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Inside Thatchers Monetarism Experiment: The Promise, the Failure, the Legacy [Kietas viršelis]

4.33/5 (18 ratings by Goodreads)
(formerly of the University of Oxford)
  • Formatas: Hardback, 240 pages, aukštis x plotis: 216x140 mm, Not illustrated
  • Išleidimo metai: 21-May-2024
  • Leidėjas: Policy Press
  • ISBN-10: 1447371356
  • ISBN-13: 9781447371359
Kitos knygos pagal šią temą:
  • Formatas: Hardback, 240 pages, aukštis x plotis: 216x140 mm, Not illustrated
  • Išleidimo metai: 21-May-2024
  • Leidėjas: Policy Press
  • ISBN-10: 1447371356
  • ISBN-13: 9781447371359
Kitos knygos pagal šią temą:
In 1979, Margaret Thatchers new government was faced with rampant double-digit inflation, rising unemployment and flatlining economic growth. In response, Thatcher pursued an economic policy which rejected the old orthodoxies and was promoted by only a minority of economists: a policy based on the doctrine of monetarism.



Tim Lankester was the private secretary for economic affairs to Thatcher during the early years of her government. His insiders account explains her attitudes and decisions and those of the other main players in this deeply damaging experiment in economic policy making, which promised much but completely failed to deliver.



Offering fascinating insights into one of the most unsuccessful episodes of British economic history, he also examines the legacy of monetarism for the economy today.

Recenzijos

A unique contribution from an impartial Treasury official who witnessed some of the most politically charged debates of the Thatcher era from within Number 10. Duncan Needham, Director of the Centre for Financial History, University of Cambridge "Achieves what very few political books do, which is give the ideas of economics a relevance to time and place....explains them clearly and relate(s) them to historical persons set in a lively narrative." Sir Simon Jenkins, journalist and author









"A sparkling tome which illuminates the theory and practice of monetarism and sets out the role of the civil servant even when they have deep misgivings about a policy." Sir Suma Chakrabarti, former Permanent Secretary, Department for International Development and Ministry of Justice, and President of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development









"A cautionary tale of correct diagnosis but misguided cure by Mrs Thatcher. It shows convincingly why invoking the mumbo-jumbo of Monetarism was not the way to administer the deflationary policy and change to labour law needed to control the inflation surge she inherited." Marcus Miller, Warwick University









"A breath of fresh thinking ....monetarism of the Thatcher years was a disaster. Sheds so much clear light on the wrong decisions of that era. Lord Vinson, co-founder of the Centre for Policy Studies. "Fascinating" William Keegan, The Observer









"An important contribution to economic history...his analysis of where monetarism went wrong is compelling." Spectator









"Lankesters inside track experience makes his eye-witness account especially enthralling." Ian Harwood, The Society of Professional Economists











"For those looking for a detailed and objective account of [ the] blunder of [ macroeconomic policy, this is an excellent book". Literary Review









"Very well written and easily accessible to non-economists." Simon Wren-Lewis, Mainly Macro blog "A quietly devastating inside account of the theory and practice of monetarism...A brilliant account." Financial Times









"Exceptionally good, honest and open. Deep on the economics and riveting with drama." Timothy Geithner, United States Secretary of the Treasury, 2009-2013









"A valuable intellectual history of monetarism - very useful for teaching on economic history." Jeff Boland, University of Melbourne









"An excellent summary of the economic policy debates at the time, how events developed and the constraints politicians, policy makers and civil servants confront with when shaping and making policy decisions; truly fascinating." Juan Castaneda, Vinson Centre, University of Buckingham A self-lacerating account of the British monetarist experiment by a man of stern principle, Lankester paints a surprisingly sympathetic picture of the lady herself and vividly illustrates how top civil servants approached their jobs, in difficult times for good or ill. Rachel Lomax, former Deputy Governor of the Bank of England















Lankester is uniquely well-placed to tell the inside story of Thatcher's monetarist policies. And what a fascinating and well-told story! Charles Goodhart, Emeritus Professor, London School of Economics and Political Science An intriguing read. It explains from inside Number 10 how a simplistic economic theory that chimed with her ideology monetarism captured Thatchers imagination and how pursuing it inflicted long-lasting damage on the fabric of the British economy. Wendy Carlin, University College London









Steers the reader through a fascinating insiders account of Thatchers approach to monetary policy and why she got some things wrong." Montek Singh Ahluwalia, Distinguished Fellow of the Centre for Social and Economic Progress and former Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission of India

1. Introduction


2. A view from Number 10


3. Keynes and Friedman


4. The monetarists challenge


5. Labour and soft monetarism


6. Mrs Thatcher and hard monetarism


7. Monetarisms high noon


8. Ending the experiment


9. Counting the cost


10. Mrs Thatcher and the trade unions


11. The quest for an alternative anchor


12. The monetarists and the critics look back


13. The legacy


14. The return to stagflation?


15. Epilogue
Tim Lankester was Margaret Thatchers first private secretary for economic affairs. He subsequently held senior positions at HM Treasury, the IMF, World Bank, Overseas Development Administration, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London and Corpus Christi College, Oxford. He is author of The Politics and Economics of Britains Foreign Aid: The Pergau Dam Affair (2013).