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El. knyga: Free Will and Responsibility: A Guide for Practitioners [Oxford Medicine Online E-books]

(Consultant Psychiatrist and Associate Medical Director, Royal Cornhill Hospital, Aberdeen. Honorary Clinical Senior Lecturer, University of Aberdeen, UK)
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`We know our will is free and there's an end on't'. Dr. Johnson's words express a widely held intuition about free will, namely that our actions are the effects of our choices and decisions, and these choices and decisions are not the effects of antecedent causes. At least for some of our actions, the causal chain begins with conscious deliberation about what to do. It is this intuition that informs our attitudes to wrongdoing and justifies the belief that wrongdoers should be punished because this is what they deserve. However, we also know that we live in a world in which events have causes. Research in psychology, psychiatry and the neurosciences aims to investigate the causes of our thoughts, feelings and behavior, and new techniques, such as neuroimaging, as well as developments in molecular genetics, are demonstrating the many ways in which dysfunction of the brain can lead to the kinds of behaviors that have hitherto been regarded as moral or immoral. So how can our intuitive sense of freedom be reconciled with causal determinism? How can moral judgment and punishment be compatible with the belief that the events that are human actions are, like any other event, the effects of prior causes?

In Free Will and Responsibility, John Callender begins by describing the evolution of morality and the roles of reason and emotion in the making of moral judgments. He then summarises recent neuroscientific research on volitional behavior, moral decision-making and criminality and discusses what this might mean for our practices of blame and punishment. In the second part, he examines the overlaps between art, free will, and moral values and argues that this offers a paradigm that reconciles our subjective sense of freedom with causal determinism. Finally, he examines these ideas in the clinical context of conditions such as psychopathic personality disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder and the dissociative disorders and discusses their implications for psychotherapy.

This book makes a unique contribution to philosophy and psychiatry literature, and will be fascinating reading for both practising psychiatrists, as well as philosophers, neuroscientists, and psychologists.

'We know our will is free and there's an end on't'. Dr. Johnson's words express a widely held intuition about free will, namely that our actions are the effects of our choices and decisions, and these choices and decisions are not the effects of antecedent causes. At least for some of our actions, the causal chain begins with conscious deliberation about what to do. It is this intuition that informs our attitudes to wrongdoing and justifies the belief that wrongdoers should be punished because this is what they deserve. However, we also know that we live in a world in which events have causes.

Research in psychology, psychiatry and the neurosciences aims to investigate the causes of our thoughts, feelings and behaviour, and new techniques, such as neuroimaging, as well as developments in molecular genetics, are demonstrating the many ways in which dysfunction of the brain can lead to the kinds of behaviours that have hitherto been regarded as moral or immoral. So how can our intuitive sense of freedom be reconciled with causal determinism? How can moral judgment and punishment be compatible with the belief that the events that are human actions are, like any other event, the effects of prior causes?

In Free Will and Responsibility, John Callender starts by describing the evolution of morality and the roles of reason and emotion in the making of moral judgments. He then summarises recent neuroscientific research on volitional behaviour, moral decision-making, and criminality, and discusses what this might mean for our practices of blame and punishment. In the second part, he examines the overlaps between art, free will, and moral value and argues that this offers a paradigm that reconciles our subjective sense of freedom with causal determinism. Finally, he examines these ideas in the clinical context of conditions such as psychopathic personality disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder and the dissociative disorders and discusses their implications for psychotherapy.

This book makes a unique contribution to the philosophy and psychiatry literature, and will be fascinating reading for both practising psychiatrists, as well as philosophers, neuroscientists, and psychologists.
Introduction 1(20)
Part I Thinking about morality
1 The evolution of morality
21(30)
1.1 Introduction
21(1)
1.2 Morality in primates
22(8)
1.3 Moral games
30(4)
1.4 Altruistic punishment
34(2)
1.5 Evolution of trust
36(2)
1.6 Moral categories
38(9)
1.7 Conclusions
47(4)
2 Moral reasoning and the moral emotions
51(18)
2.1 Introduction
51(1)
2.2 Reactive attitudes
52(5)
2.3 Moral emotions
57(5)
2.4 Reason, emotion, and morality
62(5)
2.5 Conclusions
67(2)
3 Moral theories and moral truths
69(14)
3.1 Introduction
69(1)
3.2 Moral realism
69(3)
3.3 Moral irrealism
72(2)
3.4 Naturalism
74(1)
3.5 Relativism
75(2)
3.6 Moral theory and public policy
77(4)
3.7 Conclusions
81(2)
4 Responsibility and punishment
83(20)
4.1 Introduction
83(1)
4.2 Consequentialism
84(2)
4.3 Retributivism
86(2)
4.4 Punishment as education
88(2)
4.5 Principles of punishment
90(6)
4.6 Restorative justice
96(3)
4.7 Conclusions
99(4)
5 Neuroscience, free will, and moral responsibility
103(54)
5.1 Introduction
103(1)
5.2 Benjamin Libet and free will
104(7)
5.3 The neuroscience of moral decision-making
111(6)
5.4 The neuroscience of wrongdoing
117(12)
5.5 Sociogenomics
129(5)
5.6 Neuroscience and ethics
134(3)
5.7 Implications for legal practice
137(10)
5.8 Conclusions
147(10)
Part II Thinking about free will
6 Art, free will, and moral value: An interactive model
157(60)
6.1 Introduction
157(2)
6.2 Free will and moral value
159(22)
6.3 Moral value and art
181(9)
6.4 Free will and art
190(4)
6.5 Art, free will, and moral value
194(11)
6.6 Non-overlapping areas
205(1)
6.7 Living with determinism
206(3)
6.8 Conclusions
209(8)
Part III Clinical applications
7 Weakness of the will: Akrasia in clinical practice
217(26)
7.1 Introduction
217(1)
7.2 Akrasia in classical philosophy
217(2)
7.3 Modern concepts: Akrasia, autonomy, and competence
219(5)
7.4 First- and second-order desires
224(3)
7.5 Akrasia and moral value
227(2)
7.6 Hyperbolic discounting
229(7)
7.7 Akrasia and `soft paternalism'
236(2)
7.8 The upside of akrasia
238(1)
7.9 Conclusions
239(4)
8 Psychopathic personality disorder
243(50)
8.1 Introduction
243(2)
8.2 Clinical features
245(2)
8.3 Neuroscience and psychopathy
247(7)
8.4 Nature of the concept
254(4)
8.5 Validity and reliability of the PCL-R
258(5)
8.6 Diagnosis of psychopathy, sentencing, and parole
263(3)
8.7 Origins of the concept
266(5)
8.8 What to do with the dangerous: An example of policy
271(5)
8.9 Moral and legal responsibility
276(10)
8.10 Conclusions
286(7)
9 Trauma, dissociative disorders, and PTSD
293(34)
9.1 Introduction
293(1)
9.2 Dissociative disorders
294(2)
9.3 Posttraumatic stress disorder
296(3)
9.4 Trauma, dissociation, and criminality
299(8)
9.5 Dissociation and legal responsibility
307(11)
9.6 Dissociation, PTSD, and punishment
318(4)
9.7 Conclusions
322(5)
10 Psychotherapy, freedom, and responsibility
327(42)
10.1 Introduction
327(1)
10.2 Psychoanalysis and related therapies
328(4)
10.3 Cognitive behavioral therapy
332(1)
10.4 Rational deliberation
333(10)
10.5 The moral dimension of psychotherapy
343(11)
10.6 Psychotherapy and creativity
354(5)
10.7 Psychotherapy as a threat to freedom
359(2)
10.8 Conclusions
361(8)
Part IV Conclusions
11 Conclusions
369(10)
Index 379
John Callender has been a consultant psychiatrist since 1986 and Medical Director of Grampian Psychiatric services since 1991. He is an Honorary Clinical Senior Lecturer, Medical School, University of Aberdeen. He has been interested in the philosophy of psychiatry for the past twelve years. He is a member of the Grampian Clinical Ethics Committee and the North of Scotland Research Ethics Committee. He has published papers on ethics and aesthetics in relation to psychiatry in the Journal of Medical Ethics, Clinical Psychology and Psychotherapy, and Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology.