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Epistemological Disjunctivism [Kietas viršelis]

4.50/5 (24 ratings by Goodreads)
(University of Edinburgh)
  • Formatas: Hardback, 182 pages, aukštis x plotis x storis: 221x147x18 mm, weight: 368 g
  • Išleidimo metai: 06-Sep-2012
  • Leidėjas: Oxford University Press
  • ISBN-10: 0199557918
  • ISBN-13: 9780199557912
Kitos knygos pagal šią temą:
  • Formatas: Hardback, 182 pages, aukštis x plotis x storis: 221x147x18 mm, weight: 368 g
  • Išleidimo metai: 06-Sep-2012
  • Leidėjas: Oxford University Press
  • ISBN-10: 0199557918
  • ISBN-13: 9780199557912
Kitos knygos pagal šią temą:
Duncan Pritchard offers an original defense of epistemological disjunctivism, an account of perceptual knowledge which contends that such knowledge is paradigmatically constituted by a true belief that enjoys rational support which is both factive and reflectively accessible to the agent. In particular, in a case of paradigmatic perceptual knowledge that p, the subject's rational support for believing that p is that she sees that p, where this rational support is both reflectively accessible and factive (i.e., it entails p). Such an account of perceptual knowledge poses a radical challenge to contemporary epistemology, since by the lights of standard views in epistemology this proposal is simply incoherent. Pritchard's aim in Epistemological Disjunctivism is to show that this proposal is theoretically viable (i.e., that it does not succumb to the problems that it appears to face), and also to demonstrate that this is an account of perceptual knowledge which we would want to endorse if it were available on account of its tremendous theoretical potential. In particular, he argues that epistemological disjunctivism offers a way through the impasse between epistemic externalism and internalism, and also provides the foundation for a distinctive response to the problem of radical skepticism.

Recenzijos

Epistemological Disjunctivism is original and insightful and I can recommend it without reservation. excellent ... an original, sophisticated, and well-articulated position ... Pritchard's style is clear, accessible, and engaging. In addition to making an original contribution to the contemporary literature, this book would be well suited for graduate and advanced undergraduate courses on the epistemology of perceptual knowledge ... epistemological disjunctivism is a fascinating view that deserves critical scrutiny... Pritchard deserves credit for articulating this view so clearly and putting it on the agenda for discussion. Declan Smithies, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews This is an inspirational book. Duncan Pritchard dares to go where no contemporary epistemologist has gone before. Genia Schonbaumsfeld, University of Southampton Epistemological Disjunctivism stakes out an important new position in epistemology, one which has implications for many problems under current discussion. The position has both internalist and externalist elements, and if it can be made good, then, as Pritchard says, it would constiture the "Holy Grail" of epistemology. The book is pellucid and concise, and will be of value to scholars and graduate students, as well as advanced undergraduate courses. Anthony Brueckner, University of California, Santa Barbara Duncan Pritchard's book is the most robust and sustained defense of epistemological disjunctivism I know of. Since it advances various debates not only in epistemology but also in philosophy of mind, it will be a must-read not only for those interested in the theory of knowledge but also those interested in the nature and content of perceptual experience. Sanford Goldbery, Northwestern University This is a fascinating and first-rate contribution to an important topic. It is clearly written, covers the ground in a thorough and balanced way, and deals masterfully with the pertinent literature. It is a terrific book both for the layperson and the expert. Sven Bernecker, University of California, Irvine

Acknowledgements ix
Introduction 1(7)
Notes to Introduction 8(5)
Part One Epistemological Disjunctivism in Outline
§1 Epistemological Disjunctivism: A First Pass
13(4)
§2 Motivating Epistemological Disjunctivism
17(2)
§3 Three Prima Facie Problems for Epistemological Disjunctivism
19(4)
§4 Metaphysical and Epistemological Disjunctivism
23(2)
§5 Seeing That P and Knowing That P
25(10)
§6 Epistemological Disjunctivism and the Epistemic Externalism/Internalism Distinction
35(11)
§7 Resolving the Access Problem
46(17)
Notes to Part One
53(10)
Part Two Favouring versus Discriminating Epistemic Support Introductory Remarks
63(46)
§1 The Relevant Alternatives Account of Perceptual Knowledge
65(3)
§2 Relevant Alternatives and Closure
68(5)
§3 Three Epistemic Principles: Discrimination, Evidential Transmission, and Favouring
73(4)
§4 Favouring and Discriminating Epistemic Support
77(5)
§5 Diagnosis
82(4)
§6 A Two-Tiered Relevant Alternatives Theory
86(5)
§7 Favouring versus Discriminating Epistemic Support and Epistemological Disjunctivism
91(18)
Notes to Part Two
101(8)
Part Three Radical Scepticism
Introductory Remarks
109(1)
§1 Radical Scepticism
110(3)
§2 Mooreanism
113(3)
§3 Contemporary Neo-Mooreanism
116(6)
§4 A Simpleminded Epistemological Disjunctivist Neo-Mooreanism
122(3)
§5 Motivating Epistemological Disjunctivist Neo-Mooreanism
125(6)
§6 Overriding versus Undercutting Anti-Sceptical Strategies
131(5)
§7 Radical Scepticism and Quietism
136(5)
§8 Knowing and Saying That One Knows
141(10)
§9 Concluding Remarks
151(2)
Notes to Part Three 153(6)
References 159(10)
Index 169
Duncan Pritchard is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh. His main research area is epistemology, and he has published widely in this field, including the books Epistemic Luck (Oxford University Press, 2005) and The Nature and Value of Knowledge (with A. Haddock & A. Millar, Oxford University Press, 2010). He is editor-in-chief of the journals Oxford Bibliographies Online: Philosophy (Oxford University Press) and (with D. Machuca) International Journal for the Study of Skepticism (Brill). In 2007 he was awarded a Philip Leverhulme Prize. In 2011 he was elected to a Fellowship of the Royal Society of Edinburgh.