Attracting philosophers and historians of science, logicians and computer scientists, the First World Congress on Paraconsistency was held in 1997 at Ghent U., Belgium, where the editor is based. In a dozen papers based on a congress workshop titled "The role of inconsistencies in the history and philosophy of science," contributors tackle paradoxes alien to classical logic and argue "how to reason sensibly yet naturally from inconsistencies" as Meheus' contribution is called. The overarching thesis is that inconsistency is not a coup de grace in the empirical sciences or mathematics, given that: attention has shifted from products to processes in developing theories; science offers ample case histories of inconsistencies; and the study of paraconsistent logics has been around for 50 years. Annotation c. Book News, Inc., Portland, OR (booknews.com)
For centuries, inconsistencies were seen as a hindrance to good reasoning, and their role in the sciences was ignored. In recent years, however, logicians as well as philosophers and historians have showed a growing interest in the matter. Central to this change were the advent of paraconsistent logics, the shift in attention from finished theories to construction processes, and the recognition that most scientific theories were at some point either internally inconsistent or incompatible with other accepted findings. The new interest gave rise to important questions. How is `logical anarchy' avoided? Is it ever rational to accept an inconsistent theory? In what sense, if any, can inconsistent theories be considered as true?
The present collection of papers is the first to deal with this kind of questions. It contains case studies as well as philosophical analyses, and presents an excellent overview of the different approaches in the domain.
