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European Sovereign Debt Crisis: Breaking the Vicious Circle between Sovereigns and Banks [Kietas viršelis]

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  • Formatas: Hardback, 236 pages, aukštis x plotis: 234x156 mm, weight: 453 g, 2 Tables, black and white; 6 Line drawings, black and white; 6 Illustrations, black and white
  • Serija: Routledge Research in Finance and Banking Law
  • Išleidimo metai: 24-Aug-2021
  • Leidėjas: Routledge
  • ISBN-10: 0367523469
  • ISBN-13: 9780367523466
Kitos knygos pagal šią temą:
European Sovereign Debt Crisis: Breaking the Vicious Circle between Sovereigns and BanksDidesnis paveikslėlis
  • Formatas: Hardback, 236 pages, aukštis x plotis: 234x156 mm, weight: 453 g, 2 Tables, black and white; 6 Line drawings, black and white; 6 Illustrations, black and white
  • Serija: Routledge Research in Finance and Banking Law
  • Išleidimo metai: 24-Aug-2021
  • Leidėjas: Routledge
  • ISBN-10: 0367523469
  • ISBN-13: 9780367523466
Kitos knygos pagal šią temą:
Pastovi nuoroda: https://www.kriso.lt/db/9780367523466.html
Raktažodžiai:
"The European Sovereign Debt Crisis: Breaking the Vicious Circle Between Sovereigns and Banks explains why the euro area's progress in reining-in the risks arising from the well-documented bi-directional financial contagion transmission mechanism that links sovereigns to commercial banks has been more prominent in respect of the channel of contagion moving from banks to sovereigns. Providing an analysis of the legal and regulatory measures that Europe and the euro area have taken to mitigate the exposureof sovereigns to financial crises generated by commercial banks, this book draws attention to areas where improvements to the arsenal of tools hitherto introduced are either desirable or necessary. Chapters further explain - with recourse to economic andlegal arguments - why the channel of contagion moving from sovereigns to commercial banks has proven harder to close, and explores ways in which progress could be made in the direction of closing it so as to avert the risk of future banking sector crises. This work provides essential reading for students, researchers and practitioners with an interest in sovereign debt crises and the euro area banking system. Phoebus L. Athanassiou (LL.B, LL.M, Ph.D) is Senior Lead Legal Counsel with the Legal Services of the European Central Bank, a published author of works on banking and financial law, and a member of the Academic Faculty of the Institute of Law and Finance at the Goethe University of Frankfurt, Germany. Angelos T. Vouldis (M.Eng, MSc, Ph.D) is an Economist at the European Central Bank, with year-long policy experience in financial crises and the stress testing of financial institutions. He has published extensively in leading journals on banking, financial stability, business cycles and institutionalchange"--

This book explains why the euro area’s progress in reining-in the risks arising from the well-documented bi-directional financial contagion transmission mechanism that links sovereigns to commercial banks has been more prominent in respect of the channel of contagion moving from banks to sovereigns.



The European Sovereign Debt Crisis: Breaking the Vicious Circle Between Sovereigns and Banks explains why the euro area’s progress in reining-in the risks arising from the well-documented bi-directional financial contagion transmission mechanism that links sovereigns to commercial banks has been more prominent in respect of the channel of contagion moving from banks to sovereigns.

Providing an analysis of the legal and regulatory measures that Europe and the euro area have taken to mitigate the exposure of sovereigns to financial crises generated by commercial banks, this book draws attention to areas where improvements to the arsenal of tools hitherto introduced are either desirable or necessary. Chapters further explain – with recourse to economic and legal arguments – why the channel of contagion moving from sovereigns to commercial banks has proven harder to close, and explores ways in which progress could be made in the direction of closing it so as to avert the risk of future banking sector crises.

This work provides essential reading for students, researchers and practitioners with an interest in sovereign debt crises and the euro area banking system.

List of main legal instruments and sources
ix
List of cases
xii
List of abbreviations and acronyms
xv
Preface xviii
Introduction 1(7)
1 The sovereign--banks nexus: An economic analysis
8(34)
1.1 Introductory remarks
8(1)
1.2 Brief historical overview
8(1)
1.3 Why do banks bold domestic sovereign debt?
9(13)
1.3.1 Discrimination and selective defaults
9(2)
1.3.2 Pro-cyclicality of sovereign debt
11(3)
1.3.3 Moral suasion and financial repression
14(2)
1.3.4 Sovereign debt's preferential regulatory treatment and use as collateral
16(5)
1.3.5 Concluding remarks
21(1)
1.4 The sovereign--banks nexus
22(20)
1.4.1 From sovereigns to banks
24(2)
1.4.2 From banks to sovereigns
26(2)
1.4.3 From banks to other banks and to other financial institutions
28(2)
1.4.4 From banks to the real economy (and vice versa)
30(5)
1.4.5 From the real economy to the sovereign (and vice versa)
35(3)
1.4.6 Particular relevance for countries in a monetary union
38(3)
1.4.7 Concluding remarks
41(1)
2 Case studies from the European sovereign debt crisis
42(13)
2.1 Effects of commercial bank crises on sovereigns
42(5)
2.1.1 Introductory remarks
42(1)
2.1.2 The case of Ireland
42(3)
2.1.3 The case of Cyprus
45(1)
2.1.4 Concluding remarks
46(1)
2.2 Effects of sovereign crises on commercial banks
47(8)
2.2.1 Introductory remarks
47(3)
2.2.2 The case of Greece
50(1)
2.2.3 The case of Cyprus
51(2)
2.2.4 Conclusions
53(2)
3 An economic analysis of policy options
55(65)
3.1 Introductory remarks
55(1)
3.2 Fiscal policy and why fiscal measures may not be sufficient
55(7)
3.3 Closing the first channel of contagion from banks to sovereigns: Is the European Banking Union an optimal policy response?
62(16)
3.4 Closing the second channel of contagion from sovereigns to banks
78(42)
3.4.1 Revision of the regulatory treatment of sovereign debt holdings and its challenges
78(8)
3.4.2 Safe assets
86(18)
3.4.3 Eurobonds
104(16)
4 Closing the first channel of contagion from banks to sovereigns: Hitherto European actions and their critique
120(34)
4.1 Introductory remarks
120(2)
4.2 The single supervisory mechanism: Overview of legal and operational shortcomings and concerns
122(12)
4.2.1 Operational set-up and related concerns
122(5)
4.2.2 Other legal concerns and open questions
127(7)
4.3 Bank recovery and resolution directive and the single resolution mechanism: Overview and shortcomings
134(6)
4.3.1 From the bank recovery and resolution directive to the single resolution mechanism
134(1)
4.3.2 Single resolution mechanism and single resolution fund
135(2)
4.3.3 Remaining challenges in the field of resolution
137(3)
4.4 European deposit guarantee scheme: Overview and state of play
140(3)
4.5 Other institutional and legal concerns thrown up by the European Banking Union
143(2)
4.6 Centralisation of emergency liquidity assistance provision as a means of closing the first channel of contagion?
145(2)
4.7 Intermediate assessment: Does the European Banking Union break the first channel of contagion?
147(7)
5 Closing the second channel of contagion from sovereigns to banks: Legal assessment of policy options
154(51)
5.1 Introductory remarks
154(5)
5.1.1 Ex Ante measures: Limits on sovereign bond holdings and for change in their favourable regulatory treatment
155(4)
5.1.2 Other policy options
159(1)
5.2 A credible euro-area stability support mechanism: State of the debate
159(22)
5.2.1 The European Stability Mechanism
159(8)
5.2.2 From the European Stability Mechanism to a European Monetary Fund?
167(1)
5.2.2.1 Introductory remarks
167(2)
5.2.2.2 Choice of institutional set-up: An intergovernmental European Stability Mechanism or a supranational European Monetary Fund?
169(6)
5.2.2.3 What powers for a credible European lender of last resort?
175(5)
5.2.2.4 Concluding remarks
180(1)
5.3 Creation and issuance of a European safe asset: Eurobonds and other proposals
181(24)
5.3.1 Eurobonds and other proposals
181(1)
5.3.1.1 Overview of proposals
181(3)
5.3.1.2 Legal assessment of existing proposals
184(9)
5.3.1.3 The European Central Bank as issuer of an alternative common safe asset?
193(2)
5.3.1.4 Concluding remarks
195(1)
5.3.2 A European Central Securities Depository for the issuance of common safe assets?
196(1)
5.3.2.1 Possible legal bases
197(1)
5.3.2.2 Proportionality considerations
198(1)
5.3.2.3 Subsidiarity considerations
199(2)
5.3.2.4 Legal regime governing a European Central Securities Depository and the instruments issued through it
201(4)
Concluding remarks 205(4)
Bibliography 209(19)
Index 228
Phoebus L. Athanassiou (LLB, LLM, PhD) is Senior Lead Legal Counsel with the Legal Services of the European Central Bank, a published author of works on banking and financial law, and a member of the Academic Faculty of the Institute of Law and Finance at the Goethe University of Frankfurt, Germany.

Angelos T. Vouldis (MEng, MSc, PhD) is an Economist at the European Central Bank, with year-long policy experience in financial crises and the stress testing of financial institutions. He has published extensively in leading journals on banking, financial stability, business cycles and institutional change.