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El. knyga: Ethics of War and the Force of Law: A Modern Just War Theory [Taylor & Francis e-book]

(The University of Hong Kong)
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This book provides a thorough critical overview of the current debate on the ethics of war, as well as a modern just war theory that can give practical action-guidance by recognizing and explaining the moral force of widely accepted law.

Traditionalist, Walzerian, and "revisionist" approaches have dominated contemporary debates about the classical jus ad bellum and jus in bello requirements in just war theory. In this book, Uwe Steinhoff corrects widely spread misinterpretations of these competing views and spells out the implications for the ethics of war. His approach is unique in that it complements the usual analysis in terms of self-defense with an emphasis on the importance of other justifications that are often lumped together under the heading of "lesser evil." It also draws on criminal law and legal scholarship, which has been largely ignored by just war theorists. Ultimately, Steinhoff rejects arguments in favor of "moral fundamentalism"— the view that the laws and customs of war must simply follow an immutable morality. In contrast, he argues that widely accepted laws and conventions of war are partly constitutive of the moral rules that apply in a conflict.

The Ethics of War and the Force of Law will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in just war theory, applied ethics, political philosophy, political theory, philosophy of law, and criminal and military law.

Preface xi
Acknowledgments xiii
1 Introduction and Overview
1(11)
2 What Is War - and Can a Lone Individual Wage One?
12(19)
2.1 Defining War - What Is It Good For?
12(2)
2.2 War as Event and War as Action
14(1)
2.3 Individual War
15(3)
2.4 Sovereignty
18(2)
2.5 Violent Struggle
20(5)
2.6 A Comparison with Some Other Definitions
25(6)
3 Jus ad Bellum: Justifying the Use of War
31(84)
3.1 Legitimate Authority
32(19)
3.1.1 Traditional Just War Theory and Legitimate Authority
33(3)
3.1.2 The Spurious "Priority" of Legitimate Authority
36(6)
3.1.3 The Consequentialist Argument for Legitimate Authority: The Specter of Chaos and Anarchy
42(4)
3.1.4 Other Arguments for Legitimate Authority or "Authorization"?
46(4)
3.1.5 Conclusion
50(1)
3.2 Just Cause and "Right Intention"
51(40)
3.2.1 Just Cause, Retribution, and the Continuous Application of Jus ad Bellum
51(1)
3.2.1.1 The Formal Question: What Kind of Thing Is a "Just Cause" for War?
52(9)
3.2.1.2 The General Substantive Question: "Which Causes Are Just?" or "Under What Conditions Is There a Just Cause?"
61(7)
3.2.1.3 The Question of Timing: Does the "Just Cause" Criterion Only Apply to the Initiation of a War or Also to Its Continuation?
68(5)
3.2.2 Right Intention? The Subjective Element of a Justified War
73(3)
3.2.2.1 The Indispensability of "Right Intention" in the Form of a Knowledge Requirement
76(5)
3.2.2.2 Objections to the Previous Argument
81(6)
3.2.2.3 The Mere Knowledge Requirement Is also Sufficient
87(1)
3.2.3 Just Cause and the Subjective Element: Conclusions and Practical Consequences
88(3)
3.3 Proportionality (Again): The Subcriteria of Prospects of Success and Last Resort
91(7)
3.3.1 Prospects of Success
91(4)
3.3.2 Last Resort
95(3)
3.4 Summary
98(17)
4 Jus in hello: Justifying the Use of Force in War
115(178)
4.1 Ordinary Morality and Jus in Bello: Correcting "Revisionist" Misrepresentations of Domestic Peacetime Morality and Its Implications for War
115(99)
4.1.1 McMahan's "Responsibility Account" of "Liability to Defensive Force" as a Non-Starter
124(5)
4.1.2 Rodin on Self-Defense and the "Myth" of National Self-Defense: A Refutation
129(1)
4.1.2.1 Necessity and the "Duty to Retreat"
130(3)
4.1.2.2 Proportionality in Self-Defense
133(3)
4.1.2.3 Wide Proportionality and Imposing the Risk of Death on People One Defends
136(7)
4.1.2.4 Rodin on Just War Theory, International Law, and "Copernican Moments"
143(3)
4.1.2.5 War as Law Enforcement and Punishment: The Incoherence of Rodin's Account
146(2)
4.1.2.6 Conclusion
148(1)
4.1.3 Self-Defense Redeemed: The Common Understanding of the Self-Defense Justification
148(3)
4.1.4 Beyond Self-Defense: The Defensive and the Aggressive Emergency Justification
151(5)
4.1.5 Self-Defense vs. Justifying Emergency: Implications for Participating in War
156(2)
4.1.5.1 Equality and Inequality in War: Background and Conceptual Clarifications
158(2)
4.1.5.2 The Dubious Argument for the Two Inequality Doctrines
160(3)
4.1.5.3 Proportionality and Special Responsibilities or Prerogatives
163(7)
4.1.5.4 In Which Wars May Soldiers Participate?
170(4)
4.1.6 The Deceptive Allure of the "Revisionist" Inequality of Combatants Doctrine: On Imagined Innovations, Question-Begging Definitions, and Dogmatic Insistence
174(1)
4.1.6.1 The Moral Inequality Thesis in History: Imagined and Real Orthodoxies
175(5)
4.1.6.2 The Revisionist Formulation of the Inequality Thesis: Tautologies and Question-Begging
180(2)
4.1.6.3 The Inequality Thesis as Sustained by the "Justification Defeats Liability" Doctrine: On Ad Hoccery and Dogmatism
182(10)
4.1.7 The Doctrine of Double Effect (and Related Principles)
192(2)
4.1.7.1 Preliminaries: A Non-Absolutist Formulation of the Doctrine of Double Effect and First Doubts about Its Credibility
194(3)
4.1.7.2 A Rigged Comparison: The Terror Bomber/Tactical Bomber Example
197(10)
4.1.7.3 The Equally Rigged Trolley Examples - and a Universal Counter-Example
207(4)
4.1.7.4 A Convenient Distraction: The "Sophisticated Bomber"
211(2)
4.1.7.5 Conclusion
213(1)
4.2 War, Law, and Reciprocity: Devising the Moral Rules of War
214(79)
4.2.1 Moral Fundamentalism vs. Constitutivism: The Relation between Widely Accepted Laws and the Ethics of War
215(1)
4.2.1.1 Moral Fundamentalism and McMahan's Incoherent Account of the Relation between the "Deep Morality" and the Laws of War
216(6)
4.2.1.2 Two Kinds of "Reductivism"
222(3)
4.2.1.3 On Haque's "Service View" of the Laws of War - A Brief Critique
225(6)
4.2.1.4 Examples against Moral Fundamentalism: Reciprocity and the Morally Constitutive Force of Widely Accepted Conventions
231(5)
4.2.1.5 Lessons for War, Part I: The Variable Moral Scopes and Limits of Necessity and Proportionality in War
236(5)
4.2.1.6 Lessons for War, Part II: Reciprocity, Conventions, and the Moral Equality of Combatants
241(3)
4.2.1.7 Lessons for War, Part III: The Principle of Distinction
244(3)
4.2.1.8 A Further Reason Why Moral Fundamentalism Is Mistaken: The Moral Significance of Publicly Authorized Functions and Roles
247(1)
4.2.1.9 Conclusions
248(2)
4.2.2 Against Benbaji's and Statman's "Contractarianism"
250(43)
Concluding Remarks 293(8)
References 301(16)
Index 317
Uwe Steinhoff is Professor in the Department of Politics and Public Administration at the University of Hong Kong. He is the author of On the Ethics of War and Terrorism (2007), The Philosophy of Jürgen Habermas (2009), On the Ethics of Torture (2013), and Self-Defense, Necessity, and Punishment (Routledge, 2019), and the editor of Do All Persons Have Equal Moral Worth? (2015).
Pastovi nuoroda: https://www.kriso.lt/db/9781003110422_pe.html
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