Atnaujinkite slapukų nuostatas

El. knyga: Guardians of Finance

4.08/5 (23 ratings by Goodreads)
(Auburn University), (Williams College), (University of California At Berkeley)
  • Formatas: EPUB+DRM
  • Išleidimo metai: 10-Feb-2012
  • Leidėjas: MIT Press
  • Kalba: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9780262300766
  • Formatas: EPUB+DRM
  • Išleidimo metai: 10-Feb-2012
  • Leidėjas: MIT Press
  • Kalba: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9780262300766

DRM apribojimai

  • Kopijuoti:

    neleidžiama

  • Spausdinti:

    neleidžiama

  • El. knygos naudojimas:

    Skaitmeninių teisių valdymas (DRM)
    Leidykla pateikė šią knygą šifruota forma, o tai reiškia, kad norint ją atrakinti ir perskaityti reikia įdiegti nemokamą programinę įrangą. Norint skaityti šią el. knygą, turite susikurti Adobe ID . Daugiau informacijos  čia. El. knygą galima atsisiųsti į 6 įrenginius (vienas vartotojas su tuo pačiu Adobe ID).

    Reikalinga programinė įranga
    Norint skaityti šią el. knygą mobiliajame įrenginyje (telefone ar planšetiniame kompiuteryje), turite įdiegti šią nemokamą programėlę: PocketBook Reader (iOS / Android)

    Norint skaityti šią el. knygą asmeniniame arba „Mac“ kompiuteryje, Jums reikalinga  Adobe Digital Editions “ (tai nemokama programa, specialiai sukurta el. knygoms. Tai nėra tas pats, kas „Adobe Reader“, kurią tikriausiai jau turite savo kompiuteryje.)

    Negalite skaityti šios el. knygos naudodami „Amazon Kindle“.

The recent financial crisis was an accident, a "perfect storm" fueled by anunforeseeable confluence of events that unfortunately combined to bring down the global financialsystems. And policy makers? They did everything they could, given their limited authority. It wasall a terrible, unavoidable accident. Or at least this is the story told and retold by a chorus ofluminaries that includes Timothy Geithner, Henry Paulson, Robert Rubin, Ben Bernanke, and AlanGreenspan.

In Guardians of Finance, economists James Barth,Gerard Caprio, and Ross Levine argue that the financial meltdown of 2007 to 2009 was no accident; itwas negligent homicide. They show that senior regulatory officials around the world knew or shouldhave known that their policies were destabilizing the global financial system, had years to processthe evidence that risks were rising, had the authority to change their policies--and yet chose notto act until the crisis had fully emerged.

The current system, the authors write,is simply not designed to make policy choices on behalf of the public. It is virtually impossiblefor the public and its elected officials to obtain informed and impartial assessment of financialregulation and to hold regulators accountable. Barth, Caprio, and Levine propose a reform to counterthis systemic failure: the establishment of a "Sentinel" to provide an informed, expert,and independent assessment of financial regulation. Its sole power would be to demand informationand to evaluate it from the perspective of the public--rather than that of the financial industry,the regulators, or politicians.

Preface vi
Acknowledgments xi
1 Introduction
1(20)
2 Regulating Finance Is Hard To Do
21(36)
3 Incentives Run Amok
57(28)
4 How US Regulators Encouraged the Financial Crisis
85(36)
5 American Crisis? Ain't Necessarily So
121(26)
6 Been Down This Road Many Times Before
147(24)
7 More of the Same: Post 2007--2009 Financial Crisis Regulation
171(32)
8 Making the Guardians of Finance Work for Us
203(30)
Glossary 233(4)
Notes 237(22)
Index 259(20)
About the Authors 279