Foreword |
|
xiii | |
|
Acknowledgements |
|
xvi | |
|
|
xviii | |
|
Table of Treaties and Other Selected Instruments |
|
|
xx | |
|
|
xxxi | |
|
|
1 | (17) |
|
1.1 Emerging Military Technologies and Weapons Reviews |
|
|
1 | (5) |
|
1.2 Cyber Capabilities, Autonomous Weapon Systems, Autonomy and Artificial Intelligence |
|
|
6 | (3) |
|
|
9 | (2) |
|
|
11 | (7) |
|
2 Article 36: Background and Historical Development |
|
|
18 | (32) |
|
2.1 Compliance with Weapons Law: Clarifying Terminology |
|
|
19 | (4) |
|
2.2 Implementation Regulations in Pre-1977 Weapons Law Treaties |
|
|
23 | (14) |
|
2.2.1 1868 St Petersburg Declaration |
|
|
23 | (2) |
|
2.2.2 1874 Brussels Declaration and 1880 Oxford Manual |
|
|
25 | (1) |
|
2.2.3 1899 and 1907 Hague Conferences |
|
|
26 | (2) |
|
2.2.4 1922 Washington Treaty and 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol |
|
|
28 | (3) |
|
2.2.5 1972 Biological Weapons Convention |
|
|
31 | (1) |
|
2.2.6 1976 ENMOD Convention |
|
|
32 | (1) |
|
|
33 | (4) |
|
2.3 Drafting History of Article 36 |
|
|
37 | (13) |
|
2.3.1 Developments after the 1949 Diplomatic Conference |
|
|
38 | (2) |
|
2.3.2 1972 Conference of Government Experts |
|
|
40 | (2) |
|
2.3.3 1973 ICRC Draft and Commentary |
|
|
42 | (2) |
|
2.3.4 1974-77 Diplomatic Conference |
|
|
44 | (1) |
|
2.3.4.1 Organisation of the Conference |
|
|
44 | (1) |
|
2.3.4.2 Changes to the Wording of Article 36 at the Conference |
|
|
45 | (3) |
|
2.3.5 The Legacy of Four Years, Four Days and Nine Pages |
|
|
48 | (2) |
|
3 Interpretative Methodology |
|
|
50 | (37) |
|
3.1 Defining Interpretation |
|
|
52 | (3) |
|
3.2 Importance of Clear and Transparent Methodology for LOAC |
|
|
55 | (5) |
|
3.3 Relevant Interpretative Community |
|
|
60 | (6) |
|
|
61 | (1) |
|
|
62 | (1) |
|
|
63 | (1) |
|
|
64 | (1) |
|
3.3.5 Subject Matter Experts |
|
|
65 | (1) |
|
3.4 Interpretative Rules for LOAC |
|
|
66 | (21) |
|
3.4.1 The General Rule of Article 31 and the Subsidiary Means of Interpretation under Article 32 |
|
|
66 | (2) |
|
3.4.2 Limitations Inherent in the General Rule |
|
|
68 | (1) |
|
3.4.2.1 `Ordinary Meaning' |
|
|
68 | (1) |
|
|
68 | (2) |
|
3.4.2.3 `Object and Purpose' |
|
|
70 | (2) |
|
3.4.2.4 `Subsequent Practice in the Application of the Treaty': Article 31(3)(b) |
|
|
72 | (1) |
|
3.4.2.5 `Any Relevant Rules of International Law Applicable in the Relations between the Parties': Article 31(3)(c) |
|
|
73 | (2) |
|
3.4.2.6 `Special Meaning': Article 31(4) |
|
|
75 | (1) |
|
3.4.3 Limited Informative Scope of Subsidiary Means of Interpretation |
|
|
75 | (2) |
|
3.4.4 Requirement of Practical Interpretation |
|
|
77 | (2) |
|
3.4.5 Requirement of Evolutive Interpretation |
|
|
79 | (3) |
|
3.4.6 Requirement of Coherence |
|
|
82 | (3) |
|
3.4.7 Interpreting Article 36 |
|
|
85 | (2) |
|
4 Interpreting Article 36: The Object of Review |
|
|
87 | (35) |
|
4.1 `A ... Weapon, Means or Method of Warfare' |
|
|
88 | (27) |
|
4.1.1 Interpretation on the Basis of the General Rule |
|
|
91 | (4) |
|
|
95 | (1) |
|
4.1.2.1 `Intuitive Approach' |
|
|
95 | (1) |
|
4.1.2.2 `Extensive Definitional Approach' |
|
|
96 | (2) |
|
4.1.2.3 "Weapons" as a Subcategory of "Means" - Approach' |
|
|
98 | (2) |
|
|
100 | (1) |
|
4.1.2.5 Methods of Warfare |
|
|
100 | (1) |
|
4.1.3 Further interpretative Suggestions |
|
|
101 | (3) |
|
|
104 | (3) |
|
4.1.5 Proposed Interpretation |
|
|
107 | (1) |
|
4.1.5.1 `Weapons' and `Means of Warfare' |
|
|
107 | (4) |
|
4.1.5.2 `Methods of Warfare' |
|
|
111 | (1) |
|
|
112 | (3) |
|
|
115 | (7) |
|
4.2.1 Interpretation on the Basis of the General Rule |
|
|
115 | (1) |
|
|
115 | (2) |
|
4.2.3 Further Interpretative Suggestions |
|
|
117 | (1) |
|
|
118 | (1) |
|
4.2.5 Proposed Interpretation |
|
|
119 | (3) |
|
5 Interpretation of Article 36: The Process and Standard of Review |
|
|
122 | (41) |
|
5.1 `A High Contracting Party' |
|
|
124 | (2) |
|
5.2 `Study, Development, Acquisition or Adoption' |
|
|
126 | (9) |
|
5.2.1 Interpretation on the Basis of the General Rule |
|
|
126 | (1) |
|
|
127 | (1) |
|
5.2.3 Further Interpretative Suggestions |
|
|
128 | (2) |
|
|
130 | (1) |
|
5.2.5 Proposed Interpretation |
|
|
131 | (4) |
|
|
135 | (9) |
|
5.3.1 Interpretation on the Basis of the General Rule |
|
|
135 | (1) |
|
|
135 | (4) |
|
5.3.3 Further Interpretative Suggestions |
|
|
139 | (1) |
|
|
140 | (1) |
|
5.3.5 Proposed Interpretation |
|
|
141 | (3) |
|
5.4 `Its Employment in Some, or All Circumstances' |
|
|
144 | (4) |
|
5.5 `This Protocol or Any Other Rule of International Law' |
|
|
148 | (14) |
|
5.5.1 Interpretation on the Basis of the General Rule |
|
|
148 | (1) |
|
5.5.2 Methodology Applied in Weapons Reviews |
|
|
149 | (4) |
|
5.5.3 Applicability of IHRL in the Context of Article 36 |
|
|
153 | (4) |
|
5.5.3.1 The Right to Life |
|
|
157 | (1) |
|
5.5.3.2 The Right to Freedom from Torture and Other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment |
|
|
158 | (1) |
|
5.5.3.3 The Right to Health |
|
|
159 | (2) |
|
5.5.4 Proposed Interpretation |
|
|
161 | (1) |
|
5.6 Legal Review of Weapons Employed in NIAC |
|
|
162 | (1) |
|
6 Weapons Review Obligation under Customary International Law |
|
|
163 | (32) |
|
6.1 Customary International Law |
|
|
166 | (15) |
|
6.1.1 Contentious Concept of CIL |
|
|
168 | (3) |
|
6.1.2 Constituent Elements of CIL |
|
|
171 | (1) |
|
|
171 | (4) |
|
6.1.2.2 Nature of Practice |
|
|
175 | (3) |
|
|
178 | (3) |
|
6.2 Article 36 as Part of CIL |
|
|
181 | (7) |
|
6.2.1 Relationship between Treaty and Custom |
|
|
181 | (2) |
|
6.2.2 Has Article 36 Given Rise to a General Practice Accepted as Law? |
|
|
183 | (1) |
|
|
183 | (1) |
|
|
184 | (4) |
|
6.3 `Alternative' Weapons Review Obligation under CIL |
|
|
188 | (7) |
|
|
188 | (1) |
|
|
189 | (1) |
|
|
190 | (5) |
|
7 Weapons Reviews under the System of AP I: Relationship between Article 36 and Article 82 |
|
|
195 | (12) |
|
7.1 Article 82 of AP I: General Overview |
|
|
195 | (4) |
|
7.2 Article 82's Complementary Function |
|
|
199 | (3) |
|
7.3 Do the Scopes of Articles 36 and 82 Overlap? |
|
|
202 | (5) |
|
8 Challenges to Article 36 Reviews Posed by Autonomous Weapons Systems (AWS) |
|
|
207 | (32) |
|
8.1 Discussions within the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS) |
|
|
208 | (3) |
|
8.2 Autonomy and AI: Systems Falling under the Review Obligation |
|
|
211 | (7) |
|
8.3 Review Methodology: Weapons Law and the Law of Targeting |
|
|
218 | (14) |
|
8.4 When to Review? `Novelty' of AWS |
|
|
232 | (1) |
|
8.5 How (Much) and How to Test? |
|
|
233 | (4) |
|
8.6 Relevant Expertise and Compliance |
|
|
237 | (2) |
|
9 Challenges to Article 36 Reviews Posed by (Autonomous) Cyber Capabilities |
|
|
239 | (32) |
|
9.1 Discussions within the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) and the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on the Legal Framework Applicable in Cyberspace |
|
|
241 | (9) |
|
9.2 What Capabilities Fall under the Review Requirement? |
|
|
250 | (11) |
|
|
251 | (5) |
|
9.2.2 Extent of the Review |
|
|
256 | (5) |
|
9.3 Review Methodology: Weapons Law and the Law of Targeting |
|
|
261 | (6) |
|
9.4 When to Review? `Newness' of Cyber Capabilities |
|
|
267 | (1) |
|
9.5 How (Much) and How to Test? |
|
|
268 | (1) |
|
9.6 Relevant Expertise and Compliance |
|
|
269 | (2) |
|
|
271 | (5) |
Index |
|
276 | |