| Preface |
|
iii | |
|
|
|
ix | |
| Summary |
|
xi | |
| Acknowledgments |
|
xix | |
|
|
|
1 | (10) |
|
A Short History of the Long Tradition of American-Israeli Military Learning |
|
|
2 | (6) |
|
Scope, Methodology, and Structure of the Report |
|
|
8 | (3) |
|
Chapter Two Israel in Gaza: A Brief Background |
|
|
11 | (16) |
|
Emergence of Palestinian Armed Opposition to Israel and the 1967 War |
|
|
13 | (2) |
|
The First Intifada and the Emergence of Hamas |
|
|
15 | (3) |
|
|
|
18 | (2) |
|
Israel's Withdrawal from Gaza |
|
|
20 | (2) |
|
Conflict Between Hamas and Fatah |
|
|
22 | (2) |
|
Israel's First Gaza War: Operation Cast Lead |
|
|
24 | (3) |
|
Chapter Three Operation Pillar of Defense, 2012 |
|
|
27 | (42) |
|
The Road to War: Internal Rivalries and Regional Turmoil |
|
|
28 | (9) |
|
How the Campaign Unfolded |
|
|
37 | (23) |
|
The Campaign Ends Quickly Without Use of Ground Maneuver |
|
|
60 | (2) |
|
Key Lessons from Operation Pillar of Defense |
|
|
62 | (7) |
|
Chapter Four Operation Protective Edge, 2014 |
|
|
69 | (60) |
|
|
|
70 | (13) |
|
Planning for Operation Protective Edge: An Imperfect Process |
|
|
83 | (2) |
|
|
|
85 | (3) |
|
Mobilization and Deployment |
|
|
88 | (2) |
|
Phase I The Air Campaign (July 8-16) |
|
|
90 | (6) |
|
Phase II The Ground Campaign (July 17-August 4) |
|
|
96 | (26) |
|
Phase III The Illusive Cease-Fire (August 5-26) |
|
|
122 | (2) |
|
Aftermath of the Conflict |
|
|
124 | (5) |
|
Chapter Five Protective Edge's Other Fronts |
|
|
129 | (20) |
|
Iron Dome and the Counter-Rocket Fight During Operation Protective Edge |
|
|
129 | (10) |
|
The Intelligence Fight: Strategic Versus Tactical Trade-Off? |
|
|
139 | (2) |
|
The Cyber Fight: Protective Edge's Silent War |
|
|
141 | (2) |
|
The Legal Wars: Balancing Targeting and Collateral Damage |
|
|
143 | (6) |
|
Chapter Six Lessons of Israel's Experience in Protective Edge |
|
|
149 | (22) |
|
Victory Sensitivity Dominates Casualty Sensitivity |
|
|
149 | (2) |
|
Understanding Hybrid Actors and the Broader Strategic Environment Is Vital |
|
|
151 | (1) |
|
|
|
152 | (4) |
|
Precision Firepower Has Significant Limitations |
|
|
156 | (2) |
|
CAS and ISR Coordination with Ground Forces Are Improving |
|
|
158 | (2) |
|
Tunnels Remain an Unsolved Tactical Problem, but Perhaps Not a Strategic Threat |
|
|
160 | (2) |
|
Reserve Component Proves Its Worth |
|
|
162 | (1) |
|
The IDF Still Wrestles with Other Organizational Challenges |
|
|
163 | (2) |
|
Iron Dome Is Effective For Now |
|
|
165 | (2) |
|
Armored Vehicles Remains Key to Urban Combat |
|
|
167 | (2) |
|
Active Protection Systems Are Effective and Produce Indirect Benefits |
|
|
169 | (1) |
|
|
|
170 | (1) |
|
Chapter Seven Recommendations for the U.S. Army and the Joint Force |
|
|
171 | (22) |
|
What Lessons May Not Apply |
|
|
171 | (5) |
|
What the United States Should Learn from Protective Edge |
|
|
176 | (10) |
|
Recommendations for the U.S. Army and the Joint Force |
|
|
186 | (3) |
|
|
|
189 | (4) |
| Abbreviations |
|
193 | (2) |
| References |
|
195 | |
