This volume presents state-of-the-art research on issues related to evidentialism. It demonstrates the continuing relevance of evidentialist epistemology by bringing it into direct confrontation with some of its latest non-evidentialist rivals and by proposing new areas for exploration and development.
This volume presents state-of-the-art research on issues related to evidentialism. It demonstrates the continuing relevance of evidentialist epistemology by bringing it into direct confrontation with some of its latest non-evidentialist rivals and by proposing new areas for exploration and development.
Conee and Feldmans landmark paper Evidentialism (1985) served as a launching point for an enormous research program in epistemology. Many epistemologists define their points of view at least partly in terms of how they relate to evidentialism. The chapters in this volume address important questions related to evidentialism, including:
- How should evidentialism be defined?
- When does evidence suffice for belief?
- What does properly or appropriately responding to ones evidence involve?
- Does evidentialism capture all cases of epistemically justified believing?
- Is there any kind of epistemic normativity that falls outside the purview of evidentialist epistemology?
- Are core evidentialist theses compatible with certain forms of externalism?
- Do classical evidentialist theses successfully preclude pragmatism?
- Do moral considerations ever get a say in what it is rational to believe?
- What (more) should evidentialists say about suspending judgment?
- What is the connection between evidence and logical inference?
- What should evidentialists say about extended memory?
- Does public evidence matter to epistemic justification?
The range of fresh ideas in this cutting-edge volume, marking the 40th anniversary of Evidentialism, will appeal to scholars and graduate students working on evidentialism, evidence, the nature of justification, evidential support, and related topics in epistemology.
Introductory Note: New Arguments and New Angles on Evidentialism Part 1:
Understanding Evidentialism
1. Varieties of Evidentialism
2. Permissivist
Evidentialism
3. Support Per (and For) Evidentialism
4. Extreme Evidentialism
5. Rethinking Evidentialism
6. How to Combine Evidentialism with
Knowledge-First Epistemology Part 2: Evidentialism and Normativity
7. Does
Epistemology Rest on a Mistake? Rochester Internalism and the Normative
Question
8. Evidentialism, Encroachment, and the Moral Importance of
Understanding
9. The Applied Moral Turn of the Ethics of Belief Debate
10.
Why Are (Some) Epistemic Norms Evidential? Part 3: Challenges for
Evidentialism
11. Evidentialism and Foundationalism
12. Against Indicator
Evidentialism
13. Evidentialism and Having Evidence
14. What is Sufficient
Evidence?
15. Zetetic Norms: A Puzzle for Evidentialism?
16. Evidentialism
and Normative Expectations
17. Evidence and Withholding: Four Recent
Objections to Evidentialism Part 4: New Angles for Evidentialism
18. Group
Evidence, Group Belief, and Group Responsibility Transmission
19. Purism and
Pluralism: On the Brilliance of Tarot and the Breadth of Epistemology
20.
Reasoned Change in Logic
21. Experience, Plausibility, and Evidence Part 5:
Evidentialists Against Evidentialism
22. Evidentialism and Pragmatism
Disputed; Evidential and Practical Reasons Defended
Kevin McCain is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Alabama at Birmingham. He has authored and edited several works in epistemology and philosophy of science.
Scott Stapleford is Professor of Philosophy at St. Thomas University in Fredericton, Canada. He has authored and edited several works in epistemology and Early Modern philosophy.
Matthias Steup is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Colorado, Boulder. He has edited several books and authored many articles in epistemology.
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