Atnaujinkite slapukų nuostatas

El. knyga: Feelings of Being: Phenomenology, Psychiatry and the Sense of Reality [Oxford Medicine Online E-books]

(Reader in philosophy, Durham University, UK)
  • Oxford Medicine Online E-books
  • Kaina nežinoma
There is a great deal of current philosophical and scientific interest in emotional feelings. However, many of the feelings that people struggle to express in their everyday lives do not appear on standard lists of emotions. For example, there are feelings of unreality, heightened existence, surreality, familiarity, unfamiliarity, estrangement, strangeness, isolation, emptiness, belonging, being at home in the world, being at one with things, significance, insignificance, and the list goes on. Such feelings might be referred to as 'existential' because they comprise a changeable sense of being part of a world. Existential feelings have not been systematically explored until now, despite the important role that they play in our lives and the devastating effects that disturbances of existential feeling can have in psychiatric illness.

Feelings of Being is the first ever philosophical account of the nature, role and variety of existential feelings in psychiatric illness and in everyday life. In this book, Matthew Ratcliffe proposes that existential feelings form a distinctive group by virtue of three characteristics: they are bodily feelings, they constitute ways of relating to the world as a whole, and they are responsible for our sense of reality. The book explains how something can be a bodily feeling and, at the same time, a sense of reality and belonging. It then explores the role of changed feeling in psychiatric illness, showing how an account of existential feeling can help us to understand experiential changes that occur in a range of conditions, including depression, circumscribed delusions, depersonalisation and schizophrenia. The book also addresses the contribution made by existential feelings to religious experience and to philosophical thought.

Written in a clear, non-technical style throughout, it will be valuable for philosophers, clinicians, students, and researchers working in a wide range of disciplines.
Introduction 1
The neglect of existential feeling 1
Phenomenology and the sense of reality 4
Summary of the argument 10
Part I The structure of existential feeling
1 Emotions and bodily feelings
17
The dismissal of 'mere affect'
17
Solomon on emotion and the meaning of life
21
Uniting cognition and affect
26
Emotions as embodied appraisals
28
Emotions as bodily judgements
31
Bodily feelings and feelings towards
33
Feeling is not 'mere affect'
35
2 Existential feelings
41
Heidegger on practical understanding
42
Heidegger on mood
47
Existential feeling as a phenomenological category
52
The nonsense charge
57
Existential feelings in autobiographical accounts of psychiatric illness
61
Existential feelings in literature and everyday life
65
Propositional attitudes and the sense of reality
69
3 The phenomenology of touch
77
Vision and touch
77
Touch and proprioception
79
Aspect shifts
84
Boundaries
90
Being in touch with the world
93
Part II Varieties of existential feeling in psychiatric illness
4 Body and world
105
The feeling body
106
The conspicuous body
112
The phenomenology of sickness
116
Existential feelings, bodily dispositions and possibilities
121
Horizons
130
5 Feeling and belief in the Capgras delusion
139
Interpersonal relations
139
The Capgras delusion
143
The feeling of unfamiliarity
147
Relatedness and recognition
149
Perceiving the possible
153
Experiencing people
155
Experience and belief
159
6 Feelings of deadness and depersonalization
165
The Cotard delusion
165
Against two-factor accounts
170
Nothingness
178
Depersonalization and double-counting
180
7 Existential feeling in schizophrenia
187
Early descriptions of schizophrenia
187
Phenomenological accounts of schizophrenia
191
Inconsistency
196
Thought insertion
198
Diagnoses and existential feelings
205
Kinds of existential feeling
211
Part III Existential feeling and philosophical thought
8 What William James really said
219
Physiology and philosophy
220
The role of emotion in experience and thought
224
Pragmatism
230
Radical empiricism
233
9 Stance, feeling and belief
241
Feelings and philosophical positions
241
Philosophical stances
248
Stance, commitment and critique
253
Feeling and epistemic disposition
257
Authentic and inauthentic philosophies
259
Conviction and doubt
262
10 Pathologies of existential feeling
269
The nature of religious experience
269
Medical and existential perspectives
276
Medical, epistemic and pragmatic pathologies
279
Existential pathology
284
The poverty of the mechanistic world
289
References 293
Index 305
Matthew Ratcliffe is Reader in Philosophy at Durham University, UK. He works primarily on phenomenology, philosophical psychology and philosophy of psychiatry. He is author of Rethinking Commonsense Psychology: A Critique of Folk Psychology, Theory of Mind and Simulation (Palgrave Macmillan, 2007) and co-editor, with Daniel Hutto, of Folk Psychology Re-assessed (Springer, 2007).