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El. knyga: Logic of Precedent: Constraint, Freedom, and Common Law Reasoning

(University of Maryland, College Park)
  • Formatas: EPUB+DRM
  • Išleidimo metai: 30-Nov-2024
  • Leidėjas: Cambridge University Press
  • Kalba: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9781009356497
  • Formatas: EPUB+DRM
  • Išleidimo metai: 30-Nov-2024
  • Leidėjas: Cambridge University Press
  • Kalba: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9781009356497

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Unlike statutory law, which relies on the explicit formulation of rules, common law is thought to emerge from a complex doctrine of precedential constraint, according to which decisions in earlier cases constrain later courts while still allowing these courts the freedom to address new situations in creative ways. Although this doctrine is applied by legal practitioners on a daily basis, it has proved to be considerably more difficult to develop an adequate theoretical account of the doctrine itself. Drawing on recent work in legal theory, as well as AI and law, this book develops a new account of precedential constraint and the balance achieved in the common law between constraint and freedom. This account, which involves construction of a group priority ordering among reasons, is then applied to other topics including the semantics of open-textured predicates and the practice of making exceptions to general rules.

Drawing on recent work in legal theory, AI and law, this book develops a new account of precedential constraint as well as the balance achieved in the common law between constraint and freedom and applies a theory grounded in defeasible logic to legal reasoning and legal decision-making.

Recenzijos

'This book is both clever and insightful, with several powerful and illuminating results and advances both conceptual and technical.  It's deeply informed by a leading understanding of existing work in legal theory as well as in logic and artificial intelligence a really impressive intellectual and scholarly accomplishment as well as an achievement in logic and philosophy. It should be required reading for anyone with an interest in legal reasoning or jurisprudence.' Mark Schroeder, University of Southern California

Daugiau informacijos

Develops and presents a new account of precedential constraint based on recent work in legal theory and AI and law.
Introduction;
1. The reason model;
2. Exploring the reason model;
3.
Some alternative models;
4. Supporting the reason model;
5. Natural
reasoning;
6. Constraining natural reasoning;
7. Dimensions and magnitudes;
Appendix; Index.
John Horty is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Maryland. He is the author of three previous books as well as papers on a variety of topics in logic, philosophy, artificial intelligence, and law. His most recent book is Reasons as Defaults (2012).