'The authors provide a systematic treatment of the role of inconsistency in linguistic usage. Their discussion is thoroughly grounded in the literature of inconsistency in contemporary linguistics, semantics, logic, rhetoric, and philosophy. Their innovative perspectives and proposed solutions to problems will interest everyone who works in this challenging area.' Nicholas Rescher, Distinguished University Professor of Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh 'While inconsistencies have traditionally been regarded as fatal glitches that needed to be eliminated from theories and descriptions, Kertész and Rįkosi demonstrate that although consistency remains a fundamental desideratum, there are inconsistencies that are tolerable and that the emergence and resolution of inconsistencies are a natural part of linguistic argumentation. The authors' model throws new light on the nature of linguistic theorizing by offering a unified framework that integrates inconsistencies whether arising between data of a particular kind, or between different kinds of data, or different theories, or different descriptions.' Edith A. Moravcsik, Emeritus Professor of Linguistics, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
