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Financial Markets and European Monetary Cooperation: The Lessons of the 199293 Exchange Rate Mechanism Crisis [Kietas viršelis]

(University of Cambridge), , (Universitą degli Studi, Bologna, Italy)
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A blend of theoretical and policy-oriented analysis, this book provides a comprehensive assessment of the causes and implications of the 19923 crisis of the exchange rate mechanism of the European monetary system. Cogent factual presentation - including new details on the crisis - original theoretical analysis, and an interpretation rooted in the theory, make this treatment essential reading to understand the process toward economic and political integration in Europe. The authors first sketch the history of monetary cooperation in Europe from Bretton Woods to Maastricht. A step-by-step account of the 19923 events follows, including a discussion of the extent to which financial markets anticipated the crisis. A survey of the literature on the subject introduces the authors' center-periphery model of currency crisis. The authors argue that the vulnerability of Europe to financial crisis was - and still is - the result of the lack of concern with the systemic dimensions of monetary policy-making.

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This book provides a comprehensive assessment of the causes and implications of the 19923 crisis of the exchange rate mechanism.
Forewords vii Kenji Kawakatsu Helmut Schlesinger Acknowledgments ix Introduction 1(18) The roots of the European consensus on limiting exchange rate flexibility 3(2) The ERM and the logic of nominal anchors 5(2) Escape clauses and financial stability 7(2) The debate on the ERM crisis 9(2) Understanding the crisis: The missing elements 11(5) Lessons for the future 16(3) Exchange rate stability in Europe: A historical perspective 19(19) From Bretton Woods to the Treaty of Maastricht 19(12) The Treaty of Maastricht 31(7) The unfolding of the 1992-93 ERM crisis 38(29) Toward the crisis 38(16) A chronology of the ERM crack-up 54(13) Financial markets and ERM credibility 67(16) Capital market liberalization and ``convergence plays 67(3) Defining and measuring ERM credibility 70(4) Exchange rate expectations before the crisis 74(9) Modelling currency crises 83(10) Exchange rate crises and speculative attacks 83(6) Fundamental models of the ERM crisis 89(4) A Center-Periphery model 93(15) Introduction 93(1) The Center country 94(2) The Periphery countries 96(1) The objective function of the Center 97(2) The objective function of the Periphery 99(4) The semireduced form of the model 103(5) Unilateral pegs and escape clauses: The role of domestic credibility 108(26) Exchange rate crises as equilibrium outcomes 108(4) Imperfect commitment and expectations formation 112(6) Multiple equilibria, self-fulfilling expectations, and the ERM crisis 118(4) Open issues in the ``self-fulfilling vs. ``fundamental debate 122(3) Revisiting theories based on domestic fundamentals 125(7) A summary 132(2) Policy coordination and currency crises 134(29) Introduction 134(2) Noncooperative equilibrium 136(13) Cooperation in the Periphery 149(5) Does cooperation in the Periphery make a difference? 154(9) What caused the system to crumble? 163(13) Building blocks of a systematic theory 163(2) Lessons from the theory 165(3) The interpretation of the 1992-93 ERM crisis in a Center-Periphery model 168(8) Rebuilding the system: What next? 176(29) Introduction 176(1) Microeconomic efficiency arguments for a common currency 177(3) Seigniorage and exchange rates 180(5) Nominal rigidities and the Keynesian arguments for an optimal currency area 185(6) What makes up for loss of exchange rate flexibility? 191(5) Capital mobility as an argument for a common currency 196(2) Issues in the transition to EMU 198(2) Reconstructing the monetary system in Europe through EMU 200(5) Appendix 203(2) References 205(10) Index 215