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Impact of Societal Norms on Safety, Health, and the Environment: Case Studies in Society and Safety Culture [Kietas viršelis]

  • Formatas: Hardback, 672 pages, aukštis x plotis x storis: 231x160x33 mm, weight: 953 g
  • Išleidimo metai: 08-Nov-2022
  • Leidėjas: John Wiley & Sons Inc
  • ISBN-10: 1119830028
  • ISBN-13: 9781119830023
Kitos knygos pagal šią temą:
Impact of Societal Norms on Safety, Health, and the Environment: Case Studies in Society and Safety CultureDidesnis paveikslėlis
  • Formatas: Hardback, 672 pages, aukštis x plotis x storis: 231x160x33 mm, weight: 953 g
  • Išleidimo metai: 08-Nov-2022
  • Leidėjas: John Wiley & Sons Inc
  • ISBN-10: 1119830028
  • ISBN-13: 9781119830023
Kitos knygos pagal šią temą:
Pastovi nuoroda: https://www.kriso.lt/db/9781119830023.html
Raktažodžiai:
"Safety culture refers to the norms, values, and practices shared by groups in relation to risk and safety. Within safety critical industries (e.g., nuclear energy, oil and gas, aviation), safety culture assessments with cross sectional surveys are used to identify trends that are promotive (e.g., shared beliefs on risk) and problematic (e.g., lack of incident reporting) for safety management. Through further investigation, opportunities for interorganizational learning are identified (e.g., sharing bestpractice) and used to improve safety culture. Research indicates that safety culture within an organization may be influenced by national cultural tendencies to avoid the anxiety caused by risky and ambiguous situations. This has implications for how theresults of safety culture assessments are analyzed and interpreted"--

A compelling exploration of how social norms and commercial culture impact the safety of organizational operations

In Impact of Societal Norms on Safety, Health, and the Environment: Case Studies in Society and Safety Culture, distinguished engineer Dr. Lee T. Ostrom delivers an authoritative treatment of the cultural, social, and human factors of safety cultures and issues in the workplace. The book offers readers compelling discussions of how those factors impact organizational operations and what contributes to making those impacts beneficial or detrimental.

The author provides numerous real-world case studies from North America and Europe that are relevant to a global audience, highlighting the central message of the book: that an organization that views its safety culture as unimportant could be setting itself up for a significant workplace accident.

Readers will also find:

  • A thorough introduction to social norms that impact how commercial organizations treat issues of safety and workplace health
  • In-depth safety culture case studies from North America and Europe
  • Comprehensive explorations of how peoples’ perceptions of hazards impact workplace operations and the daily lives of employees
  • Fulsome discussions of the effect of societal attitudes on workplace health and safety

Perfect for industrial and safety managers, safety coordinators, and safety representatives, Impact of Societal Norms on Safety, Health, and the Environment will also earn a place in the libraries of industrial hygienists, ergonomic program coordinators, and HR professionals.

Preface xvii
Abbreviations xix
1 Safety Culture Concepts
1(60)
1.0 Introduction
1(1)
1.1 Culture
2(2)
1.2 Safety and Health Pioneers
4(1)
1.3 The Evolution of Accident Causation Models
5(8)
1.4 Safety and Common Sense
13(1)
1.5 Interviews with Safety Professionals
14(45)
1.6
Chapter Summary
59(2)
References
59(2)
2 History of Safety Culture
61(58)
2.1 Life Expectancy and Safety
61(4)
2.2 Consumer Items and Toys
65(4)
2.2.1 Vintage Toys and Other Items
66(3)
2.3 Flawed Cars
69(1)
2.4 Ford Pinto
69(1)
2.5 Off-Highway-Vehicle-Related Fatalities Reported
70(1)
2.6 Work Relationships
71(4)
2.7 Food
75(5)
2.7.1 Food Trends and Culture
78(1)
2.7.1.1 The Tomato
78(1)
2.7.1.2 Fad Diets
78(2)
2.8 Genetically Modified Organisms (GMO) Foods
80(3)
2.8.1 Messenger Ribonucleic Acid (mRNA) Vaccines
82(1)
2.9 Traffic Safety
83(3)
2.10 Public Acceptance of Seatbelts and Masks for Protection from Respiratory Disease
86(4)
2.11 Radiation Hazards and Safety
90(13)
2.11.1 Radiation
91(2)
2.11.2 Measuring Radiation (CDC 2021)
93(2)
2.11.3 Health Effects of Radiation (EPA 2021)
95(2)
2.11.4 Uses of Radiation (NRC 2020)
97(1)
2.11.5 Medical Uses
97(1)
2.11.6 Academic and Scientific Applications
98(1)
2.11.7 Industrial Uses
98(2)
2.11.8 Nuclear Power Plants
100(1)
2.11.9 Misuse of Radiation (EPA 2021)
101(1)
2.11.10 Radium Dial Painters
101(2)
2.11.11 Safety Culture Issues
103(1)
2.12 The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)
103(8)
2.12.1 Who Does OSHA Cover
105(1)
2.12.1.1 Private Sector Workers
105(1)
2.12.1.2 State and Local Government Workers
105(1)
2.12.1.3 Federal Government Workers
106(1)
2.12.1.4 Not Covered Under the OSHA Act
106(1)
2.12.2 Voluntary Protection Program
107(4)
2.13 Human Performance Improvement (HPI)
111(1)
2.14
Chapter Summary
111(8)
References
111(8)
3 Chemical Manufacturing
119(1)
3.0 Introduction
119(1)
3.1 Process Safety Management
119(1)
3.1.1 Introduction
119(2)
3.1.2 Process Safety Management
121(2)
3.1.2.1 Process Safety Information
123(3)
3.1.2.2 Process Hazards Analysis
126(3)
3.1.2.3 Operating Procedures
129(2)
3.1.2.4 Mechanical Integrity
131(5)
3.1.2.5 Management of Change
136(2)
3.2 DuPont La Porte, TX, Methyl Mercaptan Release -- November 15, 2014
138(25)
3.2.1 Accident Description and Analysis
139(21)
3.2.2 DuPont's Initiation of Process Safety Culture Assessments
160(2)
3.2.3 Summary of Safety Culture Findings
162(1)
3.3 BP Texas City Refinery Explosion -- March 23, 2005
163(12)
3.3.1 Introduction
163(1)
3.3.2 Texas City
164(1)
3.3.3 Description of the BP Refinery
165(2)
3.3.4 The Accident
167(6)
3.3.5 Trailer Siting Recommendations
173(1)
3.3.6 Blowdown Drum and Stack Recommendations
174(1)
3.3.7 Additional Recommendations from July 28, 2005, Incident
174(1)
3.3.8 Summary of Safety Culture Issues
174(1)
3.4 T2 Laboratories, Inc. Explosion -- December 19, 2007
175(11)
3.4.1 T2 Laboratories, Inc.
175(1)
3.4.2 Event Description
176(1)
3.4.3 Events Leading Up to the Explosion
176(4)
3.4.4 Analysis of the Accident
180(3)
3.4.5 Process Development
183(1)
3.4.6 Manufacturing Process
184(1)
3.4.7 Summary Safety Culture Issues
185(1)
3.5 Final Thoughts for This
Chapter
186(3)
References
186(3)
4 Chemical Storage Explosions
189(30)
4.0 Introduction
189(1)
4.1 Port of Lebanon -- August 4, 2020
190(13)
4.1.1 PEPCON Explosion -- May 4, 1988
191(10)
4.1.2 Lessons Learned
201(2)
4.1.3 Safety Culture Issues
203(1)
4.2 PCA DeRidder Paper Mill Gas System Explosion, DeRidder, Louisiana -- February 8, 2017
203(8)
4.2.1 PCA DeRidder Mill
205(1)
4.2.2 The Explosion
205(5)
4.2.3 Safety Culture Summary
210(1)
4.3 West Fertilizer Explosion -- April 17, 2013
211(8)
4.3.1 The Fire and Explosion
212(3)
4.3.2 Injuries and Fatalities
215(1)
4.3.3 Safety Culture Summary
215(1)
References
216(3)
5 Dust Explosions and Entertainment Venue Case Studies
219(54)
5.0 Introduction
219(2)
5.1 Dust Explosion Information and Case Studies
221(4)
5.2 AL Solutions December 9, 2010
225(14)
5.2.1 Facility Description
225(3)
5.2.2 Zirconium
228(1)
5.2.3 Description of the Incident
228(3)
5.2.4 The Origin of the Explosion
231(3)
5.2.5 AL Solutions Dust Management Practices
234(1)
5.2.6 Water Deluge System
235(1)
5.2.7 Safety Audits
235(2)
5.2.8 Hydrogen Explosion
237(1)
5.2.9 Previous Fires And Explosions
237(2)
5.2.10 Summary of Safety Culture Findings
239(1)
5.3 Imperial Sugar Company, February 7, 2008
239(28)
5.3.1 Sugar
239(1)
5.3.2 Accident Description
240(1)
5.3.3 Synopsis of Events
240(2)
5.3.4 Detailed Accident Scenario
242(1)
5.3.5 The Chemical Safety Board Investigation
243(5)
5.3.6 South Packing Building
248(1)
5.3.7 Sugar Spillage and Dust Control
249(1)
5.3.8 Force of the Explosion
250(1)
5.3.9 Pre-explosion Sugar Dust Incident History
251(1)
5.3.10 Steel Belt Conveyor Modifications
251(1)
5.3.11 Primary Event Location
252(1)
5.3.12 Primary Event Combustible Dust Source
253(2)
5.3.13 Secondary Dust Explosions
255(1)
5.3.14 Ignition Sources
256(1)
5.3.15 Open Flames and Hot Surfaces
256(1)
5.3.16 Ignition Sources Inside the Steel Belt Enclosure
257(1)
5.3.16.1 Hot Surface Ignition
257(1)
5.3.16.2 Friction Sparks
258(1)
5.3.16.3 Worker Training
258(1)
5.3.17 Evacuation, Fire Alarms, and Fire Suppression
259(1)
5.3.18 Electrical Systems Design
260(1)
5.3.19 Sugar Dust Handling Equipment
261(1)
5.3.20 Housekeeping and Dust Control
262(1)
5.3.21 Imperial Sugar Management and Workers
263(2)
5.3.22 Chemical Safety Board Key Findings
265(1)
5.3.23 Summary of Safety Culture Findings
266(1)
5.4 Entertainment Venue Case Studies
267(3)
5.4.1 Introduction
267(1)
5.4.2 Crowd Surge Events
267(1)
5.4.3 Fires at Bars and Nightclubs
267(1)
5.4.4 The New Taipei Water Park Fire -- June 2015
268(2)
5.5 Safety Culture Summary
270(3)
References
270(3)
6 University Laboratory Accident Case Studies
273(42)
6.0 Introduction
273(1)
6.1 My Experience at Aalto University
273(11)
6.2 Texas Tech University October 2008
284(16)
6.2.1 Specifically, the CSB Found
299(1)
6.3 University of California Los Angeles -- December 29, 2008
300(2)
6.4 University of Utah -- July 2017
302(4)
6.4.1 Utah, Report to the Utah Legislature Number 2019-06
302(4)
6.5 University of Hawaii -- March 16, 2016
306(9)
6.5.1 Grounding (OSHA 2021)
307(1)
6.5.1.1 Summary of Grounding Requirements
308(1)
6.5.1.2 Methods of Grounding Equipment
308(1)
6.5.1.3 Event Description
309(2)
6.5.1.4 Summary of Safety Culture Issues
311(1)
References
312(3)
7 Aviation Case Studies
315(90)
7.0 Introduction
315(22)
7.1 Helicopter Accident
337(18)
7.1.1 Liberty Helicopter Crash March 11, 2018
338(1)
7.1.1.1 Overview
338(8)
7.1.1.2 Liberty Helicopter's Safety Program
346(8)
7.1.1.3 Safety Culture Summary
354(1)
7.2 Commercial Aviation
355(15)
7.2.1 Successful Landing of Crippled Commercial Airliners
355(1)
7.2.2 Gimli Glider -- Successful Landing of a Crippled Commercial Airliner 1 -- July 23, 1983
356(1)
7.2.2.1 Accident Information
356(6)
7.2.2.2 Analysis of the Fuel Problem
362(8)
7.3 Illegal Dispatch Contrary to the MEL: Taking Off With Blank Fuel Gauges
370(3)
7.4 Summary of Safety Culture Issues
373(1)
7.5 Miracle on the Hudson River -- Successful Landing of a Crippled Commercial Airliner 2, January 15, 2009
374(12)
7.5.1 Accident Information
374(3)
7.5.2 Flight Crew and Cabin Crew
377(2)
7.5.3 The Captain's 72-Hour History
379(1)
7.5.4 The First Officer
380(1)
7.5.4.1 The First Officer's 72-Hour History
380(1)
7.5.4.2 The Flight Attendants
381(1)
7.5.4.3 Airbus A320-214
381(1)
7.5.4.4 Operational Factors
382(2)
7.5.4.5 Flight Crew Training
384(1)
7.5.4.6 Dual-Engine Failure Training
385(1)
7.5.4.7 Ditching Training
386(3)
7.5.4.8 CRM and TEM Training
387(1)
7.5.4.9 FAA Oversight
388(1)
7.5.4.10 Summary of Safety Culture Issues
389(1)
7.6 737 MAX
389(11)
7.6.1 Introduction
389(1)
7.6.2 737 MAX Design and Manufacture
390(1)
7.6.3 Accidents
391(2)
7.6.4 Design Certification of the 737 MAX 8 and Safety Assessment of the MCAS
393(2)
7.6.5 Assumptions about Pilot Recognition and Response in the Safety Assessment
395(5)
1.1 De Haviland Comet
400(1)
7.8 Summary of Safety Culture Issues
401(4)
References
401(4)
8 Nuclear Energy Case Studies
405(80)
8.0 Introduction
405(1)
8.1 Nuclear Power
405(25)
8.1.1 Sodium Cooled Reactors
409(1)
8.1.1.1 Santa Susana -- 1959
410(1)
8.1.1.2 Fission Gas Release
411(2)
8.1.1.3 Fermi 1 -- Near Detroit Michigan -- 1966
413(1)
8.1.1.4 Safety Culture Summary of Sodium Cooled Reactors
414(1)
8.1.2 The Vladimir Lenin Nuclear Power Plant or Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant (ChNPP) -- April 26, 1986
415(1)
8.1.2.1 Reactivity and Power Control
416(2)
8.1.2.2 Chernobyl Accident
418(3)
8.1.3 Three Mile Island Accident -- March 28, 1979 (NRC 2022a)
421(1)
8.1.3.1 Accident
421(1)
8.1.3.2 Summary of Events
422(3)
8.1.3.3 Health Effects
425(1)
8.1.3.4 Impact of the Accident
425(1)
8.1.3.5 Current Status
426(1)
8.1.3.6 Human Factor Engineering Findings (Malone et al. 1980)
427(1)
8.1.3.7 Human Engineering and Human Error
428(1)
8.1.3.8 Procedures
428(2)
8.2 Nuclear Criticality
430(12)
8.2.1 Mayak Production Association, 10 December 1968 (LANL 2000)
430(5)
8.2.1.1 Safety Culture Issues
435(1)
8.2.2 National Reactor Testing Station-January 3, 1961 (LANL 2000)
436(1)
8.2.2.1 Safety Culture Issues
437(1)
8.2.3 JCO Fuel Fabrication Plant -- September 30, 1999 (LANL 2000)
438(3)
8.2.3.1 Safety Culture Issues
441(1)
8.3 Medical Misadministration of Radioisotopes Events
442(34)
8.3.1 Loss of Iridium-192 Source at the Indiana Regional Cancer Center (IRCC) -- November 1992
444(1)
8.3.1.1 Introduction
444(1)
8.3.1.2 Event Description
444(1)
8.3.1.3 Patient Treatment Plan
444(11)
8.3.2 Greater Pittsburgh Cancer Center Incident
455(1)
8.3.3 Omnitron High Dose Rate (HDR) Remote Afterloader System
456(1)
8.3.3.1 Description of the Afterloader System
456(1)
8.3.3.2 High Dose Rate Afterloader
456(5)
8.3.3.3 Main Console
461(1)
8.3.3.4 Door Status Panel
461(1)
8.3.3.5 Afterloader System Safety Features
462(1)
8.3.3.6 Patient Applicators and Treatment Tubes
462(1)
8.3.3.7 Description of the Source Wire
462(2)
8.3.3.8 Prototype Testing Performed on Nickel-Titanium Source Wire
464(1)
8.3.3.9 Description of the Omnitron 2000 Afterloader System Software
464(4)
8.3.3.10 Equipment Performance
468(1)
8.3.3.11 Failure Analysis Pertaining to the Source Wire
468(1)
8.3.3.12 Possible Failure Areas
468(1)
8.3.3.13 Organization of Oncology Services Corporation
469(1)
8.3.3.14 Management Oversight
469(1)
8.3.3.15 Safety Culture
470(4)
8.3.3.16 Emergency Operating Procedures
474(1)
8.3.3.17 Training
474(1)
8.3.3.18 Radiation Safety Training at the Indiana Regional Cancer Center
475(1)
8.3.3.19 Summary of Safety Culture Issues
476(1)
8.4 Goiania, Brazil Teletherapy Machine Incident (IAEA 1988)
476(9)
8.4.1 Safety Culture Summary
481(1)
References
481(4)
9 Other Transportation Case Studies
485(122)
9.1 Large Marine Vessel Accidents
485(18)
9.1.1 LNG Carrier Collision with Barge
485(2)
9.1.1.1 Accident Description
487(12)
9.1.1.2 Work/Rest of Ships' Crews
499(2)
9.1.1.3 Drug and Alcohol Testing
501(1)
9.1.1.4 Findings
502(1)
9.2 Navy Vessel Collisions
503(45)
9.2.1 USS FITZGERALD Collided with the Motor Vessel ACX Crystal
503(1)
9.2.1.1 Summary of Findings
504(1)
9.2.1.2 Background
505(1)
9.2.1.3 Events Leading to the Collision
506(1)
9.2.1.4 Collision
507(7)
9.2.1.5 Impact to Berthing 2
514(5)
9.2.1.6 Findings
519(1)
9.2.1.7 Training
520(1)
9.2.1.8 Seamanship and Navigation
520(1)
9.2.1.9 Leadership and Culture
520(1)
9.2.1.10 Fatigue
521(1)
9.2.1.11 Timeline of Events
521(3)
9.2.2 Collision of USS JOHN'S MCCAIN with Motor Vessel ALNIC MC
524(1)
9.2.2.1 Introduction
524(1)
9.2.2.2 Summary of Findings
525(1)
9.2.2.3 Background
525(2)
9.2.2.4 Events Leading to the Collision
527(3)
9.2.2.5 Results of Collision
530(3)
9.2.2.6 Impact to Berthing 5
533(3)
9.2.2.7 Impact on Berthing 3
536(3)
9.2.2.8 Impact on Berthings 4, 6, and 7
539(3)
9.2.2.9 Findings
542(1)
9.2.2.10 Training
542(1)
9.2.2.11 Seamanship and Navigation
543(1)
9.2.2.12 Leadership and Culture
543(1)
9.2.2.13 Timeline of Events
544(4)
9.2.2.14 Summary of Safety Culture Issues
548(1)
9.3 Stretch Duck 7 July 19, 2018
548(5)
9.3.1 Introduction
548(1)
9.3.2 Accident Description
549(3)
9.3.3 1999 Sinking of Miss Majestic
552(1)
9.3 A Types of DUKW Amphibious Vessels
553(8)
9.3.5 NTSB Identified Safety Issue No. 1: Providing Reserve Buoyancy
556(1)
9.3.6 Safety Issue No. 2: Removing Canopies and Side Curtains
557(3)
9.3.7 Findings and Conclusions
560(1)
9.3.8 Safety Culture Summary Findings
560(1)
9.3.9 Other Events
560(1)
9.3.9.1 Minnow, Milwaukee Harbor, Lake Michigan, September 18, 2000
560(1)
9.3.9.2 DUKW No. 1, Lake Union, Seattle, Washington, December 8, 2001
561(1)
9.3.9.3 DUKW34, Delaware River, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, July 7, 2010
561(1)
9.3.9.4 DUCK 6, Seattle, Washington, September 24, 2015
561(1)
9.4 Recent Railroad Accidents
561(46)
9.4.1 AMTRAK Passenger Train -- May 12, 2015
562(1)
9.4.1.1 Accident Scenario
562(3)
9.4.1.2 Amtrak
565(1)
9.4.1.3 Analysis of the Engineer's Actions
566(3)
9.4.1.4 Loss of Situational Awareness
569(3)
9.4.1.5 Two-Person Crews
572(1)
9.4.1.6 Factors Not Contributing to This Accident
572(2)
9.4.1.7 NTSB Probable Cause
574(1)
9.4.1.8 Summary of Safety Culture Issues
574(1)
9.4.2 Transportation Safety Board of Canada (2013a)
574(4)
9.4.2.1 Personnel Information
578(5)
9.4.2.2 Train Brakes
583(3)
9.4.2.3 Locomotives
586(1)
9.4.2.4 Rules and Instructions on Securing Equipment
587(3)
9.4.2.5 Locomotive Event Recorder
590(2)
9.4.2.6 Sense and Braking Unit
592(1)
9.4.2.7 Mandatory Off-Duty Times for Operating Employees
592(1)
9.4.2.8 Securement of Trains (MMA-002) at Nantes
592(1)
9.4.2.9 Securement of Trains (MMA-001) at Vachon
593(1)
9.4.2.10 Recent Runaway Train History at Montreal, Maine, and Atlantic Railway and Previous TSB Investigations
593(1)
9.4.2.11 Training and Requalification of Montreal, Maine, and Atlantic Railway Crews in Farnham
594(1)
9.4.2.12 Training and Requalification of the Locomotive Engineer
595(1)
9.4.2.13 Operational Tests and Inspections at Montreal, Maine, and Atlantic Railway
595(2)
9.4.2.14 Implementation of Single-Person Train Operations
597(2)
9.4.2.15 Canadian Railway Operating Rules (CROR)
599(1)
9.4.2.16 Single-Person Train Operations at Montreal, Maine, and Atlantic Railway
599(2)
9.4.2.17 Review of the Montreal, Maine, and Atlantic Railway Submission and its Relation to the Requirements of Standard CSA Q850
601(1)
9.4.2.18 Research into Single-Person Train Operations
602(1)
9.4.2.19 Safety Culture
603(1)
9.4.2.20 Summary of Safety Culture Issues
604(1)
References
604(3)
10 Assessing Safety Culture
607(27)
10.0 Introduction
607(1)
10.1 Survey Research Principles
608(12)
10.1.1 Developing the Survey Instrument
609(1)
10.1.1.1 Developing the Questions/Statements
609(2)
10.1.1.2 Question/Statement Development
611(1)
10.1.1.3 Sampling
612(1)
10.1.1.4 Demographics
612(1)
10.1.1.5 Survey Delivery
613(1)
10.1.1.6 Analyzing the Results and Reports
613(1)
10.1.1.7 Final Thoughts on Developing and Delivering Surveys
614(1)
10.1.2 Safety Culture Assessment Methods
614(1)
10.1.2.1 DuPont (DuPont) De Nemours Sustainable Solutions (DSS)
614(1)
10.1.2.2 Department of Energy Assessment of Safety Culture Sustainment Processes
615(2)
10.1.2.3 Institute for Nuclear Power Operations Safety Culture Assessment
617(2)
10.1.2.4 Developing Team Findings
619(1)
10.1.3 United States Air Force Assessment Tool
619(1)
10.2 Assessing Health Care Safety Culture
620(1)
10.3 Seven Steps to Assess Safety Culture
621(13)
10.3.1 A Framework for Assessing Safety Culture
623(1)
10.3.2 Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality
623(1)
10.3.3 Graduate Student Safety Culture Survey
623(3)
10.3.4 Idaho National Engineering Laboratory Survey
626(8)
10.4
Chapter Summary
634(1)
References 634(3)
Index 637
Lee T. Ostrom, PhD, is the Center Executive Officer at Idaho Falls Center and full Professor in the College of Engineering. He has authored or co-authored four books as well as several book chapters and articles, including Risk Assessment Tools and Techniques and Their Application. He has over 35 years experience in the field of workplace safety and health.