El. knyga: Hughes Court: Volume 11: From Progressivism to Pluralism, 1930 to 1941

"Steven Shapin began a classic work with this sentence: "There was no such thing as the Scientific Revolution, and this is a book about it."1 This book's theme might be put in similar terms. There was no Constitutional Revolution of 1937, and this is a book about it. As the book's subtitle suggests, the Hughes Court from its inception in 1930 was in large measure a Progressive court, committed in a wide range of areas to the vision of active government associated with the Progressive movement in thought and politics. The Court was not dominated by a deep formalism, though most of the justices, liberals and conservatives alike, had their moments of formalism - and not merely for strategic reasons when controlling precedent forced formalism on them. At onetime or another and cumulatively a great deal of the time, all of the justices incorporated ideas about good public policy in their interpretations of the Constitution and federal statutes"--

This comprehensive study unpacks the claim that there was a Constitutional Revolution in 1937, instead concluding that US constitutional law gradually transformed throughout the 1930s. In combining doctrinal analysis with the political, economic and social contexts of the Court's decisions, this will interest both historians and legal scholars.

The Hughes Court: From Progressivism to Pluralism, 1930 to 1941 describes the closing of one era in constitutional jurisprudence and the opening of another. This comprehensive study of the Supreme Court from 1930 to 1941 – when Charles Evans Hughes was Chief Justice – shows how nearly all justices, even the most conservative, accepted the broad premises of a Progressive theory of government and the Constitution. The Progressive view gradually increased its hold throughout the decade, but at its end, interest group pluralism began to influence the law. By 1941, constitutional and public law was discernibly different from what it had been in 1930, but there was no sharp or instantaneous Constitutional Revolution in 1937 despite claims to the contrary. This study supports its conclusions by examining the Court's work in constitutional law, administrative law, the law of justiciability, civil rights and civil liberties, and statutory interpretation.