This is the first book published on the 67,000 Indian Prisoners of War captured by the Japanese in World War Two, and it draws on a decade of research by the author on this neglected subject.
During World War Two some 67,000 Indian personnel of the British Indian Army were captured by Imperial Japanese forces, including a large number at the surrender of Singapore in February 1942. This book, the first of its kind, critically examines why these colonial Prisoners of War (POW) were largely forgotten in the post-war period, and therefore represents a case study in the formation of British wartime historical memory.
It addresses three questions, relating to the impact of evidence that some Indian prisoners were disloyal, the role of British colonial propaganda in shaping later memory of Indian prisoners, and the unavailability of important documentary sources. It argues that the process of forgetting can be understood in terms of three active memory practices, namely: suppression; obscuration; and selection. Examples of how each of these have impacted British memory of Indian prisoners are provided. These practices acted in a colonial context within which a pertinent element was a myth of loyalty, namely the idea that whatever may have occurred in captivity most Indian prisoners stayed fundamentally loyal to the British. Newly available sources, including records from British military intelligence, allow a reassessment of such narratives. It examines the impact of the creation of the Indian National Army (INA) from volunteers among the Indian prisoners, the way that the experiences of Indian prisoners were remembered, explores how the INA was denigrated in later British accounts, and reviews post-war war-crimes trials of Japanese military personnel where the victims were Indian prisoners, including highlighting cases involving miscarriages of justice.
The book provides vivid portrayals of Indian prisoner experiences in areas such as Singapore, Borneo, and the Southwest Pacific, as well as offering new perspectives on the INA's contribution to campaigns such as Imphal and Kohima in 1944, arguing that their impact was greater than previously admitted in British accounts. Throughout, the emphasis is on the role of forgetting in the management of unpalatable truths by the British.
