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El. knyga: Living with Peril: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Nuclear Weapons

  • Formatas: EPUB+DRM
  • Išleidimo metai: 01-Jan-2000
  • Leidėjas: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers
  • Kalba: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9780585114187
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  • Formatas: EPUB+DRM
  • Išleidimo metai: 01-Jan-2000
  • Leidėjas: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers
  • Kalba: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9780585114187
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Living with Peril explains in detail how the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations adapted to the reality of a Soviet nuclear force capable of destroying the United States and against which there was no effective defense. Wenger illuminates the development, implementation, and evolution of U.S. government policies designed to avoid war and to respond to the vulnerability of nuclear destruction. Drawing from a wealth of sources, Wenger provides an insightful and original perspective on the origins of cold war nuclear diplomacy. This is crucial reading for students and scholars of international relations, peace and conflict studies, and diplomatic history.

Recenzijos

During the presidential administrations of Dwight D. Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy the United States slipped from a position of massive nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union to one of perceived mutual vulnerability. Drawing extensively upon archival materials, Andreas Wenger, a leading young Swiss analyst of world politics, argues that these were the decisive years of the nuclear era, the years when the most * Nuclear Learning * Thoroughly researched and well argued, this book makes a major contribution to the literature. -- R. L. Wendzel, United States Air University This is a meticulously researched and well-written analysis of a very important historical period, and of a very important set of issues involving nuclear history. It makes new contributions in many areas, and addresses several perennial questions and sheds much new light on them. . . . Highly recommended to historians of the nuclear age, and to students pursuing research topics in this area or time period. It provides all researchers a wealth of new information and quotes. -- Niall Michelsen, Roosevelt University Wenger's highly readable account comes as close as historians are likely to get to an authoritative retelling of a complex past. -- Richard H. Ullman, Princeton University Wenger narrates a compelling account of the political and psycological forces that shaped the nuclear weapons strategies of Eisenhower and Kennedy. Wenger convincingly demonstrates that the level of destruction inherent in nuclear use created a gap between the theory and pratice of nuclear strategy. Wenger contributes a timely reminder of these realities and the continuing importance of the past for comtemporary nuclear debates. -- Patricia Ownes * Cambridge Review of International Affairs * Historians and political scientists will find new insights into the debate surrounding the Cold War and American policy based on deterrence and change . . . a real tour de force. -- Joseph Richard Goldman, University of Minnesota It is one of the many strengths of Wenger's exemplary and well-researched study to remind a new generation of IR students (whose indifference to history is wondrous to behold) of the complexity of a world that once was, but is no more. -- Michael Cox, University of Wales, Aberystwyth * Political Studies Review * Meticulously documented and researched...Highly recommended for historian of the nuclear age and for students pursuing research topics in this area or time period. -- Niall Michelsen * H-Pol, February 1998 *

Acknowledgments xiii(2)
List of Abbreviations xv
Introduction 1(12)
Part I: Eisenhower and Overwhelming Nuclear Superiority 13(110)
1 The Integration of Nuclear Weapons into American National Security Policy
13(36)
2 The Impact of the Strategic Nuclear Balance on Policy
49(36)
The New Look: Gigantic Bluff or Coherent National Security Policy?
50(5)
The Shifting Strategic Balance and Considerations of Preventive War
55(14)
The Strategic Nuclear Balance and the End of the Korean War
69(16)
3 The Impact of the Thermonuclear Revolution on Policy
85(20)
Nuclear Arms Limitation: The Origins of Project Candor
87(7)
Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" Speech
94(5)
The Quandary of Nuclear Arms Limitation
99(6)
4 The Nuclearization of NATO: A Delicate Balance
105(18)
The Eisenhower Administration and the Europeans
106(6)
NATO Goes Nuclear
112(11)
Part II: Eisenhower and Evolving Mutual Vulnerability 123(58)
5 Eisenhower's Approach: Buying Time with Tactical Nuclear Weapons
123(22)
Early Skepticism about Tactical Nuclear Warfare: NSC 5602/1
124(6)
High Tide for Tactical Nuclear Weapons: NSC 5707/8
130(15)
6 Into the Missile Age: Does Relative Strength Matter?
145(28)
Meeting the Threat of Surprise Attack
146(8)
Sputnik and the Missile Gap
154(19)
7 Eisenhower, Nuclear Weapons, and Policy at the End of the 1950s
173(8)
Part III: Kennedy and Perceived Mutual Vulnerability 181(132)
8 Kennedy's Approach: A Strategy of Multiple Options
181(16)
9 The Berlin Crisis: Example of Self-Deterrence or Successful Manipulation of Risk?
197(44)
The Reaction of the Eisenhower Administration
198(6)
The Crisis Builds Up under Kennedy
204(5)
The Reaction of the Kennedy Administration: A Strategy of Risk Manipulation
209(9)
The Berlin Wall As a Symbol of Mutual Acceptance of the Status Quo
218(3)
Nuclear Danger and Its Influence on Politics
221(16)
The Berlin Crisis and Nuclear Weapons: Risk Manipulation and Self-Deterrence
237(4)
10 Nuclear Politics--Symbols and Signals: How Political Considerations Affected Military Strategy, Planning, and Budgets
241(32)
Nuclear Superiority As a Signal of Resolve and Reassurance
243(5)
The Arms Race As a Functional Substitute for War
248(7)
Political Considerations and Military Planning: The Case of Nuclear Testing
255(10)
Nuclear Strategy: The Growing Gap between Theory and Practice
265(8)
11 The Cuban Missile Crisis: The Impact of the Nuclear Danger on Policy
273(32)
The Cuban Missile Crisis
275(1)
The Roots of the Crisis
276(7)
From Crisis Bargaining to Not Losing Control
283(12)
Nuclear Superiority Versus Nuclear Danger in the Settlement of the Crisis
295(10)
12 The Detente of 1963: Lessons of the Cuban Missile Crisis
305(8)
Conclusions 313(10)
Notes 323(16)
Bibliography 439(16)
Abbreviations of Archival Sources 439(1)
Published Sources 440(2)
Books and Articles 442(13)
Index 455(8)
About the Author 463
Andreas Wenger is deputy director of the Center for Security Studies and Conflict Research at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich.