LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS |
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INTRODUCTION |
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PART 1: TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND OUTSOURCING |
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CHAPTER 1 THE WTO AND THE WORLD ECONOMY: A WELFARE-THEORETIC PERSPECTIVE |
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2 Preliminaries: Welfare comparison |
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4 Labor and environmental policies |
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CHAPTER 2 TRADE LIBERALIZATION AS A GAME OF DECISION UNDER UNCERTAINTY |
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Henry Wan Jr. and Yinggang Zhou |
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2.2 The game of tariff war: Johnson (1953-1954) |
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3 Tariff reform as a decision problem under uncertainty? |
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CHAPTER 3 COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE AND TRADE LIBERALIZATION IN A CHAMBERLINIANRICARDIAN MODEL |
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Toru Kikuchi and Koji Shimomura |
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3 The impact of trade liberalization |
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CHAPTER 4 OUTSOURCING AND IMPORT RESTRICTION POLICIES |
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Kai-Hsi Chu and Kar-yiu Wong |
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4 Policies to control outsourcing |
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4.2 Quantitative restriction |
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CHAPTER 5 LIBERALIZATION OF GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENTS: COMPETITION FROM FOREIGN FIRMS |
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2.1 Domestic firms, foreign firms, and domestic welfare |
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2.2 Optimization by individual firms |
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2.3 Properties of Nash equilibriums of the lobbying game |
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3 Properties of equilibrium strategies |
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4 Entry of a foreign firm |
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5 Effects of foreign entry on welfare |
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6 Mean-preserving spreads |
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PART II: TRADING CLUBS AND PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS |
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CHAPTER 6 NORMATIVE COMPARISONS OF CUSTOMS UNIONS AND OTHER TYPES OF FREE TRADE ASSOCIATION |
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3 Extensions of Theorem 2 |
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3.1 Non-passive non-members |
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4 Summarizing and cautionary remarks |
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Appendix: The extended KempWan FTA |
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CHAPTER 7 A FREE TRADE AREA AND ITS NEIGHBOR'S WELFARE: A REVEALED PREFERENCE APPROACH |
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Masahiro Endoh, Koichi Hamada and Koji Shimomura |
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4 Interpretation of the condition for the non-existence of Pareto-improving PTA |
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5 Government interventions and the effect of a PTA |
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CHAPTER 8 TARIFF ADJUSTMENTS IN PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS |
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Eric W. Bond and Constantinos Syropoulos |
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2 A symmetric three-country trade model |
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3 Tariffs and the terms of trade |
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4 Tariffs and member country welfare |
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CHAPTER 9 MORE (OR LESS) ON NECESSARILY WELFARE-ENHANCING FREE TRADE AREAS |
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Martin Richardson and Niven Winchester |
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2 The OhyamaPanagariyaKrishna result |
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CHAPTER 10 PARETO-IMPROVING TRADING CLUBS WITHOUT INCOME TRANSFERS |
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Kazumichi Iwasa, Raymond Riezman and Koji Shimomura |
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2 The model and equilibrium conditions |
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3 The first main result: Pareto-improving non-discriminatory reform |
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4 The second main result: Pareto-optimal customs unions without income transfers |
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5 A diagrammatic exposition |
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Appendix 1 Proof of Lemma 1 |
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Appendix 2 Cases of specific tariffs and ad valorem tariffs imposed on all goods |
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PART III: TRADE AND WELFARE |
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CHAPTER 11 THE CONTRIBUTION OF MURRAY KEMP TO THE DISCIPLINE OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND WELFARE ECONOMICS |
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2 How Murray Kemp came to economic theory |
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3 Murray Kemp's major contributions to trade and welfare economics |
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3.1 Kemp and welfare economics |
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3.2 Kemp and exhaustible and renewable resources |
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3.3 Kemp and international trade |
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4 Kemp as a discipline builder and his contributions to economic methodology |
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CHAPTER 12 THE GAINS FROM TRADE AND REFUSAL TO TRADE |
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2 The individual and gains from trade |
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3 Domestic and foreign trade |
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5 A more general model with asymmetric income sources |
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6 The feasibility of free-trade consensus |
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7 The evolutionary case for free trade |
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8 Political economy and refusal to allow free trade |
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10 Strategic trade policy and rent seeking |
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12 Trade diversion: The second-best within political economy |
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13 International externalities and refusal to trade |
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14 Other explanations for refusal to trade |
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CHAPTER 13 A TWO-COUNTRY MODEL OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE WITH INCREASING RETURNS AND OLIGOPOLY |
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Kenji Fujiwara, Nobuhito Suga and Makoto Tawada |
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2 An autarkic equilibrium |
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Appendix 1 Some properties of the allocation curve |
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Appendix 2 The factor price equalization condition |
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CHAPTER 14 TARIFF POLICY AND FOREIGN ECONOMIC AID FOR THE ECONOMY WITH A MONOPOLISTICALLY COMPETITIVE NONTRADED INDUSTRY AND CAPITAL INFLOW |
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3 The effects of import tariffs and foreign economic aid |
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3.1 Comparative static analysis of the effects of import tariffs and foreign economic aid |
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3.2 The welfare effects of import tariff and foreign economic aid |
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CHAPTER 15 INFRASTRUCTURE AID AND DEINDUSTRIALIZATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES |
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E. Kwan Choi and Jai-Young Choi |
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2 Assumptions and the basic properties of the model |
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2.1 Short-term effect of infrastructure investment on production costs |
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2.2 Factor prices, price of the nontraded good, and the exchange rate |
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2.3 Infrastructure aid to the export sector |
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2.4 Infrastructure aid to the import sector |
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2.5 Infrastructure aid to the nontraded good sector |
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3 Infrastructure aid, welfare, and deindustrialization |
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3.1 Infrastructure aid and national income |
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4 Sectoral outputs and deindustrialization |
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4.1 Infrastructure aid to the export sector and deindustrialization |
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4.2 Infrastructure aid to the import sector and deindustrialization |
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4.3 Infrastructure aid to the nontraded good sector and deindustrialization |
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CHAPTER 16 ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS FOR A SMALL OPEN ECONOMY WITH TOURISM |
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Chi-Chur Chao, Bharat R. Hazari, Jean-Pierre Laffargue and Eden S.H. Yu |
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3 Optimal tariff and pollution tax |
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3.3 Jointly optimal tariffs and pollution taxes |
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SUBJECT INDEX |
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