism
144(9)
2 Anti-skeptical Contrasts (II): Contrastivism
153(4)
3 Anti-skeptical Contrasts (III): Dogmatism
157(3)
4 A Weakness in Epistemological Disjunctivism
160(3)
5 Epistemological Disjunctivism and Its Competitors
163(3)
6 Concluding Remarks
166(1)
Part 4 Farewell to Epistemic Angst
167(22)
Chapter 7 Farewell to Epistemic Angst
169(20)
0 Introductory Remarks
169(1)
1 Recap: The Problem of Radical Skepticism
169(4)
2 The Biscopic Proposal: Epistemic Angst Avoided
173(6)
3 Some Anti-skeptical Contrasts
179(5)
4 Concluding Postscript: Epistemic Vertigo
184(5)
Notes 189(28)
Bibliography 217(20)
Index 237
Duncan Pritchard is professor of philosophy at the University of Edinburgh, where he is the director of Eidyn: The Edinburgh Centre for Epistemology, Mind and Normativity. His books include Epistemic Luck and Epistemological Disjunctivism.
Daugiau apie elektronines knygas Daugiau apie elektronines knygas
Pastovi nuoroda: https://www.kriso.lt/db/97814008739132e.html