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ix | |
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xiii | |
Preface |
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xv | |
Contributing Authors |
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xix | |
Introduction |
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xxv | |
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Game Theory and Decision Theory |
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1 | (28) |
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1 | (1) |
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2 | (8) |
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10 | (10) |
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20 | (6) |
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26 | (3) |
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29 | (14) |
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29 | (1) |
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30 | (1) |
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31 | (1) |
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Payoff-structures of Partnerships |
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32 | (1) |
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Selecting the Potentially most Beneficial Partnership for Limited Interactions |
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32 | (2) |
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34 | (2) |
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Comparative Evaluation with a Decision Mechanism for Infinite Interactions |
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36 | (1) |
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37 | (1) |
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37 | (2) |
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39 | (4) |
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Evolution of Agents with Moral Sentiments in an IPD Exercise |
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43 | (22) |
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44 | (1) |
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Moral Sentiments in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma |
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45 | (3) |
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The Unwitting Benefits of Altruism |
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48 | (3) |
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An Evolutionary Setting for the Simulations |
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51 | (1) |
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Playing with Moral Sentiments Secures the Survival of the Group |
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52 | (4) |
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A Case for Benevolence in Agents |
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56 | (4) |
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60 | (5) |
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65 | (16) |
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66 | (1) |
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Utilities, Desires and Goals |
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67 | (5) |
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An Example from Negotiation |
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72 | (2) |
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74 | (5) |
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79 | (1) |
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79 | (2) |
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81 | (16) |
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82 | (2) |
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Decision-Theoretic Preliminaries |
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84 | (3) |
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Emotional States and Personality |
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87 | (4) |
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Conclusions and Future Work |
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91 | (2) |
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93 | (4) |
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Decision-Theoretic Approach to Game Theory |
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97 | (22) |
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Background on Decision-Theoretic Approach to Game Theory |
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98 | (3) |
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101 | (5) |
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106 | (3) |
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109 | (1) |
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Experiments in Air Defense Domain |
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110 | (4) |
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114 | (5) |
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119 | (40) |
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120 | (1) |
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121 | (2) |
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123 | (5) |
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128 | (10) |
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138 | (12) |
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150 | (2) |
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Conclusions and Future Work |
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152 | (7) |
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Appendix: No Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium |
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153 | (6) |
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Finding the Best Way to Join in |
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159 | (18) |
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159 | (1) |
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Game Theoretic Foundations |
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160 | (3) |
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163 | (5) |
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Solving More General Games |
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168 | (6) |
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174 | (3) |
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Shopbots and Pricebots in Electronic Service Markets |
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177 | (20) |
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Introduction and Definitions |
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177 | (3) |
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Our Model of an Electronic Service Market |
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180 | (6) |
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186 | (3) |
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189 | (2) |
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191 | (6) |
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Appendix: The Derivation of Equilibrium for the XX Market Configuration |
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192 | (5) |
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Polynomial Time Mechanisms |
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197 | (20) |
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198 | (2) |
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200 | (3) |
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Polynomial Time Mechanisms |
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203 | (3) |
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Dominant Strategy Implementation |
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206 | (2) |
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208 | (4) |
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Upper Bounds on Approximability |
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212 | (1) |
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213 | (4) |
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Multi-Agent Q-learning and Regression Trees |
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217 | (18) |
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218 | (1) |
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219 | (3) |
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Single and Multi-Agent Q-learning |
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222 | (3) |
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Q-learning with Regression Trees |
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225 | (2) |
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227 | (4) |
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231 | (4) |
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235 | (32) |
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236 | (1) |
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237 | (6) |
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243 | (4) |
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247 | (5) |
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252 | (6) |
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258 | (9) |
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Investigating Commitment Flexibility in Multi-agent Contracts |
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267 | (26) |
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267 | (3) |
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270 | (2) |
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Some Analysis of Special Cases |
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272 | (8) |
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280 | (8) |
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Conclusions and Further Work |
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288 | (5) |
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Pricing in Agent Economies using Multi-agent Q-learning |
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293 | (22) |
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294 | (3) |
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297 | (4) |
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301 | (4) |
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305 | (5) |
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310 | (5) |
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Using Hypergames to Increase Planned Payoff and Reduce Risk |
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315 | (22) |
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315 | (2) |
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317 | (10) |
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327 | (6) |
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333 | (4) |
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Bilateral Negotiation with Incomplete and Uncertain Information |
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337 | (18) |
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338 | (1) |
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338 | (2) |
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The Negotiation Mechanism |
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340 | (3) |
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343 | (7) |
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Related Work on Negotiation |
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350 | (1) |
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351 | (4) |
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Robust Combinatorial Auction Protocol against False-name Bids |
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355 | (20) |
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356 | (2) |
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Generalized Vickrey Auction Protocol (GVA) |
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358 | (3) |
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Robust Protocol against False-name Bids |
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361 | (5) |
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Proof of Incentive Compatibility |
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366 | (2) |
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368 | (1) |
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369 | (2) |
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371 | (4) |
Index |
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375 | |