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El. knyga: Jane Austen, Game Theorist: Updated Edition

3.54/5 (272 ratings by Goodreads)
  • Formatas: 296 pages
  • Išleidimo metai: 23-Mar-2014
  • Leidėjas: Princeton University Press
  • Kalba: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9781400851331
  • Formatas: 296 pages
  • Išleidimo metai: 23-Mar-2014
  • Leidėjas: Princeton University Press
  • Kalba: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9781400851331

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Game theory--the study of how people make choices while interacting with others--is one of the most popular technical approaches in social science today. But as Michael Chwe reveals in his insightful new book, Jane Austen explored game theory's core ideas in her six novels roughly two hundred years ago--over a century before its mathematical development during the Cold War.Jane Austen, Game Theorist shows how this beloved writer theorized choice and preferences, prized strategic thinking, and analyzed why superiors are often strategically clueless about inferiors. Exploring a diverse range of literature and folktales, this book illustrates the wide relevance of game theory and how, fundamentally, we are all strategic thinkers.


Recenzijos

"Jane Austen, Game Theorist ... is more than the larky scholarly equivalent of 'Pride and Prejudice and Zombies.'... Mr. Chwe argues that Austen isn't merely fodder for game-theoretical analysis, but an unacknowledged founder of the discipline itself: a kind of Empire-waisted version of the mathematician and cold war thinker John von Neumann, ruthlessly breaking down the stratagems of 18th-century social warfare."--Jennifer Schuessler, New York Times "[ A] convincing case for how mathematical models and fictional narratives can work towards reciprocal illustration."--Jonathan Sachs, Times Literary Supplement "This is insightful literary analysis at its most accessible and enjoyable."--Kate Hutchings, Huffington Post Books "Jane Austen, Game Theorist should join the list of strategic classics like The Art of War ... on the shelf of everybody who wants to be effective in life."--Diane Coyle, Enlightenment Economics "Chwe makes an argument for Austen as a founder of decision science in this 2013 book that boasts an impressive array of diagrams and hard-nosed textual analysis."--Evelyn Crowley, Vogue.com "This is such a fabulous book--carefully written, thoughtful and insightful."--Guardian.co.uk's Grrl Scientist blog "[ B]lends two very different subjects--game theory and literature--delightfully."--Siddarth Singh, Mint "Well researched and with an excellent index, the book will appeal to Austen fans who can see her characters in another light."--Choice "When an intelligent, knowledgeable reader with a new distinctive viewpoint engages intensely with a great work of literature, the results are usually worthy of attention. There is much that is valuable in Chwe's book."--Ernest Davis, SIAM News "Chwe's volume is a valuable first step toward a more interdisciplinary and much more inclusive field of decision sciences."--Mary Flanagan, American Journal of Play "Chwe's book is already a success among academics with a taste for rational choice theory and among Austen fans. It is highly recommended for students of game theory who would like to place the theory within different contexts, as well as students of political economy who would like to understand the extent to which a unique context influences individual objectives in strategic thinking."--Aurelie Charles, Eastern Economic Journal "The book is in more of a social science vein than a technical one. The general reader should have no trouble following the author's arguments."--Mary Long, Mathematical Reviews Clippings

Preface xi
Abbreviations xiii
Chapter One The Argument
1(8)
Chapter Two Game Theory in Context
9(26)
Rational Choice Theory
9(3)
Game Theory
12(3)
Strategic Thinking
15(4)
How Game Theory Is Useful
19(6)
Criticisms
25(5)
Game Theory and Literature
30(5)
Chapter Three Folktales and Civil Rights
35(8)
Chapter Four Flossie and the Fox
43(6)
Chapter Five Jane Austen's Six Novels
49(48)
Pride and Prejudice
50(4)
Sense and Sensibility
54(6)
Persuasion
60(7)
Northanger Abbey
67(8)
Mansfield Park
75(11)
Emma
86(11)
Chapter Six Austen's Foundations of Game Theory
97(18)
Choice
97(5)
Preferences
102(3)
Revealed Preferences
105(2)
Names for Strategic Thinking
107(4)
Strategic Sophomores
111(2)
Eyes
113(2)
Chapter Seven Austen's Competing Models
115(18)
Emotions
115(4)
Instincts
119(2)
Habits
121(3)
Rules
124(3)
Social Factors
127(1)
Ideology
128(2)
Intoxication
130(1)
Constraints
130(3)
Chapter Eight Austen on What Strategic Thinking Is Not
133(8)
Strategic Thinking Is Not Selfish
133(1)
Strategic Thinking Is Not Moralistic
134(1)
Strategic Thinking Is Not Economistic
135(2)
Strategic Thinking Is Not About Winning Inconsequential Games
137(4)
Chapter Nine Austen's Innovations
141(30)
Partners in Strategic Manipulation
141(12)
Strategizing About Yourself
153(5)
Preference Change
158(9)
Constancy
167(4)
Chapter Ten Austen on Strategic Thinking's Disadvantages
171(8)
Chapter Eleven Austen's Intentions
179(9)
Chapter Twelve Austen on Cluelessness
188(23)
Lack of Natural Ability
188(10)
Social Distance
198(2)
Excessive Self-Reference
200(2)
High-Status People Are Not Supposed to Enter the Minds of Low-Status People
202(3)
Presumption Sometimes Works
205(1)
Decisive Blunders
205(6)
Chapter Thirteen Real-World Cluelessness
211(17)
Cluelessness Is Easier
211(2)
Difficulty Embodying Low-Status Others
213(4)
Investing in Social Status
217(2)
Improving Your Bargaining Position
219(5)
Empathy Prevention
224(1)
Calling People Animals
225(3)
Chapter Fourteen Concluding Remarks
228(7)
Afterword to the Paperback Edition 235(2)
References 237(16)
Index 253
Michael Suk-Young Chwe is professor of political science at the University of California, Los Angeles, and the author of Rational Ritual: Culture, Coordination, and Common Knowledge (Princeton).