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Insider Threats in Cyber Security 2010 ed. [Kietas viršelis]

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  • Formatas: Hardback, 244 pages, aukštis x plotis: 235x155 mm, weight: 1190 g, XII, 244 p., 1 Hardback
  • Serija: Advances in Information Security 49
  • Išleidimo metai: 10-Aug-2010
  • Leidėjas: Springer-Verlag New York Inc.
  • ISBN-10: 1441971327
  • ISBN-13: 9781441971326
Kitos knygos pagal šią temą:
Insider Threats in Cyber Security 2010 ed.Didesnis paveikslėlis
  • Formatas: Hardback, 244 pages, aukštis x plotis: 235x155 mm, weight: 1190 g, XII, 244 p., 1 Hardback
  • Serija: Advances in Information Security 49
  • Išleidimo metai: 10-Aug-2010
  • Leidėjas: Springer-Verlag New York Inc.
  • ISBN-10: 1441971327
  • ISBN-13: 9781441971326
Kitos knygos pagal šią temą:
Pastovi nuoroda: https://www.kriso.lt/db/9781441971326.html
Raktažodžiai:

Covering every angle of the subject, this is a cutting-edge text presenting IT and non-IT facets of insider threats together. The volume gathers a critical mass of well-established worldwide researchers, and provides a unique multidisciplinary overview.



Insider Threats in Cyber Security is a cutting edge text presenting IT and non-IT facets of insider threats together. This volume brings together a critical mass of well-established worldwide researchers, and provides a unique multidisciplinary overview. Monica van Huystee, Senior Policy Advisor at MCI, Ontario, Canada comments "The book will be a must read, so of course I'll need a copy."

Insider Threats in Cyber Security covers all aspects of insider threats, from motivation to mitigation. It includes how to monitor insider threats (and what to monitor for), how to mitigate insider threats, and related topics and case studies.

Insider Threats in Cyber Security is intended for a professional audience composed of the military, government policy makers and banking; financing companies focusing on the Secure Cyberspace industry. This book is also suitable for advanced-level students and researchers in computer science as a secondary text or reference book.

Recenzijos

From the reviews:

This book is an edited volume of nine papers by respected authorities--for example, Peter Neumann--in computing. The contributions are well written, thorough, and, most importantly, up to date. Each paper includes extensive references, including many from 2010. The intended audience includes graduate students, computer science researchers, and technical professionals on the cutting edge. In short, this book is an excellent contribution to the field. (David Bellin, ACM Computing Reviews, January, 2011)

This edited book provides a timely summary of recent research and development results in this area of insider-related cyber security issues, which, hopefully, will enable the reader to incorporate insider threats into his/her business decision making processes, and identify avenues for risk reduction. this book is an important work for academics, policy makers, and practitioners as it is a step toward a better understanding of the recent research and trends in insider threats . (Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo, SIGACT News, April, 2012)

Aspects of Insider Threats
1(16)
Christian W. Probst
Jeffrey Hunker
Dieter Gollmann
Matt Bishop
1 Introduction
1(1)
2 Insiders and Insider Threats
2(5)
2.1 Insider Threats
5(1)
2.2 Taxonomies
6(1)
3 Detection and Mitigation
7(2)
4 Policies
9(2)
5 Human Factors and Compliance
11(2)
6 Conclusion
13(2)
References
15(2)
Combatting Insider Threats
17(28)
Peter G. Neumann
1 A Contextual View of Insiders and Insider Threats
17(3)
2 Risks of Insider Misuse
20(2)
2.1 Types of Insiders
20(1)
2.2 Types of Insider Misuse
21(1)
3 Threats, Vulnerabilities, and Risks
22(3)
3.1 Relevant Knowledge and Experience
23(1)
3.2 Exploitations of Vulnerabilities
24(1)
3.3 Potential Risks Resulting from Exploitations
25(1)
4 Countermeasures
25(4)
4.1 Specification of Sound Policies for Data Gathering and Monitoring
27(1)
4.2 Detection, Analysis, and Identification of Misuse
28(1)
4.3 Desired Responses to Detected Anomalies and Misuses
29(1)
5 Decomposition of Insider Misuse Problems
29(4)
5.1 Stages of Development and Use
30(1)
5.2 Extended Profiling Including Psychological and Other Factors
31(2)
6 Requirements for Insider-Threat-Resistant High-Integrity Elections
33(3)
7 Relevance of the Countermeasures to Elections
36(3)
8 Research and Development Needs
39(1)
9 Conclusions
40(1)
References
41(4)
Insider Threat and Information Security Management
45(28)
Lizzie Coles-Kemp
Marianthi Theoharidou
1 Introduction
45(1)
2 Definitions of Insider and the Relevance to Information Security Management
46(3)
3 Risk and Insiderness
49(4)
3.1 The Importance of Organisational Culture and the Significance of Cultural Risks
51(1)
3.2 Fieldwork on Culture and the Insider Threat
51(2)
4 The Structure of the ISMS and Traditional Information Security Management Responses to Insiderness
53(3)
4.1 Analysis - Turning an ISMS Inwards
54(1)
4.2 The Role of Operationalisation
55(1)
5 Information Security Management Standards, Best Practice and the Insider Threat
56(5)
5.1 General Security Management Standards
56(1)
5.2 Guidelines Focused on the Management of the Insider Threat
57(3)
5.3 Analysis of the Contribution of Best Practice and Guidelines
60(1)
6 Crime theories and insider threat
61(2)
6.1 Existing Connections between Crime Theories and Information Security Management
62(1)
7 Implications of Crime Theories for ISMS Design
63(6)
7.1 Application of SCP to the ISO Control Domains
64(2)
7.2 Implications for ISMS Process Design
66(2)
7.3 Summary of Crime Theory Contribution
68(1)
8 Conclusions
69(1)
References
70(3)
A State of the Art Survey of Fraud Detection Technology
73(12)
Ulrich Flegel
Julien Vayssiere
Gunter Bitz
1 Introduction
73(3)
1.1 Data Analysis Methodology
74(2)
2 Survey of Technology for Fraud Detection in Practice
76(4)
2.1 General Approaches for Intrusion and Fraud Detection
76(2)
2.2 State of the Art of Fraud Detection Tools and Techniques
78(2)
3 Why Fraud Detection is not the Same as Intrusion Detection
80(2)
4 Challenges for Fraud Detection in Information Systems
82(1)
5 Summary
82(2)
References
84(1)
Combining Traditional Cyber Security Audit Data with Psychosocial Data: Towards Predictive Modeling for Insider Threat Mitigation
85(30)
Frank L. Greitzer
Deborah A. Frincke
1 Introduction
85(3)
2 Background
88(3)
3 Issues of Security and Privacy
91(3)
4 Predictive Modeling Approach
94(12)
5 Training Needs
106(3)
6 Conclusions and Research Challenges
109(2)
7 Acknowledgments
111(1)
References
111(4)
A Risk Management Approach to the "Insider Threat"
115(24)
Matt Bishop
Sophie Engle
Deborah A. Frincke
Carrie Gates
Frank L. Greitzer
Sean Peisert
Sean Whalen
1 Introduction
116(1)
2 Insider Threat Assessment
117(5)
2.1 Example
120(2)
2.2 Summary
122(1)
3 Access-Based Assessment
122(4)
4 Psychological Indicator-Based Assessment
126(4)
5 Application of Risk to System Countermeasures
130(5)
5.1 Example
133(2)
5.2 Summary
135(1)
6 Conclusion
135(1)
References
135(4)
Legally Sustainable Solutions for Privacy Issues in Collaborative Fraud Detection
139(34)
Ulrich Flegel
Florian Kerschbaum
Philip Miseldine
Ganna Monakova
Richard Wacker
Frank Leymann
1 Introduction
139(1)
2 Monitoring Modern Distributed Systems
140(5)
2.1 Evidence Model
142(3)
3 Observing Fraudulent Service Behaviours
145(4)
3.1 Architectural Support
148(1)
4 Introduction to the Legal Perspective
149(1)
5 Basic Principles of Data Privacy Law
150(3)
5.1 A Set of Six Basic Rules
151(2)
6 General Legal Requirements of Fraud Detection Systems
153(3)
6.1 Privacy Relevance of Fraud Detection Systems
154(1)
6.2 Necessary Data for Fraud Detection
154(1)
6.3 Transparency in the Fraud Detection Context
155(1)
6.4 Purpose Specification and Binding in Fraud Detection
155(1)
6.5 Permissibility of Fraud Detection
155(1)
6.6 Quality of Event Data
156(1)
6.7 Security of Event Data
156(1)
7 Technical Solutions for Privacy-respecting Fraud Detection
156(9)
7.1 Technical Requirements
157(4)
7.2 Lossless Information Reduction with Covered Data
161(1)
7.3 Lossy Information Reductions for Timestamps
161(4)
8 Legal Improvements by Pseudonymizing Event Data
165(3)
8.1 Technical Description
165(1)
8.2 Privacy Relevance of Pseudonymized Event Data
166(1)
8.3 Strengthening the Data Privacy Official
167(1)
8.4 Disclosure With Legal Permission
167(1)
8.5 Data and System Security
168(1)
9 Conclusion
168(1)
References
169(4)
Towards and Access-Control Framework for Countering Indider Threats
173(24)
Jason Crampton
Michael Huth
1 Introduction
173(4)
2 Motivation and related work
177(5)
2.1 Illustrative scenarios
177(2)
2.2 Definitions of insiders
179(1)
2.3 Access control
180(1)
2.4 The insider problem and access control
181(1)
3 Trust, trustworthiness, and the insider problem
182(3)
3.1 Insiderness
183(1)
3.2 Trust management and risk assessment
183(1)
3.3 Pragmatics of identifying suspicious events
184(1)
4 Toward a context- and insider-aware policy language
185(6)
4.1 Context and request predicates
186(1)
4.21 Requirements
186(1)
4.3 Policy transformations2 via declarative programming
187(1)
4.4 Discussion of requirements
188(1)
4.5 Policy transformations
189(1)
4.6 Risk-and trustworthiness-aware policy composition
190(1)
5 Access-control architectures and the insider problem
191(1)
6 Concluding remarks
192(2)
References
194(3)
Monitoring Technologies for Mitigating Insider Threats
197(22)
Brian M. Bowen
Malek Ben Salem
Angelos D. Keromytis
Salvatore J. Stolfo
1 Introduction
197(3)
2 Related Research
200(1)
3 Threat Model - Level of Sophistication of the Attacker
201(1)
4 Decoy Properties
202(5)
5 Architecture
207(8)
5.1 Decoy Document Distributor
207(1)
5.2 SONAR
208(1)
5.3 Decoys and Network Monitoring
208(3)
5.4 Host-based Sensors
211(4)
6 Concluding Remarks and Future Work
215(2)
References
217(2)
Insider Threat Specification as a Threat Mitigation Technique
219
George Magklaras
Steven Furnell
1 Introduction
219(2)
1.1 The Insider Threat Problem
220(1)
2 Background
221(5)
2.1 The Common Intrusion Specification Language
221(4)
2.2 Panoptis
225(1)
3 Insider Misuse Taxonomies and Threat Models
226(11)
4 The Scope of the Insider Threat Prediction Specification Language
237(5)
4.1 The Domain Specific Language Programming Paradigm
240(2)
5 Conclusion
242(1)
References
242