Acknowledgments |
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xiii | (2) |
List of Abbreviations |
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xv | |
Introduction |
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1 | (12) |
Part I: Eisenhower and Overwhelming Nuclear Superiority |
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13 | (110) |
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1 The Integration of Nuclear Weapons into American National Security Policy |
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13 | (36) |
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2 The Impact of the Strategic Nuclear Balance on Policy |
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49 | (36) |
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The New Look: Gigantic Bluff or Coherent National Security Policy? |
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50 | (5) |
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The Shifting Strategic Balance and Considerations of Preventive War |
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55 | (14) |
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The Strategic Nuclear Balance and the End of the Korean War |
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69 | (16) |
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3 The Impact of the Thermonuclear Revolution on Policy |
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85 | (20) |
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Nuclear Arms Limitation: The Origins of Project Candor |
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87 | (7) |
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Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" Speech |
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94 | (5) |
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The Quandary of Nuclear Arms Limitation |
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99 | (6) |
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4 The Nuclearization of NATO: A Delicate Balance |
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105 | (18) |
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The Eisenhower Administration and the Europeans |
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106 | (6) |
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112 | (11) |
Part II: Eisenhower and Evolving Mutual Vulnerability |
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123 | (58) |
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5 Eisenhower's Approach: Buying Time with Tactical Nuclear Weapons |
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123 | (22) |
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Early Skepticism about Tactical Nuclear Warfare: NSC 5602/1 |
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124 | (6) |
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High Tide for Tactical Nuclear Weapons: NSC 5707/8 |
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130 | (15) |
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6 Into the Missile Age: Does Relative Strength Matter? |
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145 | (28) |
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Meeting the Threat of Surprise Attack |
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146 | (8) |
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Sputnik and the Missile Gap |
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154 | (19) |
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7 Eisenhower, Nuclear Weapons, and Policy at the End of the 1950s |
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173 | (8) |
Part III: Kennedy and Perceived Mutual Vulnerability |
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181 | (132) |
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8 Kennedy's Approach: A Strategy of Multiple Options |
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181 | (16) |
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9 The Berlin Crisis: Example of Self-Deterrence or Successful Manipulation of Risk? |
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197 | (44) |
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The Reaction of the Eisenhower Administration |
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198 | (6) |
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The Crisis Builds Up under Kennedy |
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204 | (5) |
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The Reaction of the Kennedy Administration: A Strategy of Risk Manipulation |
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209 | (9) |
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The Berlin Wall As a Symbol of Mutual Acceptance of the Status Quo |
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218 | (3) |
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Nuclear Danger and Its Influence on Politics |
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221 | (16) |
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The Berlin Crisis and Nuclear Weapons: Risk Manipulation and Self-Deterrence |
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237 | (4) |
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10 Nuclear Politics--Symbols and Signals: How Political Considerations Affected Military Strategy, Planning, and Budgets |
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241 | (32) |
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Nuclear Superiority As a Signal of Resolve and Reassurance |
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243 | (5) |
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The Arms Race As a Functional Substitute for War |
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248 | (7) |
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Political Considerations and Military Planning: The Case of Nuclear Testing |
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255 | (10) |
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Nuclear Strategy: The Growing Gap between Theory and Practice |
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265 | (8) |
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11 The Cuban Missile Crisis: The Impact of the Nuclear Danger on Policy |
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273 | (32) |
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275 | (1) |
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276 | (7) |
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From Crisis Bargaining to Not Losing Control |
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283 | (12) |
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Nuclear Superiority Versus Nuclear Danger in the Settlement of the Crisis |
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295 | (10) |
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12 The Detente of 1963: Lessons of the Cuban Missile Crisis |
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305 | (8) |
Conclusions |
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313 | (10) |
Notes |
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323 | (16) |
Bibliography |
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439 | (16) |
Abbreviations of Archival Sources |
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439 | (1) |
Published Sources |
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440 | (2) |
Books and Articles |
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442 | (13) |
Index |
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455 | (8) |
About the Author |
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463 | |