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El. knyga: Handbook of the Economics of Finance: Corporate Finance

Edited by (University of Chicago, Chicago, IL, USA), Edited by (University of Chicago, Chicago, IL, USA), Edited by (The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, USA)
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Handbook of the Economics of Finance: Corporate FinanceDidesnis paveikslėlis
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In the 11 articles in this first of two volumes, top scholars will summarize and analyze recent scholarship in corporate finance.  Covering subjects from corporate taxes to behavioral corporate finance and econometric issues, their articles will reveal how specializations resonate with each other and will indicate likely directions for future research. By including both established and emerging topics, Volume 2 will have the same long shelf life and high citations that characterize Volume 1 (2003).

  • Presents coherent summaries of major finance fields, marking important advances and revisions
  • Describes the best corporate finance research created about the 2008 financial crises
  • Exposes readers to a wide range of subjects described and analyzed by the best scholars


In the 11 articles in this first of two parts, top scholars summarize and analyze recent scholarship in corporate finance. Covering subjects from corporate taxes to behavioral corporate finance and econometric issues, their articles reveal how specializations resonate with each other and indicate likely directions for future research. By including both established and emerging topics, Volume 2 will have the same long shelf life and high citations that characterize Volume 1 (2003).

  • Presents coherent summaries of major finance fields, marking important advances and revisions
  • Describes the best corporate finance research created about the 2008 financial crises
  • Exposes readers to a wide range of subjects described and analyzed by the best scholars

Recenzijos

"A scholarly compendium of contemporary research in Financial Economics which will be of great value not only for researchers in finance but also for researchers in many other of economics including money and banking, growth and development, international economics, public finance, and macro economics." --Edward C. Prescott, Nobel Laureate, Arizona State University

"This Handbook provides a timely and comprehensive account of the state-of-the-art of Financial Economics, including corporate finance and asset pricing, written by many of the leading names in their respective fields." --Harry M.Markowitz, Nobel Laureate, University of California, San Diego

Daugiau informacijos

Detailed surveys of major subjects in corporate finance and financial markets for graduate students and professors
Introduction to the Series xxiii
Preface xxv
Volume 2A Corporate Finance
1 Securitization
1(70)
Gary Gorton
Andrew Metrick
1 Introduction
2(3)
2 Securitization: Some Institutional Details
5(1)
2.1 Legal Structure
5(2)
2.2 Securitization Example: Credit Card Securitization via the Chase Issuance Trust
7(5)
2.3 Other Forms of Securitization
12(1)
3 Overview of the Performance of Asset-Backed Securities
13(1)
3.1 The Size and Growth of the ABS Market
13(2)
3.2 The Default and Ratings Performance of ABS
15(5)
3.3 ABS Performance in Terms of Spreads
20(2)
3.4 Performance During the Financial Crisis
22(7)
4 A Simple Model of the Securitization Decision
25(4)
5 The Origins of Securitization
29(1)
5.1 The Supply of Securitized Bonds
29(3)
5.2 Relative Convenience Yield and the Demand for Securitized Bonds
32(3)
5.3 Securitization and Financial Innovation
35(9)
6 Security Design and the Cost of Capital: Theory
40(4)
7 Security Design and the Cost of Capital: Evidence
44(1)
7.1 Does Securitization Lower the Cost of Capital?
44(1)
7.2 Components of the Return Differential
45(8)
8 Securitization, Regulation, and Public Policy
53(1)
8.1 Securitization and Financial Stability
53(3)
8.2 The Federal Reserve and Asset-Backed Securities during the Crisis
56(3)
8.3 Securitization and Monetary Policy
59(1)
8.4 The Future of Securitization
60(11)
9 Final Comments and Open Questions
62(3)
References
65(6)
2 Dynamic Security Design and Corporate Financing
71(52)
Yuliy Sannikov
1 Introduction
71(3)
2 Informational Problems in Static Models
74(1)
2.1 Moral Hazard
75(7)
2.2 Adverse Selection
82(20)
3 Simple Securities in Dynamic Models
87(3)
4 Optimal Dynamic Security Design under Moral Hazard
90(12)
4.1 Other Models that Involve Dynamic Moral Hazard
102(9)
5 Asymmetric Information in Dynamic Settings
111(1)
5.1 Static Contracts in Dynamic Settings
111(6)
5.2 Optimal Dynamic Contracts with Adverse Selection
117(6)
References
121(2)
3 Do Taxes Affect Corporate Decisions? A Review
123(88)
John R. Graham
1 Introduction
124(2)
2 Taxes and Capital Structure--The US Tax System
126(1)
2.1 Theory and Empirical Predictions
126(7)
2.2 Empirical Evidence on Whether the Tax Advantage of Debt increases Firm Value
133(8)
2.3 Empirical Evidence on Whether Corporate Taxes Affect Debt vs. Equity Policy
141(9)
2.4 Empirical Evidence on Whether Personal Taxes Affect Corporate Debt vs. Equity Policy
150(8)
2.5 Beyond Debt vs. Equity
158(6)
3 Taxes and Capital Structure---Multinational Tax Issues
163(1)
3.1 Tax Incentives and Financial Policy in Multinational Firms: Theory and Tax Rules
164(6)
3.2 Empirical Evidence Related to Multinational Tax Incentives to Use Debt
170(3)
3.3 Other Predictions and Evidence about Multinational Tax Incentives
173(1)
3.4 Empirical Evidence Related to Repatriation of Profits Earned Abroad
174(1)
4 Taxes, LBOs, Corporate Restructuring, and Organizational Form
175(1)
4.1 Theory and Predictions
175(1)
4.2 Empirical Evidence
176(4)
5 Taxes and Payout Policy
179(1)
5.1 Theory and Empirical Predictions
180(1)
5.2 Empirical Evidence on Whether Firm Value Is Negatively Affected by Dividend Payments
181(1)
5.3 Empirical Evidence on Whether Corporate Payout Policy Changes in Response to Investor-Level Payout Tax Rates
182(2)
5.4 Evidence on Whether Ex-day Stock Returns and Payout Policy Are Affected by Investor Taxes
184(5)
6 Taxes and Compensation Policy
189(1)
6.1 Theory and Empirical Predictions
189(2)
6.2 Empirical Evidence
191(3)
7 Taxes, Corporate Risk Management, and Earnings Management
193(1)
7.1 Theory and Empirical Predictions
194(1)
7.2 Empirical Evidence
195(16)
8 Tax Shelters
196(1)
9 Summary and Suggestions for Future Research
197(3)
References
200(11)
4 Executive Compensation: Where We Are, and How We Got There
211(146)
Kevin J. Murphy
1 Introduction
212(5)
2 Where We Are: A Primer on Executive Compensation
217(1)
2.1 Measuring Executive Pay
217(16)
2.2 Measuring Executive Incentives
233(8)
2.3 (Dis)Incentives from Bonus Plans
241(5)
2.4 (Dis)Incentives from Capital Markets
246(2)
3 How We Got There: A Brief History of CEO Pay
248(1)
3.1 Introduction
248(1)
3.2 Executive Compensation Before the Great Depression
249(2)
3.3 Depression-Era Outrage and Disclosure Requirements (1930s)
251(2)
3.4 The Rise (and Fall) of Restricted Stock Options (1950-1969)
253(6)
3.5 Wage-and-Price Controls and Economic Stagnation (1970-1982)
259(8)
3.6 The Emerging Market for Corporate Control (1983-1992)
267(7)
3.7 The Stock Option Explosion (1992-2001)
274(14)
3.8 The Accounting and Backdating Scandals (2001-2007)
288(13)
3.9 Pay Restrictions for TARP Recipients (2008-2009)
301(7)
3.10 The Dodd-Frank Executive Compensation Reform Act (2010-2011)
308(5)
4 International Comparisons: Are US CEOs Still Paid More?
313(1)
4.1 The US Pay Premium: What We Thought We Knew
313(2)
4.2 New International Evidence
315(4)
4.3 Why Do US CEOs Receive More Options?
319(4)
5 Towards a General Theory of Executive Compensation
322(1)
5.1 Agency Problems: Solutions and Sources
323(6)
5.2 "Competing" Hypotheses to Explain the Increase in CEO Pay
329(17)
5.3 Explaining Executive Compensation: It's Complicated
346(11)
References
347(10)
5 Behavioral Corporate Finance: An Updated Survey
357(68)
Malcolm Baker
Jeffrey Wurgler
1 Introduction
358(3)
2 Market Timing and Catering
361(1)
2.1 Background on Investor Behavior and Market Inefficiency
361(5)
2.2 Theoretical Framework: Rational Managers in Irrational Markets
366(4)
2.3 Empirical Challenges
370(2)
2.4 Investment Policy
372(4)
2.5 Financial Policy
376(10)
2.6 Other Corporate Decisions
386(5)
3 Managerial Biases
391(1)
3.1 Background on Managerial Behavior
391(3)
3.2 Theoretical Framework
394(2)
3.3 Empirical Challenges
396(1)
3.4 Investment Policy
397(4)
3.5 Financial Policy
401(5)
4 Behavioral Signaling
405(1)
4.1 Theoretical Framework
406(3)
4.2 Applications
409(16)
5 Some Open Questions
411(2)
References
413(12)
6 Law and Finance After a Decade of Research
425(68)
Rafael La Porta
Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes
Andrei Shleifer
1 Introduction
426(2)
2 Background on Legal Origins
428(5)
3 Some Evidence
433(1)
3.1 Organizing the Evidence
433(1)
3.2 Investor Protection and Financial Markets
434(4)
3.3 Tunneling
438(1)
3.4 Consequences of Shareholder Protection
439(2)
3.5 Ownership
441(1)
3.6 Consequences of Creditor Protection
442(1)
3.7 Substitute Mechanisms
443(1)
3.8 Reforms
443(2)
3.9 Legal Rules Versus Law Enforcement
445(1)
3.10 Legal Origins Beyond Finance
446(4)
3.11 Summary
450(1)
4 Explaining the Facts
450(1)
4.1 Explanations Based on Revolutions
451(3)
4.2 Explanations Based on Medieval Developments
454(1)
4.3 Legal Origins Theory
455(4)
4.4 Interpretation of the Evidence
459(11)
5 Legal Origins and Culture
460(1)
6 Legal Origins and Politics
461(4)
7 Legal Origins and History
465(5)
7.1 Stock Markets and the Start of the 20th Century
470(3)
7.2 Britain at the Start of the 20th Century
473(3)
7.3 Explaining Divergence
476(17)
8 Conclusion
477(1)
Appendix
478(5)
References
483(10)
7 Endogeneity in Empirical Corporate Finance
493(80)
Michael R. Roberts
Toni M. Whited
1 Introduction
494(2)
2 The Causes and Consequences of Endogeneity
496(1)
2.1 Regression Framework
497(7)
2.2 Potential Outcomes and Treatment Effects
504(7)
2.3 Identifying and Discussing the Endogeneity Problem
511(1)
3 Instrumental Variables
511(1)
3.1 What are Valid Instruments?
511(2)
3.2 Estimation
513(1)
3.3 Where do Valid Instruments Come From? Some Examples
514(1)
3.4 So Called Tests of Instrument Validity
515(1)
3.5 The Problem of Weak Instruments
516(1)
3.6 Lagged Instruments
517(1)
3.7 Limitations of Instrumental Variables
518(2)
4 Difference-in-Differences Estimators
520(1)
4.1 Single Cross-Sectional Differences After Treatment
520(1)
4.2 Single Time-Series Difference Before and After Treatment
521(2)
4.3 Double Difference Estimator: Difference-in-Differences (DD)
523(6)
4.4 Checking Internal Validity
529(2)
4.5 Further Reading
531(2)
5 Regression Discontinuity Design
531(2)
5.1 Sharp RDD
533(3)
5.2 Fuzzy ROD
536(3)
5.3 Graphical Analysis
539(2)
5.4 Estimation
541(5)
5.5 Checking Internal Validity
546(3)
6 Matching Methods
549(1)
6.1 Treatment Effects and Identification Assumptions
549(2)
6.2 The Propensity Score
551(1)
6.3 Matching on Covariates and the Propensity Score
551(2)
6.4 Practical Considerations
553(4)
7 Panel Data Methods
557(1)
7.1 Fixed and Random Effects
557(3)
8 Econometric Solutions to Measurement Error
560(1)
8.1 Instrumental Variables
560(2)
8.2 High Order Moment Estimators
562(2)
8.3 Reverse Regression Bounds
564(2)
8.4 Avoiding Proxies and Using Proxies Wisely
566(7)
9 Conclusion
566(1)
References
567(6)
8 A Survey of Venture Capital Research
573(76)
Marco Da Rin
Thomas Hellmann
Manju Puri
1 Introduction
574(3)
2 Data Sources arid Methodology for Empirical Research
577(1)
2.1 Main Commercial Databases
577(1)
2.2 Hand-Collected Survey Data
578(1)
2.3 Proprietary Industry Data
579(1)
2.4 Census Databases
579(1)
2.5 Other Databases
580(1)
2.6 Choice of Sample
580(2)
2.7 Empirical Estimation Challenges
582(1)
3 Venture Capital Investments in Entrepreneurial Companies
583(1)
3.1 Investment Choices
583(6)
3.2 Contracting
589(6)
3.3 Post-Investment
595(4)
3.4 Exits
599(5)
4 The Analysis of Venture Capital Firms
604(1)
4.1 The Organizational Structure of Venture Capital Firms
604(8)
4.2 Venture Capital Firms' Investment Strategies
612(2)
4.3 Relationships Among Venture Capital Firms
614(3)
4.4 The Relationship Between General and Limited Partners
617(3)
5 Returns to Venture Capital Investments
619(1)
5.1 Data and Methodological Challenges
620(3)
5.2 Return Estimates
623(8)
6 Venture Capital and the Economy
631(1)
6.1 The Contribution of Venture-Backed Companies to Innovation
631(2)
6.2 The Role of Venture Capital for Entry, Employment And Growth
633(1)
6.3 Public Policy For Venture Capital
634(15)
7 Conclusion
637(1)
References
637(12)
9 Entrepreneurship and the Family Firm
649(34)
Vikas Mehrotra
Randall Morck
1 Creative Destruction and the Family Firm
649(7)
2 The Succession Decision
656(8)
3 Economic Development and the Family Firm
664(3)
4 The Importance of Oligarchs
667(4)
5 Schumpeter and Chandler, Reconciled?
671(4)
References
675(8)
10 Financing in Developing Countries
683(76)
Meghana Ayyagari
Asli Demirguc-Kunt
Vojislav Maksimovic
1 Introduction
683(3)
2 Stylized Facts About Firms in Developing Countries
686(6)
3 Firms in Developing Countries---Theories and Empirical Research Issues
692(1)
3.1 Models of Firms in Developing Countries
692(5)
3.2 Empirical Research Issues
697(7)
4 Institutions and Access to Finance in Developing Countries
704(1)
4.1 Finance and Growth
704(3)
4.2 Legal Traditions and Property Rights
707(5)
4.3 Information Quality and Availability
712(2)
4.4 Government Intervention, Corruption, and Political Ties
714(2)
5 Firm Financing in Developing Countries
716(1)
5.1 Financing Constraints
716(2)
5.2 Firm Financing Patterns (Capital Structure Choice)
718(3)
5.3 Cash Holdings and Liquidity Management
721(1)
5.4 Issuance Activities
722(5)
5.5 Small Firm Financing
727(8)
6 Bank-based Versus Market-based Systems
735(1)
6.1 Prevalence of Bank-based and Market-based Systems Across the World
735(1)
6.2 Banks Versus Market-based Systems---Theory and Empirical Evidence
736(23)
7 Formal and Informal Systems
740(3)
8 Conclusion
743(1)
References
744(15)
11 Financial Intermediation, Markets, and Alternative Financial Sectors
759
Franklin Allen
Elena Carletti
Jun "QJ" Qian
Patricio Valenzuela
1 Introduction
759(4)
2 State of the Financial System and Firms' Financing Channels
763(2)
2.1 The Banking and Intermediation Sector
765(3)
2.2 Financial Markets: Stock Markets and Bond Markets
768(2)
2.3 International Sectors
770(5)
2.4 Alternative Sectors
775(3)
3 Firms' Financing Channels: The Role of Alternative Finance
778(1)
3.1 Overview of Alternative Financing Channels
778(4)
3.2 Different Types of Alternative Financing Channels
782(6)
3.3 Data Issues
788(4)
4 Comparing Traditional and Alternative Financial Sectors
789(3)
4.1 Comparing Different Forms of Financing
792(1)
4.2 Conditions Conducive to Developing Legal and Alternative Institutions
793(1)
4.3 Future Research on Alternative Finance
794
5 Concluding Remarks
795(1)
References
796
Index to Volume 2A 1
Milt Harris is a Fellow of the Econometric Society and of the American Finance Association. He is past president of the Western Finance Association and the Society for Financial Studies.
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