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El. knyga: Gambling with Armageddon

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  • Formatas: EPUB+DRM
  • Išleidimo metai: 13-Oct-2020
  • Leidėjas: Alfred A. Knopf
  • Kalba: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9780525659310
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  • Formatas: EPUB+DRM
  • Išleidimo metai: 13-Oct-2020
  • Leidėjas: Alfred A. Knopf
  • Kalba: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9780525659310
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From the Pulitzer Prize-winning author of American Prometheus: The Triumph and Tragedy of J. Robert Oppenheimer comes the first effort to set the Cuban Missile Crisis, with its potential for nuclear holocaust, in a wider historical narrative of the ColdWar--how such a crisis arose, and why at the very last possible moment it didnt happen. In this groundbreaking look at the Cuban Missile Crisis, Martin Sherwin not only gives us a riveting sometimes hour-by-hour explanation of the crisis itself, but also explores the origins, scope, and consequences of the evolving place of nuclear weapons in the post WWII world. Mining new sources and materials, and going far beyond the scope of earlier works on this critical face-off between the United States and the Soviet Union--triggered when Khruschev began installing missiles in Cuba at Castros behest--Sherwin shows how this volatile event was an integral part of the wider Cold War and was a consequence of nuclear arms. Gambling with Armageddon looks in particular at the original debate in the Truman Administration about using the Atomic Bomb; the way in which President Eisenhower relied on the threat of massive retaliation to project U.S. power in the early Cold War era; and how President Kennedy, though unprepared to deal with the Bay of Pigs debacle, came of age during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Here too is a clarifying picture of what was going on in Khruschevs Soviet Union. Martin Sherwin has spent his career in the study of nuclear weapons and how they have shaped our world--Gambling with Armegeddon is an outstanding capstone to his work thus far-- From the Pulitzer Prize-winning author of American Prometheus: The Triumph and Tragedy of J. Robert Oppenheimer comes the first effort to set the Cuban Missile Crisis, with its potential for nuclear holocaust, in a wider historical narrative of the Cold War—how such a crisis arose, and why at the very last possible moment it didn’t happen. Illustrations. From the Pulitzer Prize-winning author of American Prometheus: The Triumph and Tragedy of J. Robert Oppenheimer comes the first effort to set the Cuban Missile Crisis, with its potential for nuclear holocaust, in a wider historical narrative of the Cold War--how such a crisis arose, and why at the very last possible moment it didnt happen.In this groundbreaking look at the Cuban Missile Crisis, Martin Sherwin not only gives us a riveting sometimes hour-by-hour explanation of the crisis itself, but also explores the origins, scope, and consequences of the evolving place of nuclear weapons in the post-World War II world. Mining new sources and materials, and going far beyond the scope of earlier works on this critical face-off between the United States and the Soviet Union--triggered when Khrushchev began installing missiles in Cuba at Castros behest--Sherwin shows how this volatile event was an integral part of the wider Cold War and was a consequence of nuclear arms. Gambling with Armageddon looks in particular at the original debate in the Truman Administration about using the Atomic Bomb; the way in which President Eisenhower relied on the threat of massive retaliation to project U.S. power in the early Cold War era; and how President Kennedy, though unprepared to deal with the Bay of Pigs debacle, came of age during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Here too is a clarifying picture of what was going on in Khrushchevs Soviet Union. Martin Sherwin has spent his career in the study of nuclear weapons and how they have shaped our world. Gambling with Armegeddon is an outstanding capstone to his work thus far.
Prologue xiii
1 A Reflection On Luck In History
3(2)
2 World War II I Was About To Begin
5(6)
3 "We Will Die, But We Will Sink Them All"
11(11)
4 Capt. Vasily Alexandrovich Arkhipov
22(7)
5 The Long Cuban Missile Crisis, 1945--1962
29(15)
BOOK I THE MAKING OF THE NUCLEAR AGE, 1945--1962
PART ONE TRUMAN AND STALIN
6 "This Is The Greatest Thing In History"
44(11)
7 "The Secret Of The Atomic Bomb Might Be Hard To Keep"
55(9)
8 "Our Momentary Superiority"
64(12)
PART TWO EISENHOWER, KHRUSHCHEV, CASTRO, AND THE "WEAPON OF MASS DESTRUCTION"
9 "We Face A Battle To Extinction"
76(10)
10 "An Extraordinary Departure"
86(7)
11 "There Is Not Communists But Cubanists"
93(14)
12 "General Disarmament Is The Most Important"
107(15)
13 "We Cannot Let The Present Government There Go On"
122(10)
PART THREE KENNEDY, KHRUSHCHEV, CASTRO, AN I) THE BAY OF PIGS
14 "Eisenhower Is Going To Escape"
132(14)
15 "Aes Wholly Disapproves Of The Project"
146(14)
16 "Cuba Might Become A Sino-Soviet Bloc Missile Base"
160(7)
17 "It Will Be A Cold Winter"
167(15)
BOOK II THE THIRTEEN DAYS, OCTOBER 16--28, 1962
PART FOUR KHRUSHCHEV'S MISSILES
18 "What If We Put Our Nuclear Missiles In Cuba?"
182(11)
19 "Without Our Help Cuba Will Be Destroyed"
193(11)
PART FIVE OCTOBER 16 (TUESDAY), DAY ONE
20 "They're There"
204(11)
21 "Actions Were Begun On October 3 To Prepare For Military Action Against Cuba"
215(7)
22 "Bomb The Missiles; Invade Cuba"
222(14)
23 "I'll Tell My Big Brother On You"
236(5)
24 "Negotiation And Sanity, Always"
241(6)
25 "Last Month I Should Have Said That We Don't Care"
247(11)
PART SIX OCTOBER 17 (WEDNESDAY)--OCTOBER 22 (MONDAY)
26 "Possible Courses Of Action And Unanswered Questions"
258(8)
27 "What Action Lessens The Chance Of A Nuclear Exchange?"
266(11)
28 "Flipping A Coin As To Whether You End Up With World War Or Not"
277(10)
29 The Chief Confronts The Chiefs
287(9)
30 "Pull The Group Together!"
296(5)
31 "I Trust That You Will Support Me"
301(8)
32 "Nuclear War That Week Certainly Was Not Excluded From His Mind"
309(7)
33 "What's Edp?"
316(10)
PART SEVEN OCTOBER 22 (MONDAY)--OCTOBER 26 (FRIDAY)
34 "We May Have The War In The Next Twenty-Four Hours"
326(11)
35 "Kennedy Sleeps With A Wooden Knife"
337(7)
36 "A Game Which We Don't Know The Ending Of"
344(9)
37 "The Mobs Turned Up In London Instead Of Havana"
353(6)
38 "You Would Have Been Impeached"
359(2)
39 "We Are Trying To Convey A Political Message Not Start A War"
361(11)
40 "A Russian Submarine---Almost Anything But That"
372(11)
41 "Events Have Gone Too Far"
383(10)
42 "Trade Them Out Or Take Them Out"
393(10)
43 "Time Is Very Urgent"
403(7)
PART EIGHT OCTOBER 27(SATURDAY)--OCTOBER 28 (SUNDAY)
44 "Let Us Take Measures To Untie That Knot"
410(6)
45 "Liquidate The Bases In Turkey And We Win"
416(3)
46 "To Any Rational Man It Will Look Like A Very Fair Trade"
419(4)
47 "Attacking Sunday Or Monday"
423(3)
48 "We're Going To Have To Take Our Weapons Out Of Turkey"
426(11)
49 "An Act Of Legitimate Defense"
437(3)
50 "There Is Very Little Time To Resolve This Issue"
440(9)
51 "You Got Us Into This, Now You Get Us Out"
449(4)
52 "I Thought It Was My Last Meal"
453(3)
53 "We Have Ordered Our Officers To Stop Building Bases"
456(4)
PART NINE EIES AND LEGACIES
54 "Most Of Them Did Not Like Adlai"
460(5)
55 "It Ain't Necessarily So "
465(6)
Notes 471(82)
Bibliography 553(18)
Acknowledgments 571(6)
Index 577